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WHITHER RECHARACTERIZATION 
Lawrence Ponoroff< 
''Things are not always as they seem; the first appearance deceives 
many.''l 
Abstract 
The ability of bankruptcy courts to recharacterize a putative debt 
claim as an equity interest in order to ensure that form does not prevail 
over substance is beyond cavil. There is considerable uncertainty, 
however, over whether this power derives from the inherent equitable 
authority of the bankruptcy courts to subordinate a purported claim to 
ensure attainment of system-wide objectives or from the courts' statutory 
authority to allow and disallow claims. The answer to that question has 
significant ramifications far beyond the question of debt 
recharacterization, implicating both the division of authority between 
state and federal law in bankruptcy cases and the policies and purposes 
of the bankruptcy regime. This Article takes the position that 
"subordination," not "disallowance," is the most accurate metaphorical 
concept for understanding recharacterization and that by locating the 
source of the courts' authority under the statutory power to equitably 
subordinate claims, the issue will properly be resolved under a federal 
framework and with specific attention to the unique aims of the 
bankruptcy system. 
* Dean and Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Equality of distribution is a core policy of American bankruptcy 
law.2 In a sense, creditors trade their potential but uncertain prospect 
2. See, e.g., Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990) (noting equality of distribution 
among creditors as a central concern of the Federal Bankruptcy Code); Nathanson v. 
NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 29 (1952) ("The theme of the Bankruptcy Act is 'equality of 
distribution'; and if one claimant is to be preferred over others, the purpose should be 
clear from the statute." (citation omitted) (quoting Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color 
Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219 (1941))); see also COMM'N OF THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., 
REPORT OF THE COMM'N OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 
93-137, pt. 1, at 75 (1973) (discussing internal and external goals of the bankruptcy 
system, including, among the most critical, equality of distribution among creditors). Of 
course, the statement "equality of distribution" is not an entirely accurate (or perhaps it is 
an oversimplified) description of the distributional norms that pertain to a bankruptcy 
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of being paid in full under state law, for the right to take-pari passu 
with similarly situated claimants-a lesser but assured amount in 
bankruptcy.3 This places an enormous premium on making certain that 
claims against the debtor are not only what they purport to be in fact 
but also that the claimholders are "entitled" to the status and priority to 
which, on their face, they lay entitlement. In turn, this means that the 
federal bankruptcy courts must not only determine that claims are 
"good" in the sense that they are not subject to any valid defenses that 
might result in their reduction in whole or in part and good in the sense 
of not "naughty,"4 but also good in the sense that they are what they 
proclaim to be in the first instance. 
As for the last of the above three tasks, seven circuit courts of 
appeals have now addressed the question of whether the bankruptcy 
courts possess the authority to recharacterize a transaction branded as 
a loan to the entity-debtor from a debt to an equity contribution, 
thereby effectively subordinating that interest to the claims of the 
debtor's general unsecured creditors. 5 All seven courts have responded 
affirmatively,6 but that is where the unanimity of opinion comes to an 
abrupt halt. The circuit courts have yet to agree on whether the 
appropriate conceptual equivalent for recharacterization is 
subordination or disallowance, 7 and the absence of concurrence over 
that ideation has significant consequences not just with respect to how 
the doctrine is understood, but also in terms of when the remedy is 
properly invoked. 
case as bankruptcy policy must be reconciled with other social policies with which it from 
time-to-time competes. See generally Alec P. Ostrow, The Animal Farm of Administrative 
Insolvency, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 339 (2003). 
3. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LoGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 11-13 (1986) 
(offering the analogy of a lake filled with fish and one hundred fishermen to illustrate how 
bankruptcy is designed to make competing creditors act as one for their mutual 
advantage). Equality is no less important in rehabilitation proceedings than in 
liquidations. See Lawrence Ponoroff, Bankruptcy Preferences: Recalcitrant Passengers 
Aboard the Flight from Creditor Equality, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J. (forthcoming 2016) 
(manuscript at 66) (on file with author) ("[T]he fact that equality policy operates in 
conjunction with other policy considerations in Chapter 11 that do not attend a Chapter 7 
case does not make equality policy, properly understood, less compelling in the 
reorganization context."). 
4. "Naughty" for these purposes meaning not the product of the sort of inequitable 
conduct that might, under the prevailing approach to the doctrine, trigger equitable 
subordination. See infra text accompanying notes 178-80. 
5. See infra Part III. 
6. These cases are cited and discussed in Part I of this Article. Moreover, one 
additional court of appeals has signaled its receptivity to recharacterization theory but 
did not actually so hold in the case. See infra note 110. 
7. See infra Part III. 
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To begin with, there is a split of opinion among the circuit decisions 
as to the source of the bankruptcy courts' authority to recharacterize 
debt and, deriving from that division, a further disagreement over the 
standards governing when it is fitting for a court to exercise that power. 
Insofar as the latter question is concerned, the principal source of 
contention relates to the allocation of authority between state and 
federal law, implicating a much larger question regarding the extent to 
which private state law rights should be preserved in bankruptcy, a 
question that has resisted efforts to supply a definitive answer around 
which any consensus might develop.8 If this were not travail enough, 
the authority of the bankruptcy courts to engage in the 
recharacterization of debt under their general equity jurisdiction9 
8. The disagreement over the extent to which private state law rights should be 
respected in bankruptcy mirrors the disagreement in the academic commentary over the 
ideological basis for bankruptcy law. For convenience sake, Professor Baird lumped legal 
scholars into two camps. Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE 
L.J. 573, 576-77 (1998). Those who view bankruptcy as more of a minimalist procedural 
structure shun the notion that substantive policies and rules should inhere in the 
bankruptcy system separate and apart from state law, except to the very limited extent 
necessary to accommodate a collective proceeding. See, e.g., Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A 
Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy as (Is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 931, 931 (2004) (proposing a purely procedure-oriented theory of bankruptcy 
under which it would be "wrong . . . to redistribute a debtor's wealth away from its 
[cognizable] rightsholders to benefit third-party interests'); Thomas E. Plank, The Erie 
Doctrine and Bankruptcy, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 633, 691-92 (2004) (suggesting the 
desirability, to the extent feasible, of following Erie in bankruptcy cases so as to advance 
the development of a coherent body of national commercial law). In the other camp is the 
group that Baird refers to as the traditionalists, who understand bankruptcy as harboring 
unique distributional policies designed to serve substantive bankruptcy goals distinct 
from state law. See, e.g., Vem Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases 
(Part 1), 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 407, 408-09 (1972) ("Also in the category of judicial errors, in 
my judgment, are those decisions which treat Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins as requiring 
the application of state law in bankruptcy cases." (footnote omitted)); Donald R. Korobkin, 
Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 766 (1991) 
(describing bankruptcy as "provid[ing] a forum in which competing and various interests 
and values accompanying financial distress may be expressed and sometimes 
recognized"). As I have stated in another context, "[t]he need to honor creditors' state law 
rights, interests, and entitlements-and the need from time-to-time to modify those 
rights ... in pursuit of the goals of equality, fresh start, and debtor survival-generate an 
essential and inescapable tension in bankruptcy law." Ponoroff, supra note 3 (manuscript 
at 56); see also infra notes 242-43, 253 and accompanying text (discussing further the 
disagreement in the academic literature as it relates to this issue). 
9. 11 U.S. C. § 105(a) (2012). The equitable powers of the bankruptcy courts may also 
stem from 28 U.S. C. § 1481, which provided: "A bankruptcy court shall have the powers of 
a court of equity, law, and admiralty, but may not enjoin another court or punish a 
criminal contempt not committed in the presence of the judge of the court or warranting a 
punishment of imprisonment." 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (1982) (repealed 1984). However, that 
provision no longer appears in the current compilation (or the previous two) of the United 
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(which remains the majority position in the circuits)lO may now be in 
doubt as a consequence of the Supreme Court's decision in Law v. 
Siegel.11 
Historically, it has been quite frequently said that bankruptcy 
courts are "courts of equity,"12 though some have questioned the 
States Code, and there is serious doubt as to whether that proVIsion survived the 
enactment of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 98 P.L. 
353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984). Indeed, the strong majority view is that it did not. See, e.g., In re 
Avery, Nos. 01-28602 EEB, 06-16033 EEB, 11-30256 EEB, 2012 WL 1021348, at *7 & n.9 
(Bankr. D. Colo. Mar. 20, 2012) (stating that 28 U.S. C. § 1481 "was repealed in 1984, and 
no comparable provision has been enacted" but also observing that the legislative history 
does not indicate why it was repealed). If it has been repealed, one explanation is that it 
was probably just an oversight, as Congress's focus at the time was on resolving the 
constitutional crisis that had been created by Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. 
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). See Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal 
Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 1, 29 (2006) (''The most likely answer is that Congress simply did not notice the equity 
jurisdiction issue when it passed BAFJA."). 
10. See infra Part I.B--C. 
11. 134 S. Ct. 1188 (2014). See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text for further 
discussion of the case. 
12. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939) ("[F]or many purposes 'courts 
of bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity, and their proceedings inherently 
proceedings in equity."' (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934))). A 
very early statement that the bankruptcy proceedings are essentially equitable in nature 
was made on the heels of the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 ("1898 Act"), Ch. 
541, 30 Stat. 544, 548 (repealed 1978), in Bardes v. First National Bank of Hawarden. 178 
U.S. 524 (1900) (referring to section 2 of the 1898 Act in stating that proceedings in 
bankruptcy are "in the nature of proceedings in equity''); see also Bank of Marin v. 
England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966) (observing "that equitable principles govern the exercise 
of bankruptcy jurisdiction" (citing Pepper, 308 U.S. at 304-05; SEC v. U.S. Realty & 
Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 455 (1940))); Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 732 (1946) 
(first citing Hunt, 292 U.S. at 240; and then citing Pepper, 308 U.S. at 306) (outlining the 
legal and equitable powers of the bankruptcy courts under the 1898 Act); Young v. Higbee 
Co., 324 U.S. 204, 214 (1945) (citing U.S. Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. at 455). 
Judge Ahart has traced the origins of the maxim that the "bankruptcy court is a court of 
equity" to the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 ("1841 Act''), ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843). Alan 
M. Ahart, The Limited Scope of Implied Powers of a Bankruptcy Judge: A Statutory Court 
of Bankruptcy, Not a Court of Equity, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 13-16 (2005); see also Levitin, 
supra note 9, at 6 n.29, 7 n.34 (citing authorities holding that the bankruptcy courts are 
courts of equity under both the 1841 Act and the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 
517, 517 (repealed 1878)). For two examples of the scores of cases under the current law of 
bankruptcy expressing the same opinion, see Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49-50 
(2002) ("Congress must be presumed to draft limitations periods in light of this 
background principle [of equitable tolling, especially] when it is enacting limitations 
periods to be applied by bankruptcy courts, which are courts of equity and 'appl[y] the 
principles and rules of equity jurisprudence.'" (alteration in original) (first citing Nat1 
Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582, 589-90 (1995); United 
States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 13 (1994); and then quoting Pepper, 308 U.S. at 304)) and 
Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42, 44 (1990) ("[T]he creditor's claim and the ensuing 
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veracity of that statement under the current bankruptcy law, 13 as well 
as in connection with earlier national legislation. 14 In any case, the 
bankruptcy courts' general equitable authority under § 105(a)15 has 
taken something of a drubbing in recent years as appellate courts have, 
for the most part, sought to constrain the scope of the bankruptcy 
courts' ability to fashion non-Bankruptcy Code rules or practices in 
order to more effectively carry out their statutory duties. 16 Recently 
preference action by the trustee become integral to the restructuring of the debtor-
creditor relationship through the bankruptcy court's equity jurisdiction." (citing 
Granfmanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 57-58 (1989))). 
Of course, those equitable powers can only be exercised within the parameters of 
bankruptcy law. That was the case under the 1898 Act, see, e.g., Luther v. United States, 
225 F.2d 495, 499 (1954), and it is likewise the case under current bankruptcy law. See, 
e.g., Raleigh v. ill. Dep't of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 24-25 (2000); Norwest Bank 
Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988). 
13. The current law of bankruptcy is found at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532. It was enacted 
on November 6, 1978 as the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 ("1978 Act") and governs all 
cases filed on or after October 1, 1979. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as 
amended at 11 U.S.C.). In this Article, except where otherwise indicated, all references 
herein to the "Code" or the ''Bankruptcy Code" are to 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 as amended 
through January 1, 2015. 
14. See, e.g., Ahart, supra note 12, at 32 ("[A] bankruptcy court should not be referred 
to as a court of equity. Supreme Court and other decisions rendered under the 
Bankruptcy Code stating that the bankruptcy court possesses all equitable authority or 
powers are incorrect-at least where a bankruptcy judge is the presiding judicial 
officer."); Marcia S. Krieger, "The Bankruptcy Court Is a Court of Equity':· What Does That 
Mean?, 50 S.C. L. REV. 275, 310 (1999) (arguing that while the shibboleth that bankruptcy 
courts are courts of equity is among the most frequently uttered in the court room, "[f]rom 
historical, procedural, jurisprudential, and practical perspectives the bankruptcy court is 
not a court of equity. It is, instead, a specialized court of limited jurisdiction applying 
statutory law"). Both Judge Ahart and Judge Krieger argue that the assignment of 
general equitable authority to the bankruptcy courts is purely a judicial creation without 
statutory support. See Ahart, supra note 12, at 32; Krieger, supra, at 310; see also Alan M. 
Ahart, A Stem Reminder that the Bankruptcy Court Is Not a Court of Equity, 86 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 191, 191 (2012) (asserting that the Supreme Court's decision in Stern v. 
Marshall, 164 U.S. 462 (2011) corroborated his 2005 conclusion that the bankruptcy 
courts are not courts of equity); Steve H. Nickles & David G. Epstein, Another Way of 
Thinking About Section 105(a) and Other Sources of Supplemental Law Under the 
Bankruptcy Code, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 7, 15-17 (2000) (questioning the assertion that 
bankruptcy courts are courts of equity). 
15. Section 105(a) of the Code states, in pertinent part: 'The court may issue any 
order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of 
[the Code]." 11 U.S.C. § 105. It derives from section 2(a)(15) of the 1898 Act, and, 
according to the legislative history, is intended to operate similarly to the Federal All 
Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012). H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 316--17 (1977), as reprinted 
in 1978 U.S.C.C.AN. 5963, 5973. 
16. See, e.g., Anwar v. Johnson, 720 F.3d 1183, 1187 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Childress 
v. Middleton Arms, L.P. (In re Middleton Arms, Ltd. P'ship), 934 F.2d 723, 725 (6th Cir. 
1991)) (finding that bankruptcy courts lack the authority under § 105(a) to grant a 
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retired Bankruptcy Judge Randy Haines may have put it most plainly 
and directly when he stated: 
[T]he driving philosophy underlying the Stern result may be 
neither individual rights nor even separation of powers, but 
rather an agenda to narrow federal equity jurisdiction and 
powers, at least in commercial disputes, and in that case to do 
so by restricting the power of the primary federal court of equity 
retroactive extension of the time to file a nondischargeability complaint in light of the 
clear language of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure sections 4007(c) and 
9006(b)(3)); Wells Fargo Bank of Tex. N.A. v. Sommers (In re Amco Ins.), 444 F.3d 690, 
692 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that a bankruptcy court's use of§ 105(a) to order substantive 
consolidation with a nondebtor represented an abuse of discretion); Smart World Techs., 
LLC v. Juno Online Servs., Inc. (In re Smart World Techs., LLC), 423 F.3d 166, 184 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (concluding that the bankruptcy court did not have authority under § 105(a) to 
approve a creditor's motion to settle a cause of action brought by the Chapter 11 debtor in 
possession over the debtor's objection); In re Combustion Eng'g, 391 F.3d 190, 236 (3d Cir. 
2004) (vacating a confirmation order providing for a channeling injunction under § 105(a) 
and noting, consistently with Law, that "the general grant of equitable power contained in 
§ 105(a) cannot trump specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code" (citing Ahlers, 485 U.S. 
at 206)); In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that § 105(a) 
provides no authority for the issuance of critical vendor orders); see also Rosenberg v. DVI 
Receivables (In re Rosenberg), 471 B.R. 307, 315 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2012) (holding that 
§ 105(a) could not be invoked by an involuntary debtor to recover fees and costs from 
principals of the petitioning creditors). See generally Nicholas B. Malito, Recent 
Developments: Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, in 2014 NORTON ANNuAL SURVEY 
OF BANKRUPTCY LAw 13 (2014) (noting that each year the appellate courts decide at least 
one case aimed at reinforcing the limitations of the equitable authority of the bankruptcy 
courts under § 105(a)). While the appellate courts have been more attentive in recent 
years to limiting the scope of the bankruptcy courts' authority under § 105(a), the 
intellectual justification for the effort undoubtedly finds its moorings in Judge Posner's 
opinion in In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, & Pacific Railroad Co., decided under the 
1898 Act, in which Judge Posner wrote: "The fact that a proceeding is equitable does not 
give the judge a free-floating discretion to redistribute rights in accordance with his 
personal views of justice and fairness, however enlightened those views may be." 791 F.2d 
524, 528 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Shondel v. McDermott, 775 F.2d 859, 867-68 (7th Cir. 
1985); Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc., 741 F.2d 925, 939 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
Commentators have also gotten on the bandwagon. See, e.g., Daniel B. Bogart, Resisting 
the Expansion of Bankruptcy Court Power Under Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code: The 
All Writs Act and an Admonition from Chief Justice Marshall, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 793, 825 
(2003) (making the case that non-Code powers exercised by the bankruptcy courts in 
order to resolve cases as expeditiously as possible cannot be justified under the authority 
of § 105(a)); Levitin, supra note 9, at 31-35 (arguing that the statutory language of 
§ 105(a) does not authorize equity powers for the bankruptcy court and that the current 
statutory authorization of general bankruptcy equity powers is highly questionable). The 
decision in Law reflects a sharp reversal in course from the direction that some thought 
the Supreme Court was signaling in Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, 549 
U.S. 365 (2007), concerning the scope of the bankruptcy courts' discretion under§ 105(a). 
See infra text accompanying notes 273-76. 
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in the fmancial realm, the bankruptcy court.17 
While the federal circuit courts remain far from in accord on just 
how broadly (or not) to construe § 105(a), it has become widely accepted 
that its exercise must be tied to another Bankruptcy Code ("Code') 
provision and not merely to a general bankruptcy concept or objective. 18 
It has also become clear that § 105(a) cannot be pressed into service by 
the courts in order to create a new substantive right; it can only operate 
in aid of an existing right.19 Then, the Supreme Court in Law placed the 
cherry on top of the sundae, holding that a bankruptcy court's 
surcharge of a debtor's exempt property (so-called equitable 
disallowance),2° even in the face of extreme bad faith, 21 cannot be 
17. Randolph J. Haines, The Conservative Assault on Federal Equity, 88 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 451, 455 (2014) (speaking of the Supreme Court's decision in Stern v. Marshall, 564 
U.S. 462 (2011)). Judge Haines also quibbles with some of the more recent arguments, see 
supra note 14 (questioning whether bankruptcy courts are courts of equity), referring to 
these arguments as "formulistic" and observing that the jurisdictional amendments in 
1978 and 1984 were intended to broaden, not narrow, bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction. 
Haines, supra, at 455 n.23. 
18. See, e.g., Kmart, 359 F.3d at 871 (citing Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 206; In re Fesco 
Plastics Corp., 996 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir. 1993)) (stating that the power of the 
bankruptcy court under § 105(a) is to implement the Code, not override its provisions); 
New Eng. Dairies, Inc. v. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc. (In re Dairy Mart 
Convenience Stores, Inc.), 351 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 2003). 
19. United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986); accord Smart World 
Techs., 423 F.3d at 184 (citing New Eng. Diaries, 351 F.3d at 91-92) (describing 
bankruptcy courts' § 105(a) powers as generally limited to filling gaps in the statutory 
language). The "statute does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive 
rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law, or constitute a roving 
commission to do equity." Sutton, 786 F.2d at 1308 (citing S. Ry. Co. v. Johnson Bronze 
Co., 758 F.2d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
20. So-called equitable disallowance is a controversial doctrine and is discussed 
further in Part I.D.2 of this Article in the context of the claims allowance process under 
§ 502. Some concern has been expressed over the implications of Law in areas where, 
historically, § 105(a) has been used as authority for action not specifically contemplated 
by the Code in business as well as consumer cases. These situations include, most 
commonly: (1) extension of the automatic stay to nondebtor parties, see, e.g., Solidus 
Networks, Inc. v. Excel Innovations, Inc. (In re Excel Innovations, Inc.), 502 F.3d 1086, 
1094 (9th Cir. 2007); (2) release of nonconsensual nondebtor third party releases in 
Chapter 11, see, e.g., Behrmann v. Nat'l Heritage Found., Inc., 663 F.3d 704, 710 (4th Cir. 
2011); and (3) exercise of the civil contempt power. See, e.g., Solow v. Kalikow (In re 
Kalikow), 602 F.3d 82, 96-97 (2d Cir. 2010). These questions remain unresolved, although 
it should be noted that the Eleventh Circuit recently joined the majority view that courts 
may release nondebtor affiliates under a Chapter 11 plan, despite the language of 
§ 524(e), in an opinion that did not even mention Law. SE Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Seaside 
Eng'g & Surveying, Inc. (In re Seaside Eng'g & Surveying, Inc.), 780 F.3d 1070, 1081 
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 109 (2015). There is also some uncertainty over the 
implications of Law on the controversial doctrine of equitable disallowance of claims (as 
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justified under § 105(a) because the effect of doing so would be to 
override a specific provision of the Code. 22 
Although the ultimate scope of the bankruptcy courts' § 105(a) 
powers in a post-Law environment is still a work in progress, at least 
one circuit has reaffirmed that its earlier holding-to the effect that the 
bankruptcy courts' authority to recharacterize a putative debt as equity 
arises under § 105(a)-remains good law in the circuit. 23 This decision 
represents a hopeful preliminary sign. Nonetheless, given the 
increasingly rickety state of § 105(a) in general,24 particularly when 
considered in light of other recent efforts to limit the discretion of 
bankruptcy judges,25 it might be prudent for the courts to consider an 
alternative statutory basis under which a cause of action for debt 
opposed to exemptions). See infra Part I.D.2. 
21. The debtor in Law engaged in fraudulent conduct, lied to the court, and created 
sham transactions that cost the trustee over $500,000 in legal fees to unwind. Law v. 
Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1193 (2014). 
22. Id. at 1194-95. Specifically, the Court ruled in a unanimous decision that neither 
§ 105(a) nor any inherent authority of the bankruptcy court could contravene a specific 
Code provision-in this case, § 522(k), which expressly prohibited the application of a 
debtor's exempt property to the payment of any administrative expenses. Id. Although 
allowing that the bankruptcy court has statutory authority to issue any order that is 
"necessary or appropriate" to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, in the 
words of Justice Scalia, "[i]t is hornbook law that § 105(a) 'does not allow [a] bankruptcy 
court to override explicit mandates of other sections of the Bankruptcy Code."' Id. at 1194 
(quoting 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY~ 105.01[02], at 105-06 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. 
Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2013)). On its facts, Law was not a difficult case, and the result 
hardly a surprise. However, the precedential reach of the Court's holding in other areas 
where, historically, § 105(a) has been invoked, is unclear. See supra note 20; infra note 
270 and accompanying text; see also Neil C. Gordon & Jonathan H. Azoff, Law v. Siegel 
Dicta Leads Lower Courts Astray, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2015, at 34, 34 (arguing that 
the lower courts that hold bad faith and fraud are no longer grounds for disallowing an 
exemption give the specific holding in Law an overly broad construction). 
23. Redmond v. Jenkins (In re Alt. Fuels, Inc.), 789 F.3d 1139, 1148-49 (lOth Cir. 
2015). 
24. See, e.g., Seaver v. Ashenfelter (In re MSP Aviation, LLC), 531 B.R. 795, 804-05 
(Bankr. D. Minn. 2015) (discussing whether equitable recharacterization-upon a proper 
showing-remains a remedy available to the bankruptcy courts after Law). 
25. The most far-reaching of these efforts to limit judicial discretion can be found, of 
course, in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
(''BAPCPA''). Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
11 U.S.C.). Moreover, while the personal bankruptcy provisions of the Act received the 
bulk of the attention in this respect, the limitations extended to business cases as well. 
See infra note 270. For instance, the BAPCPA eliminated the authority of a bankruptcy 
judge to extend either the plan exclusivity period under § 1121 or the timeframe to 
assume or reject a lease under § 365(d)(4). BAPCPA §§ 404, 437. The Act also limited a 
bankruptcy judge's discretion to approve key employee retention plans under § 503(c). Id. 
§ 331. Also, as Judge Haines has observed, the Supreme Court, too, has gotten into the 
Act. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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recharacterization may be authorized that not only assures its 
continuation in the proper circumstances, but does so in a manner that 
does not entail ceding the determination of when those circumstances 
exist to the vagaries of state law, as the current minority view on 
recharacterization endorses. 26 It is my intention in this Article to offer 
such an alternative. 
The determination of the nature of capital contributed by an owner 
or other insider of an entity debtor has always been a tricky 
undertaking. 27 The temptation to clothe equity contributions in the 
form of loans is prompted by multiple considerations. First, equity 
stands behind debt upon liquidation of the frrm. 28 Thus, it is inherently 
riskier than debt in the sense that, in the event of insolvency, an owner 
stands to lose her entire investment in the company rather than just a 
pro rata share. Second, payments on a loan obligation are typically 
deductible to the firm, but dividend distributions to equity owners are 
not.29 This means, assuming the company is profitable, a higher ratio of 
debt to equity will produce lower taxes, or, if the company is not 
profitable, potentially valuable loss carryforwards. For these reasons, 
the failure to capitalize a business with adequate equity funding to 
support operations and the foreseeable risks of doing business has 
always been a pivotal factor under state law piercing analysis. 30 
26. See infra Part I.D. 
27. The concern over the mischaracterization of an equity contribution in the case of a 
traditional arms-length lender is ordinarily less. However, when funds denominated as a 
loan are extended to a financially distressed debtor, or an earlier loan is refinanced after 
the borrower has encountered financially turbulent waters, questions about the true 
character of the investment can become no less thorny than in the case of insider 
investments, since it is common for the ''lender" in these situations to require more than a 
fixed interest payment in return for the added risk being undertaken. See generally Smith 
v. Assocs. Commercial Corp. (In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co.), 893 F.2d 693, 702-03 (5th 
Cir. 1990) (reasoning that covenants in a loan agreement permitting greater control over 
the borrower's fmancial affairs once its financial condition is in peril are common and 
their exercise does not rise to the level of inequitable conduct). 
28. Section 726(a) of the Code provides that all unsecured claims must be paid in full 
before the holders of equity interest receive anything from the estate. The principle is not 
limited to bankruptcy law; it is a fundamental axiom of business and commercial law 
followed as a matter of general practice under state law. For example, the Model Business 
Corporation Act requires that, upon dissolution, the directors discharge all of the 
corporation's liabilities before making any distributions to shareholders. § 14.09(a) (2010). 
29. For this reason, many of the cases examining the character of a capital 
contribution as debt or equity are tax court cases, and these cases have proved influential 
in many of the recharacterization decisions that have arisen in the bankruptcy context. 
See, e.g., Lane v. United States (In re Lane), 742 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1984); see also infra 
notes 83-84, 94 and accompanying text. 
30. There are a myriad of decisions that cite undercapitalization as one of several 
factors bearing on the piercing analysis. See, e.g., E. Minerals & Chems. Co. v. Mahan, 
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Inadequate capitalization, often a consequence of too much insider 
debt in the initial capitalization of the company, has also played a 
central role in the development and analysis of equitable subordination 
under Code § 510(c).31 Though closely related, in recent years, the 
doctrine of equitable subordination has not played a prominent role in 
the analysis of the recharacterization question.32 In this Article, I 
suggest that perhaps the rigid separation of equitable subordination 
and recharacterization that has developed over the past twenty years 
should be reconsidered, if not necessarily as a matter of doctrinal 
purity, then to ensure that the issue of whether a particular 
contribution to a debtor-firm is treated as debt or equity in bankruptcy 
continues to be decided under a federal standard and with a sensitivity 
to the policies implicated by a bankruptcy proceeding. 
In advancing this proposal, Part I of the Article begins by reviewing 
the current state of the law regarding debt recharacterization and the 
circuit split that has developed in the past few years over the source of 
the courts' authority under the Code to recharacterize debt as equity. 
Part II briefly examines the history of the related doctrine of equitable 
225 F.3d 330, 333 nn.6--7 (3d Cir. 2000); Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 993 F.2d 
1309, 1312 (7th Cir. 1993). It is, however, generally understood that undercapitalization 
alone (whether at the onset or due to a draining of assets in dividends and salary) is 
insufficient to warrant piecing the corporate veil. See, e.g., Arnold v. Browne, 103 Cal. 
Rptr. 775, 782 (Ct. App. 1972). Undercapitalization of a company may also be relevant 
under non-piercing state law. See, e.g., Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United Cal. Bank, 123 Cal. 
Rptr. 848, 853 (Ct. App. 1975) (finding undercapitalization relevant in determining the 
bank's "customer" under the Uniform Commercial Code); Boyle v. Gen. Motors Corp., 661 
N.W.2d 557, 558 (Mich. 2003) (finding inadequate capitalization bearing on fraud claim). 
Likewise, undercapitalization will occasionally arise, as in bankruptcy cases, in the 
context of characterizing a capital advance to a company as debt or equity. See James M. 
Wilton & Stephen Moeller-Sally, Debt Recharacterization Under State Law, 62 Bus. LAw. 
1257, 1269-70 (2007). See generally William P. Hackney & Tracey G. Benson, 
Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 U. Prrr. L. REV. 837 (1982). Of course, 
because state collection remedies are based generally on the principle of first-come, first-
served, this will only be relevant in connection with proceedings involving matters such as 
a receivership, dissolution of the company, and an assignment for the benefit of creditors. 
31. See, e.g., Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F.2d 497, 502-03 (5th Cir. 1941); see also infra 
notes 165, 295 and accompanying text (discussing the pre-Code case law giving rise to 
§ 510(c)). 
32. The suggestion that a recharacterization claim is essentially the same as an 
equitable subordination claim is, today, regarded as "misguided." See Official Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors of Russell Cave Co. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. (In re Russell Cave 
Co.), 107 F. App'x 449, 452 (6th Cir. 2004). Historically, however, that has not been true, 
as the doctrine of equitable subordination evolved from cases involving the 
recharacterization of debt to equity and the recharacterization remedy itself was 
"considered solely in conjunction with the doctrine of equitable subordination." See Aquino 
v. Black (In re AtlanticRancher, Inc.), 279 B.R. 411, 433 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002). 
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subordination and assesses how it has fared in the decisional law since 
its codification in 1978. Next, Part III returns to debt recharacterization 
in order to identify what I consider to be the weaknesses in the 
emerging minority approach and the threat to the majority view posed 
by recent decisions circumscribing the reach of the bankruptcy courts' 
equitable jurisdiction under § 105(a). Finally, Part IV proposes an 
expansion of the doctrine of equitable subordination beyond its 
currently understood contours to cover debt recharacterization in 
appropriate cases, thereby supplying an alternative source of authority 
that preserves a federal framework within which to analyze the issue. 
I. THE RECHARACTERIZATION JURISPRUDENCE 
A. The Early Authority 
The treatment of debt recharacterization in the United States 
federal courts of appeals as an independent cause of action in 
bankruptcy cases is largely a twenty-first century phenomenon.33 
Nevertheless, the first decisions to hint at the possibility date back at 
least to the 1980s.34 In In re N & D Properties, for example, the 
plaintiff, Ms. Estes, who had recently inherited several hundred 
thousand dollars, was approached by her accountant to invest in a 
furniture company that he was forming. 35 Accordingly, Ms. Estes lent 
$40,000 to what would eventually become the debtor corporation. 36 
Several months later, Ms. Estes pledged $100,000 worth of bonds to 
assist the company in obtaining a bank loan and, in return, received 
shares representing a 47.4% ownership interest in the firm. 37 
Subsequently, Ms. Estes pledged shares of stock that she owned in 
another corporation to secure what eventually amounted to over 
$389,000 in bank loans to the company. as Management of the business 
was left to Ms. Estes's accountant, who apparently botched it badly.39 
33. See infra Part I.B--D; see also infra note 313 and accompanying text. 
34. The history of the decisional law scrutinizing the proper characterization of a 
corporate contribution has even deeper roots, but the examination typically proceeded 
under the aegis of doctrines other than recharacterization per se. See infra notes 176-78, 
313 and accompanying text. 
35. Estes v. N & D Props., Inc. (In re N & D Props., Inc.), 799 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 
1986). 
36. Id. 
37. Id. Subsequently, Ms. Estes hypothecated additional assets to fa.cilitate the 
company's ability to acquire further debt financing. Id. at 729. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
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Upon finally learning of her accountant's perfidy and ineptitude, Ms. 
Estes, on the advice of a consultant she had retained to advise her, paid 
off the bank loans and took an assignment of its security interest in the 
company's furniture.40 Thereafter, having assumed control of the 
company, Ms. Estes was advised that the firm should seek bankruptcy 
protection, and she advanced the funds necessary to cover the filing 
fees. 41 Ms. Estes filed a claim for $320,000 in the company's bankruptcy 
case.42 The bankruptcy court determined that only $192,858 of loans 
could be "verified" and concluded that $60,000 of this amount 
represented a contribution of equity capital. 43 As for the balance of 
$132,858, the court ordered this amount subordinated to the claims of 
other creditors under § 510(c) based on Ms. Estes's assumption of the 
bank's security interest at a time when the debtor was insolvent and on 
the brink of collapse. 44 On appeal, the district court determined that, 
because Ms. Estes had paid off the bank's claim, her assumption of its 
secured position was not improper under ordinary principles of 
suretyship law.45 Thus, given the absence of any finding of unfair 
dealings between the debtor and Ms. Estes, coupled with her all but 
recent lack of an active role in management, the district court ruled 
that the priority of her claim should be restored. 46 On further appeal to 
the Eleventh Circuit, the trustee urged that Ms. Estes and her 
accountant had conspired to obtain the benefits of ownership without 
incurring the correlative risks associated with a capital contribution. 47 
Thus, he urged that Ms. Estes's claim be subordinated based on her 
inequitable conduct and further, given the corporation's lack of 
adequate capitalization, that all of her loans be invalidated as disguised 
equity investments.4B Initially, the court agreed that Ms. Estes had 
40. Id. at 729-30. 
41. Id. at 730. This loan to cover filing fees and expenses was only $1200, but it was 
also secured with a second position security interest in the debtor's remaining assets. Id. 
42. Id. at 728. Defined in § 101(5), "claim" means a right to payment, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(5) (2012), and is distinguished from an "interest," which is not specifically defined in 
the Code, but refers to the rights of an equity security holder as can be seen from 
§§ 101(16) and 501(a). 
43. N & D Props., 799 F.2d at 728. 
44. Id. at 730. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 730--31. The district court focused on Ms. Estes's lack of business acumen 
and the fact that, at the time of the challenged transactions, she was a passive minority 
shareholder. Id. at 731. The district court also disagreed with the bankruptcy court's 
treatment of a portion of her claim as equity but for reasons not expounded upon in the 
opinion. Id. at 730. 
47. Id. at 731. 
48. Id. 
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engaged in inequitable conduct after taking control of the business by 
virtue of the fact that, with her knowledge, the company continued to 
take cash deposits from customers despite the fact that suppliers had 
cutoff new shipments and there was no hope those orders could be 
filled.49 However, because only consumer creditors, and not trade 
creditors, were harmed by this conduct, the court concluded that the 
portion of Ms. Estes's claim based on the bank's secured status should 
retain its priority status except with respect to the consumer creditors. 50 
As for recharacterization of Ms. Estes's claim as a capital 
investment, the court acknowledged the bankruptcy courts' power to do 
so under proper circumstances. 51 Specifically, relying on the Fifth 
Circuit's decision in In re Multiponics, 52 a case decided under the 1898 
Act, the court observed that recharacterization of debt as equity 
requires that the trustee prove either (1) initial undercapitalization or 
(2) that "the loans [in question] were made when no other disinterested 
lender would have extended credit."53 Given the absence of proof of 
either set of facts, the court stated that "invalidation of appellee's claim 
[on this basis] would be improper."54 N & D Properties was principally a 
case about equitable subordination, but with a passing reference to 
49. !d. at 732-33. The court found she was also aware that the debtor was not 
maintaining a trust account for such deposits and that the company was deceiving 
customers about delivery times and the reasons for delay. !d. at 732. 
50. !d. at 733. The court did, however, agree with the bankruptcy court that Ms. 
Estes's second claim for the $1200 she had loaned the debtor to cover the filing fee should 
be subordinated to both groups of creditors. !d. 
51. !d. 
52. Mach. Rental, Inc. v. Herpel (In re Multiponics, Inc.), 622 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980). 
Because Multiponics was decided prior to the creation of the Eleventh Circuit, it 
represented binding precedent for the court. 
53. N & D Props., 799 F.2d. at 733. AB to the latter circumstance, while not made 
explicit by the court in either N & D Properties or Multiponics, the requirement would be 
that a similar amount could not have been borrowed from an informed outside source on 
similar terms. It also bears noting, reflective of the approach of the courts at the time, 
Multiponics conflated the question of subordination based on § 510(c) and subordination 
based on undercapitalization as a species of the single issue of whether the defendant 
engaged in inequitable conduct. 622 F.2d at 713. Indeed, the heading of this section of the 
Multiponics court's decision is titled ''Undercapitalization and Other Inequitable 
Conduct," and the authorities cited in this section are all 1898 Act cases that were the 
precursors of§ 510(c). Id. at 716-20; see also infra note 295 and accompanying text. There 
is no mention of "recharacterization" at all, and certainly no indication that it might be 
asserted as an independent cause of action. In other words, Multiponics is really an 
equitable subordination case. Commentators have criticized the Eleventh Circuit's per se 
approach to recharacterization in N & D Properties as impeding a corporation's access to 
debt financing from insiders and have suggested that the approach has not gained much 
traction outside of the circuit. See, e.g., Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 30, at 1260-61. 
54. N & D Props., 799 F.2d at 733. 
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recharacterization as a separate claim. Similarly, in In re Herby's 
Foods, a case in which the Fifth Circuit affirmed the subordination of 
insider creditors' claims under § 510(c), the appellants urged that the 
bankruptcy court had erred by recharacterizing their advances as 
equity. 55 In the course of addressing the argument, the court 
acknowledged the existence of the bankruptcy courts' authority to 
recharacterize a loan as an equity contribution even when the 
circumstances would not support equitable subordination.56 However, 
the court glossed over the point, as well as the propriety of 
recharacterization in the case, on the alternative bases either that the 
bankruptcy court's judgment was in fact predicated on equitable 
subordination, or that, in any event, the practical effect of application of 
the two remedies was the same. 57 
B. AutoStyle and the Majority Approach 
The Sixth Circuit was the first circuit court of appeals to examine, 
in depth, debt recharacterization arising out of a bankruptcy case in In 
re AutoStyle Plastics. 58 It signaled the emergence of recharacterization 
55. Summit Coffee Co. v. Herby's Foods, Inc. (In re Herby's Foods, Inc.), 2 F.3d 128, 
133 (5th Cir. 1993). 
56. Id. at 132. 
57. Id. The fact that the practical effect would be identical is an important part of the 
explanation of why the circuit decisions on recharacterization are, if not flawed, at least 
susceptible to a more principled alternative analysis. See infra text accompanying notes 
234-38. 
58. Bayer Corp. v. MascoTech, Inc. (In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc.), 269 F.3d 726 (6th 
Cir. 2001). While AutoStyle was the first court of appeals case to address 
recharacterization in depth, there were certainly a number of lower court decisions that 
had grappled with the issue. See, e.g., Fett v. Moore (In re Fett Roofing & Sheet Metal 
Co.), 438 F. Supp. 726, 729 (E.D. Va. 1977) ("[A] bankruptcy court, sitting as a court of 
equity, will disregard the outward appearances of the transaction and determine its 
actual character and effect."); Herzog v. Leighton Holdings, Ltd. (In re Kids Creek 
Partners, L.P.), 212 B.R. 898, 931 (Bankr. N.D. ill. 1997) (citing Blasbalg v. Tarro (In re 
Hyperion Enters., Inc.), 158 B.R. 555, 560 (D.R.I. 1993); In re Union Meeting Partners, 
160 B.R. 757, 774 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993)) (recognizing recharacterization as a separate 
cause of action from equitable subordination); In re Cold Harbor Assocs., L.P., 204 B.R. 
904, 915 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997) (holding that a court "is not required to accept the label of 
'debt' or 'equity' placed by the debtor upon a particular transaction, but must inquire into 
the actual nature of a transaction to determine how best to characterize it"); Blasbalg, 158 
B.R. at 561 (providing that recharacterization of a disputed insider transaction requires 
consideration of numerous factors); Diasonics, Inc. v. Ingalls, 121 B.R. 626, 631 (Bankr. 
N.D. Fla. 1990) (citing the Eleventh Circuit's decision in N & D Properties in support of 
recharacterization). Of course, there were also some decisions that went the opposite way. 
See, e.g., Unsecured Creditors' Comms. of Pac. Express, Inc. v. Pioneer Commercial 
Funding Corp. (In re Pac. Express, Inc.), 69 B.R. 112, 115 (B.AP. 9th Cir. 1986) (holding 
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theory from the shadow of equitable subordination as a full-blown 
alternative to the stringent standards that had come to defme the 
interpretation and application of§ 510(c). 59 In AutoStyle, the plaintiff 
contended that the defendants' claims arising out of their participation 
interests in a senior secured loan should be subordinated to the 
plaintiffs priority in the proceeds from the sale of the common 
collateral. 60 The plaintiff offered four separate legal theories in support 
of the relief sought, including equitable subordination and debt 
recharacterization.61 The bankruptcy court granted (and the district 
court affirmed) summary judgment in favor of the defendants on both 
claims.62 
As to the equitable subordination theory, the court cautioned that, 
while particularly careful scrutiny is required in connection with 
insider claims63 (which were at issue in this case), "equitable 
subordination is an unusual remedy" that must be applied with "great 
caution" and only "in limited circumstances."64 The court stated that 
that no specific provision of the Code allows courts to recharacterize claims); Pinetree 
Partners, Ltd. v. OTR ex rel. State Teachers Ret. Sys. (In re Pinetree Partners, Ltd.), 87 
B.R. 481, 491 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988). 
59. As discussed below, infra text accompanying notes 174, 363, courts have generally 
conveyed an attitude of restraint toward imposing liability under § 510(c). See, e.g., 
Redmond v. Jenkins (In re Alt. Fuels, Inc.), 789 F.3d 1139, 1154 (lOth Cir. 2015) 
(referring to equitable subordination as "an extraordinary remedy to be employed by 
courts sparingly"); Bank of N.Y. v. Epic Resorts-Palm Springs Marquee Villas, LLC (In re 
Epic Capital Corp.), 307 B.R. 767, 773 (D. Del. 2004) (same); Bird v. SKR Credit, Ltd. (In 
re DigitalBridge Holdings, Inc.), No. 12-2373, 2015 WL 5766761, at *11 (Bankr. D. Utah 
Sept. 30, 2015) (same). 
60. AutoStyle, 269 F.3d at 735. 
61. Id. at 735, 744, 747. The other two theories were priority based on the defendants' 
alleged failure to perfect their security interests and invalidity of the participation 
agreements. Id. at 735-36, 740-41. 
62. Id. at 753; Bayer Corp. v. MascoTech, Inc. (In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc.), No. 
1:99-CV-800, SG 96-83767, 1999 WL 1566474, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 16, 1999). 
63. See, e.g., Schubert v. Lucent Techs., Inc. (In re Winstar Commc'ns, Inc.), 554 F.3d 
382, 412 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that "dealings between [the] debtor and an insider [are] to 
be rigorously scrutinized" (quoting Fabricators, Inc. v. Tech. Fabricators, Inc. (In re 
Fabricators, Inc.), 926 F.2d 1458, 1465 (5th Cir. 1991))); Wilson v. Huffman (In re 
Missionary Baptist Found., Inc.), 712 F.2d 206, 211-12 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that an 
"insider connection with the debtor[-company] compels close examination of [the] claim'~. 
The insider status, however, goes to establishing the standard to apply in reviewing the 
insider's conduct. That is to say, in order to equitably subordinate a creditor-insider's 
claim, the creditor-insider must have actually used its power to control to its own 
advantage and to the other creditors' detriment. See Comstock v. Grp. of Institutional 
lnv'rs, 335 U.S. 211, 228-29 (1948). For additional discussion of the distinction between 
insiders and noninsiders under the doctrine of equitable subordination, see infra notes 
172-174, 349. 
64. AutoStyle, 269 F. 3d at 745 (quoting Fabricators, 926 F.2d at 1464). 
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extension of an insider loan when the debtor is undercapitalized raises 
suspicion but that it is well settled that undercapitalization alone is 
insufficient to justify the subordination of insider claims. 65 Instead, the 
court admonished that§ 510(c) requires a showing by the moving party 
of inequitable conduct on the part of the party against whom 
subordination is sought. 66 Because the plaintiff in this case was unable 
to present evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact that the 
defendants had engaged in any inequitable conduct, the court affirmed 
the lower courts' entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants 
on the equitable subordination claim. 67 Turning next to the dismissal of 
the plaintiffs claim that the defendants' alleged debt should be 
recharacterized as equity, the court observed, initially, a split in the 
decisional law as to whether bankruptcy courts possess the authority to 
recharacterize claims at all. 68 Siding, however, with the view adopted 
by the district court in this case, the court affirmed that a bankruptcy 
court may consider whether to recharacterize a debt claim as an equity 
interest separate and apart from the issue of subordination under 
§ 510(c).69 Specifically, the court held that bankruptcy courts may use 
65. Id. at 746-47; see, e.g., In re Lifschultz Fast Freight, 132 F.3d 339, 345, 349 (7th 
Cir. 1997) (observing that, while the term "undercapitalization sounds bad," and is often 
used as a word "of opprobrium, . . . undercapitalization alone, without evidence of 
deception about the debtor's financial condition or other misconduct, cannot justify 
equitable subordination of an insider's debt claim"); Summit Coffee Co. v. Herby's Foods, 
Inc. (In re Herby's Foods, Inc.), 2 F.3d 128, 132 (5th Cir. 1993); Braas Sys., Inc. v. WMR 
Partners (In re Octagon Roofing), 157 B.R. 852, 858 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (noting that courts 
have been consistent in holding that undercapitalization alone is an insufficient reason to 
apply equitable subordination); see also infra note 91. 
66. AutoStyle, 269 F.3d at 747 (citing Blasbalg v. Tarro (In re Hyperion Enters., Inc.), 
158 B.R. 555, 563 (D.R.I. 1993)); see also infra notes 179-191 and accompanying text 
(concerning the essentiality of the requirement of inequitable conduct in most cases); cf 
infra Part N.A (examining the concept of no· fault subordination). 
67. AutoStyle, 269 F.3d at 747. 
68. Id. at 748 (citing Unsecured Creditors' Comms. of Pac. Express, Inc. v. Pioneer 
Commercial Funding Corp. (In re Pac. Express, Inc.), 69 B.R. 112, 115 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
1986); Pinetree Partners, Ltd. v. OTR ex rel. State Teachers Ret. Sys. (In re Pinetree 
Partners, Ltd.), 87 B.R. 481, 491 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988)). Based on circuit court 
decisions rendered after AutoStyle, it is fair to say that there is no longer such a 
disagreement. &e infra Part I.C. Compare to Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors 
of SGK Ventures, LLC v. NewKey Group, LLC (In re SGK Ventures, LLC), which expresses 
doubt that the Seventh Circuit would find that the bankruptcy courts possess the 
equitable power to reclassify a creditor's claim in a manner not stated in the Code. 521 
B.R. 842, 860-61 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014). Accord In re Fesco Plastics Corp., 996 F.2d 152, 
157 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that "a bankruptcy court is ... not authorized to do whatever 
is necessary to reach an equitable result; it may only do whatever is necessary to enforce 
the Code''). 
69. AutoStyle, 269 F.3d at 748. 
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their equitable powers to test the validity of purported debts and, when 
necessary, recharacterize a transaction facially structured as a loan as 
an equity investment. 70 
As for the source of this equitable authority, the court turned to 
§ 105 of the Code, rather than "principles of equitable subordination" 
under § 510(c). 71 In what would quickly become the orthodox 
explanation for a stand-alone cause of action for recharacterization, the 
court pointed out that "there are important differences between ... 
recharacterization and equitable subordination [remedies]."72 
Recharacterization, the court expounded, "turn[s] on whether a debt 
actually exists"; the purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain the true 
nature of the interest as debt or equity and treat it accordingly. 73 By 
contrast, in an equitable subordination analysis, the court is reviewing 
whether the holder of what is concededly a legitimate debt claim 
engaged in inequitable conduct. 74 If found to have occurred, then "the 
remedy is subordination of the [offending] creditor's claim to that of 
another creditor [but] only to the extent necessary to offset injury or 
damage suffered by the creditor in whose favor the equitable doctrine 
may be effective."75 Thus, according to the court, not only do 
recharacterization and equitable subordination serve different 
functions, but the extent to which a claim is subordinated under each 
process could be different. 76 Put another way, the distinction proffered 
70. Id. The reasoning of the court in AutoStyle has been influential with lower courts 
in those circuits where the circuit court of appeals has yet to address the issue. See, e.g., 
Aquino v. Black (In re AtlanticRancher, Inc.), 279 B.R. 411, 431-32 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
2002) (citing AutoStyle in support of the conclusion that a bankruptcy court has the power 
to recharacterize a claim from debt to equity); see also infra note 110. 
71. AutoStyle, 269 F.3d at 748. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 748-49 (quoting Matthew Nozemack, Note, Making Sense out of Bankruptcy 
Courts' Recharacterization of Claims: Why Not Use§ 510(c) Equitable Subordination?, 56 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 689, 716 (1999)). 
74. Id. at 749. This would seem to suggest that the characterization analysis precedes 
the determination of whether the creditor engaged in inequitable conduct. See FCC v. 
Airadigm Commc'ns, Inc. (In re Airadigm Commc'ns, Inc.), 616 F.3d 642, 658 (7th Cir. 
2010) (suggesting, in dicta, that the determination of "whether a claim should be 
recharacterized . . . comes logically prior to determining whether a claim should be 
subordinated"). However, not all courts approach the two questions in that order. See 
infra text accompanying notes 233-34. 
75. AutoStyle, 269 F.3d at 749 (citing In re W. T. Grant Co., 4 B.R. 53, 74 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1980)). But see In re Zenith Elecs. Corp., 241 B.R. 92, 107 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999) 
(holding that, in order for the court to be able to recharacterize a claim from debt to 
equity, the creditor must be found to have done something inequitable). Zenith is 
aberrational in this respect, but it does provide a good illustration of the confusion that 
exists between the two doctrines. 
76. AutoStyle, 269 F.3d at 748-49. In fact, despite this and seemingly other 
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by the court in AutoStyle was that equitable subordination involves the 
adjustment of the legal priority of a real claim, while recharacterization 
entails a determination of the legality of that priority in the first 
instance. 77 
The court in AutoStyle did concede, however, that some confusion 
exists between the two remedies due to the fact that 
undercapitalization can be a factor in the equitable subordination 
analysis, just as it often is a factor in the recharacterization analysis. 78 
This has caused "some courts to equitably subordinate claims that other 
courts would recharacterize as equity contributions."79 In fact, as 
discussed below,so the sharp line of demarcation between 
recharacterization and equitable subordination is of relatively recent 
ongm. Which is to say that, historically, the question of 
recharacterization was subsumed under the umbrella of equitable 
subordination. Hence, the two doctrines are not nearly as distinct from 
one another as AutoStyle and subsequent decisions make it appear. 81 
conceptual differences between the two analyses, the real practical differences between 
recharacterization and equitable subordination may not run nearly as deep as 
explanations like those offered by the court in AutoStyle (and many other opinions) would 
lead one to believe. See infra Part IV.C.3. 
77. This distinction has been repeated in multiple reported decisions. See, e.g., 
Gernsbacher v. Campbell (In re Equip. Equity Holdings, Inc.), 491 B.R. 792, 841 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. 2013) (conceding that both doctrines entail the altering of priority of payment 
for a creditor's claim in the Bankruptcy Code's distribution scheme, but, based on their 
differences in focus, describing the two doctrines as distinct). A£J put forward below, 
whether these differences warrant the separation of recharacterization and equitable 
subordination as conceptually distinct remedies has yet to receive critical analysis and is 
open to question. See infra Part IV.C.3. 
78. AutoStyle, 269 F.3d at 749 (quoting Nozemack, supra note 73, at 717). 
Interestingly, Nozemack's note makes a very different argument than the one advanced in 
this Article. He eschews § 510(c) as the basis for debt recharacterization and, instead, 
maintains that the bankruptcy courts are authorized to recharacterize a debt claim as an 
equity interest independent of the doctrine of equitable subordination. Nozemack, supra 
note 73, at 690. While I do not necessarily disagree with this point, I advance the opposite 
argument that recharacterization can occur under the auspices of§ 510(c) for the purpose 
of preserving the courts' authority. See infra Part IV.B. Ironically, Nozemack was making 
his argument for the purpose of preserving the ability of the bankruptcy courts to 
undertake debt recharacterization in the face of a Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panel decision that had determined that the power exceeded the bankruptcy courts' 
authority under§ 510(c) and thus was not available. See infra note 126 and accompanying 
text. That decision was later overturned by the Ninth Circuit. See infra notes 130-35 and 
accompanying text. Now, in reaction to Law, I am suggesting in the present treatment 
that, with the same objective in mind, authority for recharacterization can properly be 
found under the doctrine of equitable subordination. 
79. AutoStyle, 269 F.3d at 749 (quoting Nozemack, supra note 73, at 717). 
80. See infra notes 177, 313, 378 and accompanying text. 
81. See infra Part IV.C.3 for further discussion. 
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Nonetheless, having articulated the distinction between 
recharacterization pursuant to the courts' general authority under 
§ 105(a) and subordination under § 510(c), the court turned to the 
standards that should control whether recharacterization was 
warranted on the facts of the case. Rather than employ the categorical 
approach employed by the court in N & D Properties,82 the AutoStyle 
court endorsed a multifactor approach, utilizing an eleven-factor test 
articulated in the court's earlier decision in Roth Steel Tube Co. v. 
Commissioner.83 Roth Steel was not a subordination case in any sense of 
the term. Rather, it was an appeal from a tax court case in which the 
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") challenged the taxpayer's deduction 
for bad debt losses on the basis that the advances in question were 
really capital contributions rather than loans.84 In AutoStyle, given that 
eight of the eleven Roth Steel factors tilted toward "debt," to one extent 
or another, while only two leaned slightly toward "equity," and the 
evidence concerning the final factor was disputed, the court affirmed 
the decisions of the lower courts granting the defendants' summary 
judgment motion as to the recharacterization cause of action. 85 While no 
actual recharacterization thus took place in AutoStyle, the decision 
82. For an example, see Estes v. N & D Properties, Inc. (In re N & D Properties, Inc.), 
as presenting a standard grounded more or less on the principle of modus ponendo 
ponens. 799 F.2d 726, 733 (11th Cir. 1986); see also supra text accompanying note 54. 
Another shortcoming of the approach in N & D Properties-the presence of either one of 
two factors produces the result-is its implicit assumption that debt and equity are two 
kinds of financials securities in the way in which chocolate and vanilla are two flavors of 
ice cream. However, in an era of increasing diversification in the types of instruments 
used in financial transactions, including hybrid types of instruments that possess some of 
the characteristics of both debt and equity, an ipso facto approach is far too blunt of a tool. 
By contrast, the multifactor approach, with no single factor or mix of factors necessarily 
dispositive in any given case one way or the other, is far more suited to the current, more 
nuanced financing environment. See United States v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 520 B.R. 
29, 72-75 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014) (discussing the fact· intensive, case-specific nature of the 
multifactor approach). But see Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 30, at 1262-63 
(identifying the same phenomenon as one of the weaknesses of the multifactor approach). 
83. 800 F.2d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1986). These factors include the two N & D Properties 
conditions for recharacterizing, but not in the sense that the presence of either one 
necessarily produces the results. Rather, under the multifactor approach, none of the 
factors is itself dispositive and their significance will vary depending upon circumstances. 
AutoStyle, 269 F.3d at 750. However, the court went on to indicate that "[t]hin or 
inadequate capitalization is strong evidence that the advances are capital contributions 
rather than loans." Id. at 751 (citing Roth Steel, 800 F.2d at 630); see also Autobacs 
Strauss, Inc. v. Autobacs Seven Co. (In re Autobacs Strauss, Inc.), 473 B.R. 525, 576 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (discussing the relevance of undercapitalization in connection with 
both equitable subordination and debt recharacterization). 
84. Roth Steel, 800 F.2d at 626. 
85. AutoStyle, 269 F.3d at 750-53. 
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nevertheless established the availability of relief based on such a cause 
of action and offered a comprehensive apology for its existence. 
C. Other Circuit Decisions Prior to Lothian Oil 
1. The Tenth Circuit 
The next circuit court to grapple with the issue of whether the 
bankruptcy courts are endowed with the power to recharacterize debt 
claims as equity interests was the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in In 
re Hedged-Investments Associates.86 The appellants in the case were 
investors (and affiliated entities) in the debtor-entities that had 
operated a stock investment Ponzi scheme. 87 The appellants sought, in 
what has become a common pattern,ss alternatively, to have the 
defendant-lender's claim against the debtor subordinated under § 510(c) 
or to have the claim recharacterized as an equity advance. 89 In either 
case, the result would be that the defendant would lose its priority over 
the investors and, instead, take pari passu with the limited partner 
interests of the investors. Contrary to the result reached in N & D 
Properties,9o the court in Hedged-Investments agreed with the district 
court that the absence of "inequitable conduct" barred application of the 
equitable subordination remedy. 91 Following the Sixth Circuit's lead in 
AutoStyle, however, the court distinguished between "the remedies of 
recharacterization and equitable subordination," noting that the 
absence of inequitable conduct was not dispositive as to the former. 92 
More specifically, the court described equitable subordination as 
86. Sender v. Bronze Grp., Ltd., (In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs., Inc.), 380 F.3d 1292 (lOth 
Cir. 2004). 
87. Id. at 1295. 
88. Initially, virtually every recharacterization case also included a claim based on 
§ 510(c). More recently, as separation of the two doctrines has become more established, 
one occasionally finds a claim for relief only for recharacterization without an altemative 
cause of action based on equitable subordination. See, e.g., Devices Liquidation Tr. v. 
Pinebridge Vantage Partners, L.P., 528 B.R. 229, 232-33 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
89. Hedged-Invs., 380 F.3d at 1295. 
90. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. 
91. Hedged-Invs., 380 F.3d at 1302 (noting that to qualify for relief under § 510(c), the 
plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of culpable conduct, and undercapitalization 
alone is insufficient in this regard). While unquestionably the dominant view, as will be 
discussed below, inequitable conduct is not always a prerequisite for equitable 
subordination. See infra Part IV.A. The bankruptcy court had ordered that the 
defendant's loan be subordinated to equal priority with the investment interests of the 
limited partners but refused to recharacterize the loan as equity. Hedged-Invs., 380 F.3d 
at 1296-97. It was the latter decision that the limited partner interests appealed. Id. 
92. Hedged-Invs., 380 F.3d at 1297. 
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focused on the behavior of the parties, while recharacterization, 
emanating from the courts'§ 105(a) power, scrutinizes the substance of 
the transaction. 93 Turning to the legal standard governing 
recharacterization, as in AutoStyle, the court borrowed from tax law 
cases to identify a nonexclusive list of thirteen factors bearing on the 
determination of whether a purported debt is actually disguised 
equity.94 Of these factors, which, for all intents and purposes, mirrored 
the eleven Roth Steel factors, 95 the court found only three pointed in 
favor of an equity characterization of the investment in question and, 
thus, affirmed the lower courts' opinions that recharacterization of the 
defendant's advances was not in order.96 Thus, while, once more, not 
actually ordering that the remedy be imposed, the decision stood for the 
proposition that, under the right facts, the bankruptcy courts possess 
the equitable authority to recharacterize a claim even when the 
traditional grounds for subordination under§ 510(c) do not exist. 
2. The Third and Fourth Circuits 
In 2006, both the Third and Fourth Circuits rendered 
recharacterization opinions within the space of five months of one 
another.97 Both courts concurred with the holding in AutoStyle and 
Hedged-Investments that the bankruptcy courts' general equitable 
authority under § 105(a) was broad enough to encompass the 
recharacterization of debt in the proper circumstances. 98 In addition, in 
In re Dornier Aviation, the Fourth Circuit, after ruling that the 
recharacterization power is integral to a consistent application of the 
93. ld. The court treated the issue as a mixed question of fact and law, thus deferring 
to the bankruptcy court's factual findings. ld. 
94. Id. at 1298. The court derived these factors from the opinion in Stinnett's Pontiac 
Serv., Inc. v. Comm'r, 730 F.2d 634, 638 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing Estate of Mixon v. United 
States, 464 F.2d 394, 402 (5th Cir. 1972)). In explaining the test's application, the court 
observed that none of the factors on the list is itself dispositive. Hedged-/nus., 380 F.3d at 
1298-99. The court also noted its earlier rejection, in Sinclair v. Barr (In re Mid-Town 
Produce Terminal, Inc.), 599 F.2d 389 (lOth Cir. 1979), of the automatic subordination of 
insider loans on the ground that such an approach would have the undesirable effect of 
discouraging owners from attempting to salvage troubled businesses. Hedged-/nus., 380 
F.3d at 1297. AB was not unusual at the time it arose, Mid-Town did not include an 
independent claim for recharacterization, but rather proceeded simply as a subordination 
case under applicable 1898 Act precedent. 599 F.2d at 390. 
95. See supra note 83. 
96. Hedged-/nus., 380 F. 3d at 1299. 
97. Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448 
(3d Cir. 2006); Fairchild Dornier GMBH v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re 
Dornier Aviation (N. Am.), Inc.), 453 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2006). 
98. SubMicron, 432 F.3d 448; Dornier Aviation, 453 F. 3d 225. 
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Bankruptcy Code, approved of the bankruptcy court's use of the factors 
applied by the Sixth and Tenth Circuits in those cases in deciding when 
recharacterization is warranted.99 By contrast, while not by any means 
outright rejecting the multifactor approach, 1oo the Third Circuit in In re 
SubMicron Systems Corp. held that the determinative inquiry in 
classifying an advance as a loan or an equity contribution should focus 
on the intent of the parties at the time the transaction occurred. 101 
Ultimately, however, the court did concede that "[n]o mechanistic 
scorecard suffices. And none should, for Kabuki outcomes elude difficult 
fact patterns."l02 
In SubMicron, the issue arose in connection with the defendant-
lenders' attempt to credit bid their notes under § 363(k).1°3 Dornier 
Aviation involved the unsecured creditors committee's challenge to a 
parent corporation's $146 million claim arising out of prepetition 
inventory sales to its wholly-owned subsidiary that had filed for relief 
under Chapter 11.1°4 The Third Circuit, regarding the district court's 
99. Dornier Aviation, 453 F.3d at 234 ("We think it important to note that a claimant's 
insider status and a debtor's undercapitalization alone will normally be insufficient to 
support the recharacterization of a claim .... However, when other factors indicate that 
the transaction is not a loan at all, recharacterization is appropriate to ensure the 
consistent application of the Bankruptcy Code."). 
100. Indeed, the court approved of the seven-factor test that the district court had 
applied. SubMicron, 432 F.3d at 456 n.8. The district court borrowed the test from an 
earlier Delaware case, Official Committee of the Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile, Inc. v. 
Blackstone Family Investment Partnership, L.P. (In reColor Tile, Inc.). Nos. 96-76 (HSB), 
96-80 (HSB), Civ.A. 98-358-SLR, A-98-90, 96-77 (HSB), 96-78 (HSB), 96-79 (HSB), 2000 
WL 152129 (D. Del. Feb. 9, 2000). 
101. Because intent typically can only be divined from circumstantial evidence, a court 
must look closely at the economic reality in finding intent. Thus, the difference in 
approach from that of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits is probably negligible, although the 
emphasis on intent does imply an element of deliberation to mask the true character of 
the investment in a fashion that is less prevalent in the other approaches. If the point of 
the inquiry is to discern the intrinsic character of an instrument, arguably proof of intent 
should not be essential. See Friedman's Liquidating Tr. v. Goldman Sachs Credit 
Partners, L.P. (In re Friedman's Inc.), 452 B.R. 512, 519 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (reading 
SubMicron to require a recharacterization analysis to focus on the overarching inquiry of 
the parties' intent, rather than a multifactor test). 
102. SubMicron, 432 F.3d at 456; see also Va. Broadband, LLC v. Manuel, 538 B.R. 
253, 266 (W.D. Va. 2015) (stating that no single factor is dispositive). 
103. Unlike some of the earlier cases, the defendants in SubMicron, comprised of 
several financial institutions, were not traditional insiders. 
104. 453 F.3d at 230. In response to the defendant's argument that the Bankruptcy 
Code does not permit recharacterization of an allowed claim other than under § 510(c), 
the court noted: 
[D]enying a bankruptcy court the ability to recharacterize a claim would have the 
effect of subverting the Code's critical priority system by allowing equity 
investors to jump the line and reduce the recovery of true creditors. In light of the 
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recharacterization conclusion as a question of fact reviewed under a 
traditional clearly erroneous standard, 105 affirmed the decision below, 
refusing to recharacterize the challenged loans. 106 In Dornier Aviation, 
the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's fmding that, on the whole, the 
transactions in question were more consistent with a capital 
contribution than a loan, thus making it the first of these cases to 
sustain a decision to recharacterize a putative loan as a contribution of 
risk capital.l07 Of the eleven Roth Steel factors, the bankruptcy court in 
Dornier Aviation found that five in particular pointing to a capital 
contribution were most significant: (1) the defendant's insider status, 
(2) lack of a fixed maturity date, (3) lack of a fixed payment schedule, 
(4) the debtor's long history of nonprofitability, and (5) the defendant's 
assumption of the debtor's losses.lOB The Fourth Circuit agreed that 
these facts were sufficient to support the decision to recharacterize the 
claim as a capital contribution.l09 
Thus, through 2006, and even arguably through 2010,110 the courts 
broad language of § 105(a) and the larger purpose of the Bankruptcy Code, we 
believe that a bankruptcy court's power to recharacterize is essential to the 
proper and consistent application of the Code. 
Id. at 231. The fact that the claim was allowed would also become significant in light of 
later decisions, see infra Part I.D, as the court also rejected the defendant's position that 
recharacterization serves the same purposes, or calls for the same analysis, as 
disallowance under § 502(b) and equitable subordination. Dornier Aviation, 453 F.3d at 
232 (noting that disallowance entails the complete rejection of a claim, while 
recharacterization leaves the claimant with some interest). 
105. SubMicron, 432 F. 3d at 456--57. The district court had withdrawn the reference to 
the bankruptcy court in this case, so appeal was made pursuant to the court's 
conventional appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, rather than its jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) applicable in cases originating in the bankruptcy court. Id. at 
453-54. The court in Domier Aviation similarly deferred to the factual findings below-in 
that case of the bankruptcy court-in addressing the defendant's argument that the court 
erred in applying the multifactor approach to its claim. 453 F.3d at 235. 
106. SubMicron, 432 F.3d at 457. 
107. Obviously, some lower courts had already exercised the power. See, e.g., Blasbalg 
v. Tarro (In re Hyperion Enters., Inc.), 158 B.R. 555, 561 (D.R.I. 1993) (holding that 
"where shareholders have substituted debt for adequate risk capital, their claims are 
appropriately recast as equity regardless of satisfaction of the other requirements of 
equitable subordination" (citing Diasonics, Inc. v. Ingalls, 121 B.R. 626, 630 (Bankr. N.D. 
Fla. 1990))). 
108. Domier Aviation, 453 F.3d at 234-36. This was quite consistent with the view at 
the time that debt recharacterization ultimately hinges on questions of fact, not law, thus 
requiring deference to the bankruptcy courts' findings under a clearly erroneous standard. 
See supra notes 93, 105 and accompanying text. 
109. Dornier Aviation, 453 F.3d at 234. 
110. In a 2010 decision, the Seventh Circuit affirmed lower courts' refusal to 
recharacterize a cash infusion, but did not do so on the ground offered by those courts-
which was that the cause of action was likely not recognized by the circuit-but rather on 
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of appeals were in lockstep. They were in accord, first, about the 
bankruptcy courts' prerogative by means of their equitable powers to 
undertake debt recharacterization to preserve classification of advances 
based on their underlying economic substance rather than the form in 
which they had been cast. Second, they agreed that federal authority 
controlled when debt recharacterization should apply, even if they 
expressed somewhat different views on which federal law approach 
should control.111 As we see next, however, that was all about to change. 
D. Enter Lothian Oil and the Minority Approach 
1. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits 
In 2011, in In re Lothian Oil, an appeal was taken to the Fifth 
Circuit on the issue of the bankruptcy courts' ability to recharacterize 
the basis that the remedy was foreclosed by a stipulation that had been entered into by 
parties in the case. FCC v. Airadigm Commc'ns, Inc. (In re Airadigm Commc'ns, Inc.), 616 
F.3d 642, 653 (7th Cir. 2010). In the course of its opinion, the court did observe that the 
overwhelming weight of authority supports the proposition that bankruptcy courts act 
within their equitable powers when they recharacterize loans as infusions of equity. Id. 
Subsequent lower court decisions have disagreed over whether this signaled an openness 
of the circuit to recharacterization. Compare Gecker v. Flynn (In re Emerald Casino, Inc.), 
No. 11 C 4714, 2015 WL 1843271, at *8-9 (N.D. TIL Apr. 21, 2015) (suggesting the circuit 
court would likely follow the majority view on recharacterization), with Official Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors of SGK Ventures, LLC v. New Key Grp., LLC (In re SGK Ventures, 
LLC), 521 B.R. 842, 861 (Bankr. N.D. ill. 2014) (predicting that the Seventh Circuit would 
reject the notion that the bankruptcy courts possess the equitable authority to 
recharacterize claims separate from their statutory authority under§ 510(c)). 
While the Second Circuit has not issued a characterization opinion, the lower 
courts in that circuit have agreed on the view that the authority to recharacterize debt as 
equity springs from the equitable power of the bankruptcy courts. See, e.g., In re Sabine 
Oil & Gas Corp., 574 B.R. 503, 567-68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (following the Sixth 
Circuit's approach in AutoStyle); Weisfelner v. Blavatnik (In re Lyondell Chern. Co.), 544 
B.R. 75, 92-93 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
111. One commentator has identified three different approaches to when 
recharacterization will be ordered employed by the circuit courts that regard the 
authority as derived from § 105(a). Bryan C. Curran, Comment, The "State" of Federal 
Bankruptcy Law: The Ninth Circuit's Debt Recharacterization Analysis in In re Fitness 
Holdings lntemational, 55 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 47, 53 (2014). These approaches 
are (1) a per se rule (N & D Properties), (2) a multifactor test (AutoStyle, Hedged-
Investments, and Dornier Aviation), and (3) intent of the parties (SubMicron). Id. These 
classifications are reasonable. However, as explained infra note 248, the multifactor and 
the intent of the parties approaches actually have much more in common than might be 
suspected, and the per se approach has been relegated to the Eleventh Circuit. Thus, 
there was actually less disagreement on the question than might, at first blush, have 
appeared to be the case. 
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an investment denominated as a loan as an equity interest. 112 
Consistent with the other circuits to address the question, the court, in 
an opinion authored by Judge Jones, answered the question in the 
afflrmative.na However, in a significant departure from those earlier 
decisions, rather than locate the source of the bankruptcy courts' 
authority in § 105(a), as all of the other circuits to speak to the issue to 
date had done, the Fifth Circuit held that resort to § 105(a) was 
unnecessary (and perhaps unwise)JI4 Instead, the court concluded that 
the power to recharacterize resided in the bankruptcy courts' authority 
to allow and disallow claims under § 502, 115 an approach that the 
Fourth Circuit in Dornier Aviation had specifically rejected as 
inadequate.116 The issue of from where the bankruptcy courts' authority 
derives is of far more than academic interest. If the intrinsic nature of 
the advance is to be resolved as part of the claims allowance process 
under § 502, then the determination will hinge under subsection (b)(l) 
on whether the purported debt "is unenforceable as against the 
debtor ... under any agreement or applicable law."l17 Invoking the 
Supreme Court's decision in Butner v. United States,ns Judge Jones 
stated that "applicable law" for this purpose meant state law.l19 In the 
case itself, this seemed to make little difference, inasmuch as, according 
112. Grossman v. Lothian Oil Inc. (In re Lothian Oil Inc.), 650 F.3d 539, 542 (5th Cir. 
2011). 
113. Id. at 543-44. 
114. Id. at 543 (referring to the circuit's general bias for taking a "cautious" approach 
to § 105(a)). 
115. Id. (stating that "recharacterizing the claim as an equity interest is the logical 
outcome of the reason for disallowing it as debt"). 
116. See infra notes 229-36 and accompanying text. Curiously, in a post-AutoStyle 
decision, a panel of the Sixth Circuit had also indicated that "a claim seeking to 
recharacterize debt as equity is the same as objecting to the claim's 'allowance."' Official 
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Russell Cave Co. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. (In re 
Russell Cave Co.), 107 F. App'x 449, 451 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing In re Micro-Precision 
Techs., Inc., 303 B.R. 238, 243 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2003)). However, it is clear that the court 
in Russell Cave had no intention of altering circuit precedent; the opinion also stated that 
a recharacterization claim and a claims objection are "one-in-the same" because the 
bankruptcy court may take equitable considerations into account as a basis for 
disallowance of a claim, and cited AutoStyle approvingly. Id.; see Bayer Corp. v. 
MascoTech, Inc. (In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc.), 269 F. 3d 726, 748-49 (6th Cir. 2001). See 
infra note 231 for additional discussion. 
117. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
118. 440 U.S. 48 (1979). 
119. Lothian Oil, 650 F.3d at 543 (quoting Butner, 440 U.S. at 54). Interestingly, in 
Patterson v. Shumate, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the same phrase-
applicable law-should be limited to state law. 504 U.S. 753, 758 (1992). Of course, in that 
case, there was a specific federal statute on point rather than a federal standard derived 
from earlier precedent in tax cases. !d. at 755. 
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to the court, Texas courts have imported the multifactor approach from 
federal tax court cases to decide when a putative loan should be 
regarded as an equity interest.120 However, other states (including 
perhaps even Texas in the future) may use different tests, thus creating 
the potential for disuniformity that always exists when deference is 
accorded to substantive state law in defining a bankruptcy outcome. 121 
Additionally, by treating the issue on appeal as the appropriateness of 
the bankruptcy court's determination to allow or disallow the claim, the 
Lothian Oil court concluded that the lower courts' ruling should be 
reviewed as a matter of law,122 thus implicating de novo review. This, of 
course, was in sharp contrast with the approach taken in other circuits 
regarding the degree of deference to be shown to the bankruptcy courts' 
factual findings in relation to this issue.123 As detailed further below,124 
there are additional troublesome consequences to limiting 
recharacterization to circumstances where state law would authorize 
such action. In 2013, the split among the circuits was widened further 
by the Ninth Circuit's decision in In re Fitness Holdings 
International.125 Prior to that decision, precedent in the circuit had held 
that the bankruptcy courts did not possess authority to recharacterize 
claims as debt or equity other than in connection with application of the 
statutory remedy provided in § 510(c).126 The issue came up in Fitness 
Holdings in the context of the trustee's action to recover a prepetition 
transfer from the debtor to its sole shareholder as a constructively 
fraudulent conveyance.127 The defendants countered that the 
shareholder had provided reasonably equivalent return value since the 
payment was on account of a preexisting debt and, under § 548(d)(2)(A), 
120. Lothian Oil, 650 F.3d at 544. 
121. See infra notes 244, 250. See generally Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 30, at 
1268-74 (reviewing authority from Massachusetts and Wisconsin). 
122. 650 F.3d at 542. 
123. See supra notes 93, 105, 108 and accompanying text. In SubMicron, of course, the 
district court served as the trial court and, as such, finder of fact. See supra note 105. 
124. See infra Part Ill .A. 
125. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Hancock Park Capital II, L.P. (In re 
Fitness Holdings Int'l, Inc.), 714 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir.), amended by 529 F. App'x 871 (9th 
Cir. 2013). 
126. Unsecured Creditors' Comms. of Pac. Express, Inc. v. Pioneer Commercial 
Funding Corp. (In re Pac. Express, Inc.), 69 B.R. 112, 116 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986) 
(concluding that equitable subordination under § 510(c) is the sole authority under the 
Code for all actions involving the subordination of claims), superseded by Fitness 
Holdings, 714 F.3d 1141. Because the court concluded that the objectors had failed to 
meet their burden of proving the claimants had engaged in inequitable conduct, so as to 
warrant subordination under § 510(c), the court vacated the judgment of the bankruptcy 
court ordering subordination. Id. at 116-18. 
127. 714 F. 3d at 1144. 
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"the satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt" constitutes 
valueJ28 Thus, the transfer could not be fraudulent under § 548(a)(l)(B) 
if the original advances from the defendant were true loans.129 At the 
outset, the Ninth Circuit rejected the earlier precedent from the 
circuit's Bankruptcy Appellate Panel that had held that the bankruptcy 
courts lacked authority, separate and apart from the statutory remedy 
of equitable subordination, to recharacterize an obligation that did not 
constitute a debt.1ao However, in determining the source of the 
alternative authority, the court declined to follow the approach adopted 
in the majority of circuits of looking to the general equitable powers of 
the bankruptcy courts under § 105(a)131-an approach that, in turn, 
leads to application of federal rules and standards in determining when 
the power will be exercised.132 Instead, the Fitness Holdings court chose 
to follow the Fifth Circuit's lead in Lothian Oil by electing to treat a 
cause of action based on recharacterization as a plea to disallow the 
claim in question under § 502(b)(1).133 To do so, the court reasoned, 
would be "more consistent with Supreme Court precedent than that of 
the circuits that have fashioned a federal test for recharacterizing an 
alleged debt in reliance on their general equitable authority under 
§ 105(a)."134 
And so, the complete severance of recharacterization from equitable 
subordination, and a full-blown split in the circuits over the basis on 
which the bankruptcy courts derived their power to accomplish the 
former, were simultaneously established. Whether, in light of the 
uncertain state of the equitable authority of the bankruptcy courts 
under § 105(a), that unlinking of the historical connection between debt 
recharacterization and equitable subordination was judicious is open to 
doubt. Before, however, turning to a brief exegesis of the evolution of 
128. Id. at 1145 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A) (2012)). 
129. Id. at 1149. 
130. Id. at 1147 ("Pacific Express erred in holding that the 'characterization of claims 
as equity or debt' is governed by§ 510(c)." (quoting Pac. Express, 69 B.R. at 115)). 
131. See supra Part I.B-C. 
132. This is true even if the decisions that find the authority to recharacterize claims 
stems from the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court, conferred through § 105(a), are 
not fully in accord with what the federal rule should control. See supra note 111. 
133. Fitness Holdings, 714 F. 3d at 1148. 
134. Id. Those Supreme Court precedents were, of course, Travelers and Butner, see 
infra notes 214, 226, 259, and it should perhaps come as no surprise that the court was 
influenced by the Travelers decision, since it overturned a Ninth Circuit decision that had 
held that an attorneys' fees clause in a contract, enforceable under state law, could not 
form the basis for recovery of fees incurred in litigating bankruptcy issues. Travelers Cas. 
& Sur. Co. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 167 F. App'x 593, 594 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 549 
u.s. 443 (2007). 
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equitable subordination under the Code, it warrants pause to consider 
whether analogizing debt recharacterization as a request for 
disallowance under§ 502(b), rather than subordination under§ 105(a), 
requires the kind of submissive deference to state law engaged in by the 
Fifth and Ninth Circuits. 
2. Equitable Disallowance 
In their staunch adherence to a one-dimensional interpretation of 
the holding in Butner, 135 both the Lothian Oil and the Fitness Holdings 
courts presumed that "applicable law" for purposes of§ 502(b)(l) meant 
exclusively state law. And yet, even if one accepts that dubious 
construction, 136 it does not necessarily rule out the possibility of 
recharacterizing a claim as an equity interest in an appropriate case 
without resort to controlling state law precedent. Although 
controversial, 137 in Adelphia Recovery Trust v. Bank of America, N.A., 138 
the district court upheld the bankruptcy court's decision not to dismiss 
the plaintiffs objection to the defendants' claim in the case.l39 
Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant-banks had aided 
and abetted the breach of fiduciary duty by the debtor's former 
managers and that, therefore, their claim should be disallowed on 
equitable groundsJ40 
Disallowance, of course, in not available under § 510(c), only 
subordination.l41 However, if equitable disallowance were to be 
135. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979) (stating that state law governs 
property interest in bankruptcy). 
136. See Ponoroff, supra note 3 (manuscript at 57-58) (arguing that Butner is 
frequently applied more broadly than originally intended). 
137. See generally Alan M. Ahart, Why the Equitable Disallowance of Claims in 
Bankruptcy Must Be Disallowed, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 445 (2012) (arguing that 
disallowance may only be ordered based on applicability of the statutory grounds for 
disallowance detailed in § 502). 
138. 390 B.R. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), adhered to on reconsideration, Nos. 05 Civ. 9050 
(LMM), 03 MDL 1529, 2008 WL 1959542 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2008). 
139. Id. at 80. 
140. Adelphia Commc'ns Corp. v. Bank of America, N.A. (In re Adelphia Commc'ns 
Corp.), 365 B.R. 24, 31-32 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). The bankruptcy court had denied the 
defendants' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the bulk of the 
plaintiff's claims for wrongdoing on the defendants' part in their prefiling dealings with 
the debtor and the debtor's management.. Id. Procedurally, the district court had 
withdrawn the reference to the bankruptcy court over the adversary proceeding in the 
case, but the parties agreed to allow determination as to pending motions for dismissal 
with the bankruptcy court. Adelphia, 390 B.R. at 67. 
141. See infra notes 170, 247. In addition, as Judge Ahart points out in his article, 
equitable subordination is remedial in nature, while equitable disallowance is penal. 
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recognized and then invoked in the context where the proper 
characterization of a financial advance to the debtor is at issue, the 
practical effect of disallowing the claim would be to subordinate the 
investment to the claims of general creditors. That is to say, whether 
the purported claim is subordinated or disallowed, the economic impact 
on the claimant (and other creditors) is identical. 142 In Adelphia, the 
unsecured creditors committee flied suit against multiple banks that 
were advising investment banks, participants on loan syndications, or 
subsequent acquirers of bank debt involved in the extension of credit to 
the debtor companies, which, according to the complaint, was then 
promptly looted by the debtors' then-management and affiliated 
persons and entities. 143 The complaint contained multiple causes of 
action, including relief based on equitable subordination, 
recharacterization, and equitable disallowance. 144 The defendants 
moved to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a claim upon which 
relief might be granted.I45 In its lengthy opinion, the bankruptcy court 
concluded that the facts, if proven, could sustain a cause of action on 
two of the abovementioned three theories.l46 
With regard to the § 510(c) claim, the bankruptcy court ruled that 
factual issues concerning the defendants' conduct and harm to 
unsecured creditors precluded dismissal on preliminary motion.l47 As 
for the recharacterization cause of action, the bankruptcy court followed 
the prevailing wisdom at the time that it possessed the equitable 
Ahart, supra note 137, at 450--51. But see infra notes 237-42 and accompanying text. 
142. There is an important exception to this statement that pertains when 
subordination is to less than all of the debtor's creditors or there is a surplus remaining 
after senior claims are paid, since, unlike with disallowance, subordination does not 
eliminate the claim in toto. For an insightful discussion and analysis of this point, see 
David Gray Carlson, The Logical Structure of Fraudulent Transfers and Equitable 
Subordination, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157 (2003), which points out that while the 
practical consequence of characterizing a remedy as recession, demotion, or avoidance will 
make little difference in most cases, it can make a big difference at the margin, and, thus, 
proposes that the metaphoric concepts that currently drive the remedial responses in the 
case of fraudulent transfers and equitable subordination be unified under the altemative 
concept of transfer. This is why it matters whether recharacterization is conceptually 
regarded as subordination or disallowance. For further discussion of which of the two is 
the more appropriate analogical construct, and the entailments that follow therefrom, see 
infra text accompanying notes 234-38. 
143. Adelphia, 365 B.R. at 31-33. 
144. Id. at 32. 
145. !d. at 71. 
146. !d. 
147. !d. at 69-70. The court applied a standard for applying equitable subordination 
established by the Fifth Circuit in Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 
692 (5th Cir. 1977). See discussion infra text accompanying note 170. 
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authority under § 105(a) to undertake the exercise based on the 
multifactor approach derived, in part, from tax court cases.14B 
Nonetheless, dismissal as to this claim was granted based on the 
plaintiffs failure to address, by either allegations or argument, any of 
the showings required to be made in order for a debt to be 
recharacterized as equity; instead the plaintiff relied entirely on the 
argument that the funds received when the debt was incurred were 
actually used (by the former managers) as an equity contribution.149 
Turning to the cause of action seeking equitable disallowance, distinct 
from subordination under§ 510(c) or recharacterization, the bankruptcy 
court held that this power, first established by the Supreme Court in 
Pepper v. Litton, 15° survived the enactment of the 1978 Act, even though 
it is not provided for expressly in the Code.151 The court justified its 
conclusion based on two considerations: the legislative history 
accompanying § 510152 and the well-recognized principle that Congress 
intended for the courts to continue to look to pre-Code law where the 
Code itself is silent. 153 On appeal, the district court agreed that 
equitable disallowance is permissible under Pepper,154 but it corrected 
148. Adelphia, 365 B.R. at 73-75. 
149. Id. at 75. Unlike the usual recharacterization case, the individuals and entities 
extending the advance were not the owners of the debtor. Moreover, insofar as the factors 
bearing on recharacterization were concerned, the court noted that the plaintiff-creditors 
committee "putO all of its eggs in a single basket," asserting that funds received from the 
putative loan were actually used as equity contributions by the debtors' management. Id. 
Ail the court noted, this "is in too many respects a play on words-melding an equity 
contribution by the Rigases [(the former managers of the company)] and an argued equity 
contribution by the bank lenders-and fails to address, by either allegations or argument, 
the showings that need to be made under the caselaw for recharacterizing debt as equity." 
I d. 
150. 308 u.s. 295 (1939). 
151. Adelphia, 365 B.R. at 72 (suggesting that Pepper was both an equitable 
subordination case and an equitable disallowance case). Once the court recognized the 
existence of the claim under the Code, unresolved factual questions bearing on its 
applicability in the case resulted in denial of the motion to dismiss. Id. at 72-73. 
152. The court specifically relied on the following statement in the legislative history: 
This section is intended to codify case law, such as Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 
60S. Ct. 238, 84 L.Ed. 281 (1939), and Taylor v. Standard Gas and Electric Co., 
306 U.S. 307, 59 S. Ct. 543, 83 L.Ed. 669 (1938), and is not intended to limit the 
court's power in any way . ... Nor does this subsection preclude a bankruptcy court 
from completely disallowing a claim in appropriate circumstances. 
Id. at 71 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 359 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.AN. 
5963, 6315). 
153. Id. (quoting Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501 
(1976)). 
154. Adelphia Recovery Trust v. Bank of America, N.A, 390 B.R. 64, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (finding that Pepper endorsed equitable disallowance and nothing in the legislative 
history has been shown to indicate that Congress intended to eliminate that pre-Code 
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the bankruptcy court's recitation of the legislative history with a fuller 
account that negated the conclusion that Congress intended to provide 
for equitable disallowance when it enacted the Code.155 Although it 
offers an avenue for what effectively amounts to debt recharacterization 
as part of the claims allowance process that is not tied to state law, 
equitable disallowance has received, at best, a mixed reception in the 
courts, both before and after the Adelphia decision.156 In a 2012 article, 
Judge Ahart not only asserted that the doctrine was unauthorized 
under the language of the Code and the legislative history, but also that 
the Supreme Court itself erred in Pepper when it concluded that the 
bankruptcy court could equitably disallow a claim in the first place. 157 
Although that bold assertion may be dubious, as discussed below, 
disallowance does not represent the most notionally precise concept to 
which to associate debt recharacterization.158 
practice), adhered to on reconsideration, Nos. 05 Civ. 9050 (LMM), 03 MDL 1529, 2008 
WL 1959542 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2008). In a related decision in the Adelphia bankruptcy 
case, the district court cited with approval the bankruptcy judge's statement that 
equitable disallowance is available only in "extreme instances-perhaps very rare-where 
it is necessary as a remedy." 365 B.R. at 73. 
155. Adelphia, 390 B.R. at 74-76 (explaining that the House Report on which the 
bankruptcy court had based its determination was based on a version of a bill (H.R. 8200) 
that did not reflect the final text of the 1978 Act, including the final language of§ 510(c)). 
The court also pointed out that the version of the bill that the Senate Judiciary 
Committee reported out favorably (S. 2266) contained a subsection (c)(3) which 
specifically provided for disallowance based on the equities of the case. Id. at 75. Without 
explanation, that provision did not make it into the final version of the bill. Thus, the 
court concluded that, at the end of the day, "Section 510 [as enacted] ... contains no 
provision for equitable disallowance," and the legislative history insofar as the intent of 
Congress is concerned is ambiguous at best. Id. at 75-76. 
156. Compare In re LightSquared Inc., 504 B.R. 321, 338-39 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(disagreeing with the decisions in Adelphia and holding that the Code does not permit 
equitable disallowance of claims that are otherwise allowable under § 502(d)), and Ahart, 
supra note 137, at 459 n.146 (citing relevant authorities), with In reWash. Mut., Inc., 461 
B.R. 200, 256-59 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (permitting assertion of equitable disallowance 
claim to go forward in the face of a motion to dismiss on standing grounds), vacated in 
part, No. 08-12229 (MFW), 2012 WL 1563880 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 24, 2016). In a 
subsequent opinion in that case, however, the court, in referring to its earlier opinion and 
order, noted that its determination 
that the Equity Committee has standing to pursue certain equitable disallowance 
claims was merely a preliminary ruling. In contrast to a ruling on the merits 
based upon a fully developed factual record after a full trial and discovery, the 
precedential value of the portions of the September Opinion and September 
Order that are related to the Standing Motion therefore is not high. 
Wash. Mut., 2012 WL 1563880, at *19. 
157. Ahart, supra note 137, at 450--51 (explaining that the 1898 Act did authorize the 
bankruptcy courts to disallow a claim based on the equities of the case). 
158. See infra notes 234-38 and accompanying text. 
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In addition, the Supreme Court's decision in Law159 now places the 
vitality of the doctrine in even further peril. Law, of course, involved the 
equitable disallowance of an exemption, and in the context of a 
provision of the Code that specifically prohibited payment of 
administrative expenses from exempt property,160 Thus, Adelphia is 
factually distinguishable from Law. Nonetheless, the equitable 
disallowance of an exemption and the equitable disallowance of a claim 
are undeniably analogous. Combined with the Court's other 
admonitions in the case and more generally about the limited scope of 
the bankruptcy courts' equitable powers under§ 105(a),161 one can only 
conclude that the future prospects for equitable disallowance are not 
promising. Therefore, if the recharacterization question is to continue to 
be analyzed as a matter of federal law, prudence cautions that specific 
Code authority needs to be found. This then brings us foursquare to the 
doctrine of equitable subordination. 
II. EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION 
The 1978 Act, for the first time, incorporated into the substantive 
law governing bankruptcy cases an express provision recognizing the 
power of the bankruptcy courts to subordinate particular claims on 
equitable as well as contractual grounds.162 Specifically, § 510(c) of the 
159. Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188 (2014). 
160. See supra notes 20, 21 and accompanying text. Unquestionably, Law is 
distinguishable from cases like Adelphia in the sense that the Code does prohibit 
equitable disallowance in the manner that § 522(k) insulates exempt property from 
liability for administrative expenses. 
161. Law, 134 S. Ct. at 1194-95 ('We have long held that 'whatever equitable powers 
remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of 
the Bankruptcy Code." (quoting Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 495 U.S. 197, 206 
(1988))). See generally Taylor v. Caillaud, No. 315-CV-00206-GCM, 2015 WL 7738391, at 
*3 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 1, 2015) (noting that, beyond the specific holding in Law, the Court also 
rejected the argument that bankruptcy courts have an inherent equitable power to deny 
exemptions, and that nearly every court to consider Law had construed that dicta as 
precluding courts from denying an exemption on the basis of the debtor's bad faith); 
Haines, supra note 17. 
162. The recognition of consensual subordination under inter-creditor agreements is 
recognized in bankruptcy under § 510(a). In addition to contractual and equitable 
subordination, § 510(b) provides for a form of statutory subordination in the case of a 
claim (i) arising from recession, (ii) for damages arising from the purchase or sale of a 
security of the debtor (or its affiliate), or (iii) for reimbursement or contribution on 
account of such a claim to all claims or interests that are senior or equal to the claim 
represented by such security. 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (2012). The purpose for this provision is 
to prevent disgruntled investors from recouping their losses at the same level as general 
unsecured creditors. See, e.g., Rombro v. Dufrayne (In re Med Diversified, Inc.), 461 F.3d 
251, 256 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Baroda Hilllnvs., Ltd. v. Telegroup, Inc. (In re Telegroup, 
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Code provides: 
Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section, after 
notice and a hearing, the court may-
(1) under principles of equitable subordination, subordinate 
for purposes of distribution all or part of an allowed claim 
to all or part of another allowed claim or all or part of an 
allowed interest to all or part of another allowed 
interest;163 or 
(2) order that any lien securing such a subordinated claim be 
transferred to the estate.164 
The roots of court-ordered subordination, however, are found much 
earlier in bankruptcy jurisprudence. The doctrine was first articulated 
and developed in a series of Supreme Court cases decided under the 
former Act,165 According to the legislative history of § 510(c), these 
Inc.), 281 F.3d 133, 141-42 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
163. It will be recalled that the term "claim" is defined in § 101(5)(A) as a "right to 
payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, 
fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or 
unsecured." 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). The definition is, in a word, comprehensive. "Interest" 
refers to the ownership rights of "equity security holders," including corporate 
shareholders and owners of limited partnership interests. Id. Under § 502(a), claims and 
interests are deemed allowed on filing a proof of claim or interest, and, of course, under 
§ 726(a)(2), only the holders of allowed claims share in any bankruptcy distribution. 
164. Id. § 510(c). In the case of the subordination of a secured claim, this is necessary to 
preserve the interest for the estate in the event the transfer was not also voidable so as to 
trigger§ 551. See, e.g., Ford v. Feldman (In re Fla. Bay Trading Co.), 177 B.R. 374, 382-83 
(Bankr. D. Fla. 1994). 
165. In Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939), the Court elaborated on its "Deep Rock" 
decision of a few months earlier in Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., wherein the 
Court acknowledged the equity powers of the bankruptcy courts by affirming the 
subordination of the open account claims of the debtor's parent company to the rank of 
common shareholder based on the parent's mismanagement of the bankrupt. 306 U.S. 
307, 315, 323--24 (1939). These two cases, together with Comstock v. Group of 
Institutional Investors, 335 U.S. 211 (1948), comprise a trilogy, which establish the 
doctrinal foundation of equitable subordination. See Carlson, supra note 142, at 198 
(asserting that the Supreme Court "invented" equitable subordination in Pepper). Both 
Pepper and Comstock subordinated the claims of fiduciaries of the bankrupt. In Pepper, 
the Court held that subordination under equitable principles of the bankrupt party's 
dominant shareholder's claim was warranted where the shareholder used his insider 
position to gain a personal advantage at the expense of the plaintiff. 308 U.S. at 311. 
Comstock, however, which involved an alter ego and undercapitalization scenario, 
narrowed the potential scope of the bankruptcy courts' equitable authority as enunciated 
in Pepper by observing that a court cannot reclassify a valid claim that an innocent party 
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cases, along with other relevant authorities decided under the 1898 Act, 
continue to be influential in interpreting the meaning and scope of the 
doctrine under the Code.l66 That same legislative history makes equally 
clear that, in codifying the bankruptcy courts' authority to subordinate 
claims under principles of equitable subordination, Congress did not 
intend to limit the power and ability of the bankruptcy courts to further 
defme and develop the perimeters of the doctrine. 167 To the contrary, 
Congress deliberately left it to the courts, in the context of actual cases, 
to fashion the standards and guidelines governing the future 
application of the judicially-created doctrine, now newly exalted to 
statutory rank under the Code.168 However, as was observed earlier in 
asserted in good faith just because the court perceives the result to be inequitable. 
Comstock, 335 U.S at 229-30. 
For an extended treatment of subordination under the 1898 Act, see Asa S. Herzog 
& Joel B. Zweibel, The Equitable Subordination of Claims in Bankruptcy, 15 VAND. L. 
REV. 83 (1961). For summary treatments of those cases in connection with the 
development of the common law doctrine of equitable subordination, see Scott M. Brown, 
Note, No Fault Equitable Subordination: Reassuring Investors that Only Government 
Penalty Claims Are at Risk, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 487, 490--96 (1993); Nozemack, supra 
note 73, at 692 (ultimately advancing a position very much at odds with the approach 
taken herein, as the author's aim is to supply an answer to the question posed by his 
title). 
166. "It is intended that the term 'principles of equitable subordination' follow existing 
case law and leave to the courts development of this principle." 124 CONG. REC. 32,398 
(1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); id. at 33,998 (statement of Sen. DeConcini); accord 
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 359 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6315 
(noting, in relation to an earlier version of the bill, that the new provision was intended to 
codify existing case law, such as Pepper and Taylor). Representative Edwards and 
Senator DeConcini served as floor managers of the bill in their respective chambers of 
Congress and, contrary to the normal conference process, essentially hammered out the 
final terms of the bill. They issued identical statements that, because of the unusual 
circumstances, are considered important components of the legislative history. Their floor 
statements are together hereinafter referred to as the "Floor Managers' Statement." 
167. See 124 CONG. REC. 32,398 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); id. at 33,998 
(statement of Sen. DeConcini); see also infra notes 296-97 and accompanying text 
(discussing the statement in toto). House Report 95 contained even more expansive 
language suggesting that "[t]he court's power is broader than the general doctrine of 
equitable subordination, and encompasses subordination on any equitable grounds." H.R. 
REP. No. 95·595, at 359. However, as discussed, supra note 155, House Report 95 was 
issued in response to an earlier version of the bill that did not reflect the final text of 
§ 510(c), and, thus, must be read with that admonition in mind. On the other hand, it 
hardly renders House Report 95 irrelevant in the interpretation of the Code. For general 
discussion of the unusual circumstances surrounding the passage of the Code, see 
Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 941 
(1979). As to how this unusual legislative process impacted what finally became § 510(c) 
of the 1978 Act, see Rafael Ignacio Pardo, Note, Beyond the Limits of Equity 
Jurisprudence: No-Fault Equitable Subordination, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1489 (2000). 
168. See Burden v. United States, 917 F.2d 115, 117-18 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing In re 
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connection with the discussion of N & D Properties, 169 because equitable 
subordination is considered to be "remedial" and not penal, 170 it was 
understood that a claim would be subordinated only to the extent 
necessary to remediate the harm caused to the debtor and other 
creditors as a consequence of the offending conduct.171 
For a brief time after enactment of the 1978 Act, bankruptcy courts 
made relatively liberal, but appropriate, use of the doctrine of equitable 
subordination "to the end that fraud will not prevail, that substance 
will not give way to form, [and] that technical considerations will not 
prevent substantial justice from being done."172 Gradually, however, the 
Virtual Network Servs. Corp., 902 F.2d 1246, 1248-50 (7th Cir. 1990)) (reaching the 
conclusion that Congress intended for the courts to develop "principles of equitable 
subordination" based on a review of the applicable legislative history). The court in 
Virtual Network observed that "principles of equitable subordination" are broader than 
the doctrine that developed prior to § 510(c)(1)'s enactment. 902 F.2d at 1250; see also 
infra note 297 and accompanying text. 
169. See supra text accompanying note 44. 
170. See, e.g., Mishkin v. Siclari (In re Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp.), 277 B.R. 520, 
563 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (''The equitable subordination doctrine, codified in part in 
Section 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, is limited to reordering priorities; it does not 
permit disallowance of claims." (footnote omitted) (citing 80 Nassau Assocs. v. Crossland 
Fed. Sav. Bank, 169 B.R. 832, 836-37 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994))); see also supra note 141. 
171. See, e.g., 80 Nassau Assocs., 169 B.R. at 840 (''The principle of equitable 
subordination ... empowers and requires the Bankruptcy Court to tailor the remedy to fit 
the harm. If the injury or unfair advantage affects only a specific creditor or segment of 
creditors, the court should subordinate the offending claimant only to the more limited 
class of claims rather than the claims of all creditors." (citing Miller v. Borton (In re 
Bowman Hardware & Elec. Co.), 67 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1933); Bank of New Richmond v. 
Prud. Credit Assoc. of River Falls (In re Osborne), 42 B.R. 988, 1000 (W.D. Wis. 1984))). 
The misconduct, however, need not necessarily arise out of the creation of the claim for 
which subordination is sought. See, e.g., Enron Corp. v. Ave. Special Situations Fund II, 
LP (In re Enron Corp.), 333 B.R. 205, 219 n.4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Fundamentally, 
the analysis focuses on the alleged inequitable conduct, and any associated harm 
therefrom, not on any particular claim or group of claims."). 
172. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 305 (1939). Spurred by the decision of the court in 
Bergquist u. First National Bank of St. Paul (In re American Lumber), 7 B.R. 519 (Bankr. 
D. Minn. 1979), affd, 5 B.R. 4 70 (D. Minn. 1980), there was a brief period of time when 
equitable subordination was seen as a potentially powerful weapon in the emerging field 
of lender liability. See Andrew DeNatale & Prudence B. Abram, The Doctrine of Equitable 
Subordination as Applied to Nonmanagement Creditors, 40 Bus. LAW. 417, 424-25 (1985) 
("Once a creditor assumes control over a debtor's operations, it assumes a duty to deal 
fairly with the debtor and its creditors, and its conduct is subjected to the scrutiny of the 
court."); Jeremy W. Dickens, Note, Equitable Subordination and Analogous Theories of 
Lender Liability: Toward a New Model of "Control," 65 TEX. L. REV. 801, 802 (1987) 
("[T]he use of equitable subordination against nonmanagement creditors has the financial 
community searching for standards by which to measure the boundaries of legitimate 
conduct."). However, while a lender that exerts too much control over the borrower could 
still be vulnerable even today, courts have generally been reluctant to find that a lending 
institution's conduct rises to the level of the kind of gross misconduct that might warrant 
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courts, and particularly the courts that sit m appellate review of 
bankruptcy decisions, began to cut back, if not necessarily on the 
authority of the bankruptcy courts under § 510(c), then on the 
circumstances under which the bankruptcy courts might invoke that 
authority.l73 The contraction in the scope of the remedy, coupled with 
the courts' chariness in bringing it to bear, 174 was most keenly felt, of 
course, in the case of claims held by noninsiders_l75 Not coincidently by 
subordination of it claim. See supra note 163. Therefore, the traditional "easy" targets for 
subordination have been and remain claims held by insiders: a corporate debtor's officers, 
directors, and controlling stockholders. Such claimholders stand in a fiduciary 
relationship with the community of players-the debtor, equity owners, and creditors-
imposing heightened standards for their conduct. See Fabricators, Inc. v. Tech. 
Fabricators, Inc. (In re Fabricators, Inc.), 926 F.2d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that 
the level of inequitable conduct required in the case of insiders is different); CapMark Fin. 
Grp. Inc. v. Goldman Sachs Credit Partners L.P., 491 B.R. 335, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(noting that, in the case of insiders, once the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of 
inequitable conduct, the burden shifts to the claimant to prove good faith and the 
inherent fairness of the transaction); Litzler v. Cooper (In re Margaux Tex. Ventures, 
Inc.), 545 B.R. 506, 514 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014) (noting that "[a] claim arising from the 
dealings between a debtor and an insider is to be rigorously scrutinized by the courts" 
(alteration in original) (quoting Bayer Corp. v. MascoTech, Inc. (In re AutoStyle Plastics, 
Inc.), 269 F.3d 726, 744 (6th Cir. 2001))). But see Va. Broadband, LLC v. Manuel, 538 B.R. 
253, 264 (W.D. Va. 2015) (pointing out that the standard for inequitable conduct is not as 
high when the creditor is an insider). 
173. See Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 
1356-57 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that, in the case of noninsiders, a creditor whose conduct 
does not exceed the powers reserved to it under its contract does not engage in inequitable 
conduct). The Fifth Circuit went even further in Smith v. Associates Commercial Corp. (In 
re Clark Pipe and Supply Co.) with its observation that, even if the loan documents give 
the lender the right to exert control, it is the exercise of that power, and not simply its 
reservation, that is inequitable. 893 F.2d 693, 701 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Friesen v. 
Seacoast Capital Partners II, L.P. (In re QuVIS, Inc.), 469 B.R. 353, 368 (D. Kan. 2012) 
(holding that a lender that exercised its rights under a loan agreement, including having 
its managing director placed on the debtor's board of directors, did not qualify as a 
nonstatutory insider for purposes of§ 510(c)); supra note 27; infra text accompanying note 
285. 
174. See, e.g., Nat'l Emergency Servs. v. Williams, 371 B.R. 166, 170 (W.D. Va. 2007) 
(describing equitable subordination as an extraordinary remedy to be invoked sparingly); 
Aetna Bank v. Dvorak, 176 B.R. 160, 166 (N.D. ill. 1994) (providing that equitable 
subordination should only be invoked in extreme circumstances); Margaux Tex. Ventures, 
545 B.R. at 514-15 (observing that less egregious conduct may support equitable 
subordination when the claimant is an insider); see also supra note 59. In an article 
written around the heyday of lender liability, DeNatale and Abram suggested that the 
application of equitable subordination to nonmanagement creditors was due not to 
changes in the doctrine itself, but rather evolving commercial developments, including the 
use of more aggressive financial transactions. DeN a tale & Abram, supra note 172, at 44 7-
48. 
175. See, e.g., In re Mid-Am. Waste Sys., Inc., 284 B.R. 53, 70 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) 
("[T]he standard for finding inequitable conduct is much lower [for insiders versus 
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any means, this trend to rein in the bankruptcy courts' application of its 
statutory subordination powers under § 510(c) paralleled, and I would 
suggest may have instigated, the emergence of recharacterization as an 
autonomous, standalone basis for challenging equity interests allegedly 
disguised or mislabeled as debt. Prior to that time, despite whatever 
conceptual differences might have been perceived to exist between the 
two doctrines, 176 recharacterization challenges tended to be treated as 
part, and within the boundaries, of an equitable subordination 
analysis. 177 
noninsiders]."). However, while courts are reluctant to subordinate noninsider claims, the 
lack of insider status does not confer blanket immunity in the face of egregious conduct. 
See, e.g., Miller v. Greenwich Capital Fin. Prods., Inc. (In reAm. Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc.), 
362 B.R. 149, 157 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (finding that defendant intentionally suppressed 
the value of debtor's assets); Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp., 277 B.R. at 566 (finding the 
creditor "willingly" and ''knowingly" engaged in conduct that amounted to "fraud, 
illegality, [and] breach of fiduciary duty"); see also infra text accompanying notes 207-11. 
For a couple of early examples of subordination being invoked against noninsiders, see 
Osborne, 42 B.R. at 999 (finding that creditor misrepresented debtor's financial situation 
to another creditor so that the other creditor would continue to extend the debtor credit); 
First Nat'l Bank of Gatlinburg v. Charles Blalock & Sons, Inc. (In re Just for the Fun of It 
of Tenn., Inc.), 7 B.R. 166, 180 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980) (fmding that contractor filed 
false notice of completion, on which other creditors relied when granting additional credit 
to bankrupt). 
176. Among other differences, it has been pointed out that insider status is not 
technically a factor in the recharacterization analysis. See Erica Litovitz, Debt 
Recharacterization and Its Place in the Bankruptcy Code, 10 SETON HALL Cm. REV. 307, 
326 (2014). On the one hand, for the most part, disinterested third parties deal with the 
debtor at arm's length and do not infuse new equity into the corporation. See United 
States v. Colo. Invesco, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 1339, 1345 (D. Colo. 1995). Thus, 
recharacterization is primarily suggested when the contributors are insiders, bearing in 
mind that "control" may be a sufficient basis to confer insider status, even in the absence 
of a formal relationship with the debtor such as an officer or director position. See 
Fabricators, 926 F.2d at 1466. See infra Part IV.C for further discussion of this point. In 
addition, while a recharacterization scenario may well entail inequitable conduct, it is not 
a prerequisite. This probably represents, more so than the status of a claimant as an 
insider or noninsider, the most substantive contemporary difference between the two 
remedies. See infra text accompanying notes 333, 344. 
177. See, e.g., Aquino v. Black (In re AtlanticRancher, Inc.), 279 B.R. 411, 433 (Bankr. 
D. Mass. 2002) (noting that recharacterization was once considered solely in conjunction 
with equitable subordination, but now is recognized as a separate cause of action). In an 
1898 Act case, the Supreme Court observed that "[t]he power of the bankruptcy court to 
subordinate claims or to adjudicate equities arising out of the relationship between the 
several creditors is complete." Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 
219 (1941) (citing Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939); Pepper, 308 
U.S. 295; Bird & Sons Sales Corp. v. Tobin, 78 F.3d 371 (8th Cir. 1935)). In their classic 
treatment of equitable subordination under the 1898 Act, Herzog and Zweibel devote an 
entire section to the "Capital Contribution Cases," which they describe as "a sub-
classification within the general sphere of equitable subordination." Herwg & Zweibel, 
supra note 165, at 93. They go on to state: 
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Doubtless, the most influential decision affecting the scope of the 
doctrine under the Code was handed down by the Fifth Circuit in a case 
decided, ironically enough, under the 1898 Act: In re Mobile Steel Co.ns 
The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Mobile Steel is most notable for its 
articulation of a three-pronged test for ascertaining when equitable 
subordination of a claim (or interest) should be ordered. Specifically, the 
conditions that have to be satisfied in order to invoke the courts' 
authority under § 510(c) were stated as being that: (1) the claimant 
engaged in inequitable conduct, (2) the misconduct caused injury to 
other creditors or conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant, and 
(3) the subordination would not be inconsistent with the provisions of 
the Code.l79 With regard to the critical first prong, inequitable conduct 
has, in turn, generally come to be understood as comprising behavior 
falling into one of three categories: (1) fraud, illegality, and breach of 
fiduciary duty; (2) undercapitalization; and (3) use of the debtor as a 
mere instrumentality or alter egoJBO Although recognition of 
undercapitalization as bearing on inequitable conduct unquestionably 
Once the judicial investigation has determined that the claim is not in fact a debt 
but is a proprietary interest, subordination follows as a matter of course for the 
essential nature of a capital interest is a fund contributed to meet the obligations 
of a business and which is to be repaid only after all other obligations have been 
satisfied. Inasmuch as the focal issue is the true nature of the transaction, in 
order to effect subordination, it is not necessary to prove the existence of fraud or 
other inequitable conduct. 
Id. at 94. In ascertaining the true nature of a monetary advance, the authors proceed to 
discuss a list of factors that, in many respects, mirror the multifactor approach favored in 
a majority of circuits for determining when recharacterization is appropriate. Id. at 95-
97; see supra Part I. C. Never do the authors state or imply that the matter is distinct from 
or should be examined other than under the doctrine of equitable subordination. See infra 
note 337. 
178. Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977). 
179. Id. at 700. The third condition or guiding principle is something of a formality. 
See, e.g., 80 Nassau Assocs. v. Crossland Fed. Sav. Bank (In re 80 Nassau Assocs.), 169 
B.R. 832, 841 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (observing that it would be difficult to imagine a 
circumstance where subordination was not warranted once the first two prongs had been 
satisfied). However, the third prong has been described as "a reminder to the bankruptcy 
court that although it is a court of equity, it is not free to adjust the legally valid claim of 
an innocent party who asserts the claim in good faith merely because the court perceives 
that the result is inequitable." Enron Corp. v. Ave. Special Situations Fund II, LP (In re 
Enron Corp.), 333 B.R. 205, 231 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing United States v. Noland, 
517 u.s. 535, 539 (1996)). 
180. See Wilson v. Huffman (In re Missionary Baptist Found.), 712 F.2d 206, 212 (5th 
Cir. 1983); SEC. v. Spongetech Delivery Sys., Inc., 98 F. Supp. 3d 530, 553 (E.D.N.Y. 
2015) (identifying three "paradigms" in which courts have found inequitable conduct); 
Bank of N.Y. v. USA Capital Diversified Tr. Deed Fund, LLC (In re Epic Capital Corp.), 
290 B.R. 514, 524 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003), affd, 307 B.R. 767 (D. Del. 2004). 
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suggests a nexus with debt recharacterization,181 as noted earlier,182 the 
courts have overwhelmingly held that undercapitalization alone is 
insufficient to meet the standard. 183 Thus, with its emphasis on 
inequitable conduct, Mobile Steel and its progeny have made debt 
recharacterization an awkward, albeit not entirely impossible, l84 fit 
under § 510(c), thereby likely hastening the relatively recent evolution 
of recharacterization into an independent claim for relief and remedy. 
The Supreme Court entered into the discussion of equitable 
subordination under the Code in United States v. Noland, 185 a case that 
even further narrowed the scope of§ 510(c), but at the same time also 
cracked open the door to a potentially more expansive interpretation. 186 
At issue in the case was the lower courts' subordination of the 
government's postpetition, nonpecuniary tax loss penalty claim upon 
conversion of a case from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7.187 The Supreme 
Court reversed, stating emphatically that a reordering of Code 
priorities under§ 510(c) based solely on the intrinsic nature of the claim 
exceeded the scope of the courts' authority under "principles of 
equitable subordination."188 The Court reaffirmed this position in a case 
decided during the same term, United States v. Reorganized CF & I 
Fabricators of Utah, holding that even when the claim in question is not 
entitled to a statutory priority, as was true in Noland, subordination 
cannot be wholly based on the nature of the claim itself.1B9 
181. This was a consistent theme in the trilogy of Supreme Court cases, see supra note 
165, that gave rise to equitable subordination, and that also have been cited as forming 
the basis for the bankruptcy courts' authority to recharacterize claims. See, e.g., FCC v. 
Airadigm Commc'ns (In re Airadigm Commc'ns, Inc.), 616 F.3d 642, 657-58 (7th Cir. 
2010) (noting the connection made in the case law between the remedy of 
recharacterization and the sentiments expressed by the Supreme Court in Pepper). 
182. See infra Part N.A. 
183. See, e.g., Fabricators, Inc. v. Tech. Fabricators, Inc. (In re Fabricators, Inc.), 926 
F.2d 1458, 1469 (9th Cir. 1991); In re Va. Broadband, LLC, 521 B.R. 539, 564 n.170 
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 2014) (citing In re Lifschultz Fast Freight, 132 F.3d 339, 349 (7th Cir. 
1997)), affd, 538 B.R. 253 (W.D. Va. 2015). 
184. See infra Part N.A-B. 
185. 517 u.s. 535 (1996). 
186. See infra Part N.B. 
187. In affirming the bankruptcy court's decision to subordinate the government's 
administrative expense claim, the Sixth Circuit stated: "Because of the nature of 
postpetition, nonpecuniary loss tax penalty claims in a Chapter 7 case, we believe such 
claims are susceptible to subordination." United States v. Noland (In re First Truck Lines, 
Inc.), 48 F. 3d 210, 218 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 517 U.S. 535. 
188. Noland, 517 U.S. at 542-43 (stating that § 510(c) permits a court to make 
exceptions to a general rule only when justified by particular facts). 
189. 518 U.S. 213, 228 (1996) (describing Noland as having nothing to do with the fact 
that the claim in that case was entitled to statutory priority, but rather with the 
reordering of priority on a categorical basis). 
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Of critical importance for present purposes, while the Court's 
decision m Noland referred to the Mobile Steel factors as 
"influential,"190 it did not affirmatively adopt or endorse those 
standards.191 That is to say, the holdings in Noland and Reorganized 
CF & I were based entirely on the "if this, then that" nature of the 
reasoning in the lower courts' decisions, and not on their conclusion 
that equitable subordination might be invoked despite the absence of 
misconduct on the defendant's part. This omission spawned a discussion 
in the case law and commentary about the possibility of so-called no-
fault equitable subordination, 192 the phrase used to refer to application 
of the remedy without proof of the first Mobile Steel factor, namely, 
inequitable conduct. Although the concept of no-fault subordination has 
gained some support in certain types of cases, 193 for the most part, proof 
of inequitable conduct largely remains the order of the day.194 However, 
as will be discussed below, 195 it may be timely to reexamine the sagacity 
of that view. Two additional equitable subordination cases deserve 
mention before moving on. In the first, John and Jeffrey Wooley, 
officers, directors, and the largest shareholders of Schlotzsky's, Inc., 
made two secured loans, totaling $3.5 million, to the company in order 
190. Noland, 517 U.S. at 543 (noting that it is not necessary to "decide today whether a 
bankruptcy court must always find creditor misconduct before a claim may be equitably 
subordinated"). 
191. It should be observed that some courts have determined this statement to be a 
sufficient indication of the Court's approval of the Mobile Steel test so as to warrant 
adoption of the test. See, e.g., Schubert v. Lucent Techs. Inc. (In re Winstar Commc'ns, 
Inc.), 554 F.3d 382, 411-12 (3d Cir. 2009). It should also be noted that while the circuit 
court in Reorganized CF & I had specifically ruled that equitable subordination might be 
invoked despite the absence of inequitable conduct, United States v. Reorganized CF & I 
Fabricators of Utah, Inc. (In re CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc.), 53 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 
(lOth Cir. 1995), vacated, 518 U.S. 213, the Supreme Court's opinion only rejected 
categorical subordination of tax penalties and did not question the possibility of no-fault 
subordination if done after an individualized analysis of the facts of the case. Reorganized 
CF & I, 518 U.S. at 229. Even the Tenth Circuit, however, has declined to apply the 
exception to claimant misconduct beyond the tax penalty context. Sender v. Bronze Grp., 
Ltd. (In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs., Inc.), 380 F.3d 1292, 1301 (lOth Cir. 2004). 
192. See infra Part IV.A. See generally Jonathan A. Carson, Pre-Petition Capital 
Contributions: The Road to Equitable Treatment in Bankruptcy, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L. 
REV. 403, 416; Pardo, supra note 167, at 1492; Richard C. Solow, The Very Limited No-
Fault Equitable Subordination Theory: Why Section 5JO(c) Requires Misconduct in Nearly 
All Cases, 22 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 1 (2013) 
193. See infra Part IV .A. 
194. See, e.g., Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd. v. Comm. of Creditors Holding Unsecured 
Claims, 160 F.3d 982, 986-87 (3d Cir. 1998); In re LifSchultz Fast Freight, 132 F.3d 339, 
34 7-49 (7th Cir. 1997); see also supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
195. See infra Part IV.B. 
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to alleviate severe cash flow shortages. 196 In addition, the second loan 
agreement pledged the company's assets as additional security for $4.3 
million in guaranties previously made by the Wooleys on the company's 
outstanding bank debt. 197 Despite the further cash infusion, the 
company's fmancial fortunes continued to decline, and the Wooleys 
were removed as officers (and resigned as directors) of the company.198 
Not long after, the company commenced a case under Chapter 11, 
whereupon the unsecured creditors committee filed an adversary 
proceeding seeking to strip the Wooleys of their security interests and 
subordinate their purported debt claims under § 510(c)J99 The 
bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the committee, finding that the 
Wooleys had breached their fiduciary duties by the manner in which 
they obtained approval for their loans and, in so doing, had secured "an 
unfair advantage" for themselves vis-a-vis other creditors.2oo The 
district court affirmed, and the case was appealed to the Fifth Circuit, 
which reversed the lower courts in no uncertain terms.2o1 While the 
court surmised that the record could probably support a fmding of 
inequitable conduct and unfair advantage, it concluded that the absence 
of a showing of any harm to the debtor or its creditors was fatal to the 
claim for relief under§ 510(c).202 In insisting upon a showing of ''harm," 
196. Wooley v. Faulkner (In re SI Restructuring, Inc.), 532 F.3d 355, 357-58 (5th Cir. 
2008). 
197. Id. at 358. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. at 359. 
201. Id. at 360-61. 
202. Id. at 361. The court rejected the committee's argument that unsecured creditors 
were harmed because the debtor's assets were reduced when the Wooleys were granted a 
security interest in the company's assets. Id. at 362--63. Specifically, the court observed 
that the loan proceeds had been used to pay some unsecured creditors, and, thus, 
unsecured creditors as a class were not harmed. Id. The court also pointed out that the 
unsecured creditors that had not been paid were unable to show that they had any 
entitlement to payment senior to that of the creditors who were paid. Id. This may well be 
true, but it does not overcome the fact that they were still harmed by the net reduction in 
the company's assets available for distribution to unsecured creditors. In any case, the 
court also rejected the committee's theory of harm in the form of "deepening insolvency." 
Id. at 363. This represents a theory of damages under which a plaintiff might recover the 
entire difference in value between the company as of the date that it became insolvent 
and as of the date it ultimately files for bankruptcy depending on how the loaned proceeds 
are used. See generally Hugh M. McDonald, Todd S. Fishman & Laura Martin, Lafferty's 
Orphan: The Abandonment of Deepening Insolvency, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec.-Jan. 2008, 
at 1. In rejecting the deepening insolvency theory of damages, the court indicated its 
intent to align itself with the Third Circuit's decision in Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey & 
Assocs., P.C. (In re CitX Corp.), 448 F.3d 672, 678 (3d Cir. 2006), wherein the court 
qualified its earlier opinion in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty 
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the Fifth Circuit seemed to be ignoring its own formulation of the 
conditions that must be satisfied in order to invoke the doctrine, which 
included that the misconduct must cause injury to other creditors or 
confer an unfair advantage on the claimant.203 That formulation might 
logically be read to suggest that these are alternative ways to satisfy 
the second element for equitable subordination, one of which was 
satisfied in SI Restructuring. 
In any case, the result in SI Restructuring was hailed in some 
quarters for not creating an additional barrier that might tend to deter 
insiders from making loans to their beleaguered companies.204 The 
decision might also be perceived as further distancing debt 
recharacterization from equitable subordination, inasmuch as the 
former, not being directly remedial in nature, would not appear to hinge 
on a showing of harm to the debtor or other creditors. As will be seen, 205 
however, there were factors at play in SI Restructuring that do not 
make its holding, properly delineated, inconsistent with the 
recharacterization of debt by means of § 510(c). Furthermore, 
mischaracterization of an investment in the debtor entity that 
artificially elevates its priority is, by its very nature, prejudicial to the 
holders of true debt claims.206 The second case, In re Yellowstone 
Mountain Club,207 is notable as a rare contemporary example of 
subordination being (1) ordered against a noninsider, though its facts 
were unusually egregious, and (2) ordered without a specific showing of 
& Co., 267 F.3d 340, 351 (3d Cir. 2001), which had recognized deepening insolvency as a 
valid cause of action under Pennsylvania law. SI Restructuring, 532 F.3d at 363; see also 
infra notes 327-328 and accompanying text (discussing subsequent developments 
regarding the deepening insolvency theory). In any case, the court in SI Restructuring 
went on to muse that even if it were inclined to accept deepening insolvency as a valid 
theory of damages, the facts did not support its application in this case. 532 F.3d at 364. 
203. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. Instead, the court seemed to assume 
that unfair advantage was part of the first, rather than the second, prong of the Mobile 
Steel test. SI Restructuring, 532 F.3d at 361--62. 
204. See, e.g., Patricia A. Redmond & Jessica D. Gabel, Not All Loans Are Created 
Equal: Equitable Subordination and Prepetition Lending After SI Restructuring, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2008, at 22. 
205. See infra text accompanying notes 324-25. 
206. See infra note 329 and accompanying text. The only exception would be where the 
debtor remains solvent in a balance-sheet sense despite the additional liability created by 
the mischaracterized investment. 
207. Credit Suisse v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Yellowstone 
Mountain Club, LLC), No. 08-61570-11, 2009 WL 3094930 (Bankr. D. Mont. May 12, 
2009) (granting preliminary injunction), vacated, No. 08-61570-11-RBK, 2009 WL 
10624435 (Bankr. D. Mont. June 29, 2009). The opinion was thereafter vacated following 
settlement. Yellowstone Mountain, 2009 WL 10624435. 
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affirmative misconduct in the Mobile Steel sense of that phrase. 208 
Giving rise to the case, Credit Suisse acted as the lead arranger for a 
$375 million loan to the debtor companies.209 The transaction involved 
what the court referred to as a "new financial product" that, among 
other things, allowed the shareholders of the debtor companies to 
receive significant distributions from the loan proceeds.21o Finding, in 
addition to the unusual character of the credit facility, a wholesale lack 
of due diligence and negligent lending practices on the part of the 
defendant, the court ordered that $209 million of the total loan amount 
be subordinated to the claims of the debtor-in-possession lender, as well 
as to unsecured creditors.211 The decision not only marks a sharp 
reversal in the trend to narrow the scope of the doctrine of equitable 
subordination, but, as discussed in Part IV below, also points the way 
toward assuring that the courts' ability to recharacterize equity 
contributions disguised as debt is not undermined either by the 
uncertainty surrounding the reach of the equitable authority of the 
bankruptcy courts under § 105(a) or unnecessary obeisance to 
nonuniform state law. 
Ill. RECHARACTERIZATION REDUX 
A. The Flaw in the Minority Approach 
Timorous about construing § 105(a) more broadly, both Lothian 
Oil212 and Fitness Holdings213 looked to § 502(b) as the statutory basis 
on which a bankruptcy court might recharacterize a transaction 
208. Some questioned just how outrageous the lender's conduct was in light of current 
standards governing a lender's responsibilities in arms-length transactions. See, e.g., Jo 
Ann J. Brighton & Felton E. Parrish, Yellowstone: New Standards for Lender Liability in 
Today's Economic Climate, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2009, at 28. For a more critical view 
of the Credit Suisse's conduct in the loan transaction, see J. Thomas Beckett, A Rogue 
Loan, Not a Rogue Decision: A Response to a Recent Analysis of Yellowstone, AM. BANKR. 
INST. J., Nov. 2009, at 22. In terms of how the phrase "inequitable conduct" has come to be 
understood, see supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
209. Yellowstone Mountain, 2009 WL 3094930, at *5. 
210. Id. at *8. In this particular case, there are some eerie similarities to the 
transaction at issue in Adelphia Recovery Trust v. Bank of America, N.A., 390 B.R. 64 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008), adhered to on reconsideration, Nos. 05 Civ. 9050 (LMM), 03 MDL 1529, 
2008 WL 1959542 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2008), discussed supra notes 138-55 and 
accompanying text. 
211. Yellowstone Mountain, 2009 WL 3094930, at *10. The $209 million represented 
the portion of the loan proceeds transferred to the companies' shareholders. Id. 
212. Grossman v. Lothian Oil Inc. (In re Lothian Oil Inc.), 650 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 2011). 
213. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Hancock Park Capital II, L.P. (In re 
Fitness Holdings Int'l, Inc.), 714 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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denominated as a loan by classifying it as equity. Proceeding from what 
they perceived to be the sentiments of the Supreme Court expressed in 
Butner v. United States, 214 that step led both courts to the subsidiary 
conclusion regarding the primacy of state law in determining if and 
when the circumstances dictate recharacterization.215 As I have opined 
elsewhere,216 however, the Supreme Court's 1979 decision in Butner has 
been given a far more sweeping construction and application than is 
merited by its actual holding. 217 Nevertheless, even conceding for 
present purposes the broad interpretation of the case adopted by the 
Fifth and Ninth Circuits, Butner (and its progeny) still cannot possibly 
stand for the proposition for which both decisions cite it, nor can it 
support the rule applied in those cases. 
To begin with, in Fitness Holdings, the court looked to Travelers 
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., which, citing 
Butner, held that courts should not use a federal rule to determine 
whether a prepetition contract represents a "right to payment" giving 
rise to a "claim" for purposes of the federal bankruptcy law.218 Butner, 
in turn, held that "[p]roperty interests are created and defined by state 
law," and that, "[u]nless some federal interest requires a different 
result, there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed 
differently simply because an interested party is involved in a 
bankruptcy proceeding."219 The import of these statements is that, 
although the question of what constitutes property of the estate is 
214. 440 u.s. 48 (1979). 
215. See supra Part I.D.l. 
216. See, e.g., Lawrence Ponoroff, Reclaim This! Getting Credit Seller Claims in 
Bankruptcy Right, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 733, 789 (2014) ("[W]e all bow to Butner, but, in 
truth, the principle articulated in Butner represents no more than a bias. By definition, 
then, it applies more often than not, but it is not an absolute that substitutes for reasoned 
analysis in each instance where federal and state law intersect." (footnote omitted)); see 
also infra notes 221-25 for other expositions questioning the appropriateness of the 
expansive interpretation Butner has received in the lower courts. 
217. Butner actually does no more than express in the negative the basic truism that 
when a state law property definition interferes with federal bankruptcy policy, the state 
law rule is preempted under the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution. For 
example, in Kanter v. Moneymaker (In re Kanter), the court invalidated a state statute 
that purported to defease the bankruptcy trustee of any interest in a prepetition personal 
injury lawsuit. 505 F.2d 228, 230-31 (9th Cir. 1974). The court found that enforcement of 
that provision directly conflicted with the provisions of the former Bankruptcy Act's 
definition of property of the estate as well as with the overall distributional priority 
scheme established by the Act. Id.; see also In re Pruitt, 401 B.R. 546, 564 (Bankr. D. 
Conn. 2009) (suggesting that many courts read Butner too broadly). 
218. 549 u.s. 443, 450-51 (2007). 
219. Butner, 440 U.S. at 55. 
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determined as a matter of federallaw, 220 the nature and attributes of a 
debtor's interest in property will ordinarily be ascertained by reference 
to nonbankruptcy law, and, most frequently, state law.221 This only 
makes sense in that, for the most part, Congress has chosen (and wisely 
so) not to create an entirely new regime of property rights, 
entitlements, limitations, and priorities that would attain upon the 
filing of a federal bankruptcy case.222 
On its facts, however, Butner involved an issue of whether a 
mortgage interest extended to rents from the encumbered property;223 
the opinion had nothing at all to say about whether the substance of the 
transaction coincided with the manner in which it had been labelled. It 
had nothing to say because the transaction was assumed by all 
concerned to be precisely what it purported to be, such that its true 
character was never an issue in the case. Thus, Butner is largely 
superfluous insofar as the issue that the courts faced in Lothian Oil and 
Fitness Holdings is concerned. Even more to the point, however, simply 
because state law determines whether a claim exists-whether there is 
a right to payment-that determination says absolutely nothing about 
how the claim will or should be treated in bankruptcy, i.e., whether it 
will be allowed or disallowed in a bankruptcy case, and, if allowed, the 
priority it will enjoy. The questions are controlled exclusively by federal 
law,224 and therefore must be resolved based on the policies implicated 
220. Bd. of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 10 (1924); McCarthy, Johnson & Miller v. N. 
Bay Plumbing, Inc. (In re Pettit), 217 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that 
"whether an interest claimed by the debtor is 'property of the estate' is a federal question 
to be decided by federal law" and it is irrelevant that state law might not call the same 
interest property (citing Butner, 440 U.S. at 54-55)). 
221. This is basically the teaching of Butner; federal law establishes the scope of 
property of the estate-regardless of how the interest might be characterized by state 
law-and state law then defines the nature of the debtor's property interest. See Flores v. 
Yarnall (In re Flores), Nos. NV·09·1263-DJuP, 08-21047-MKN, 2010 WL 6259989, at *7 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. Apr. 6, 2010) (interpreting the Ninth Circuit's holding in Sierra 
Switchboard Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 789 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
222. Although Congress has the constitutional authority to create and determine 
property interests in bankruptcy, by and large commercial law has remained primarily 
the province of the states. See generally A. Brooke Overby, Our New Commercial Law 
Federalism, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 297 (2003) (examining the historical and present allocation 
of lawmaking power in commercial areas between the federal and state governments and 
proposing a new cooperative framework between the two). 
223. 440 U.S. at 52-53. 
224. See James N. Duca & Cori Ann C. Yokota, The Role of Res Judicata in Bankruptcy 
Claim Allowance Proceedings, 17 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 10 (1995) (observing that both before 
and after enactment of the 1978 Act, the Supreme Court's decision in Vanston 
Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946) has been understood as 
establishing "the principle that the allowance of a claim is strictly a matter of federal 
law''); see also CHARLES JORDAN TABB, LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 762 (3d ed. 2014) (making the 
2016] WHITHER RECHARACTERIZATION 1261 
upon the filing of a bankruptcy case, policies that simply do not attain 
under state law.225 In no way does Butner alter that axiomatic truth. 
Thus, to conclude that state law would regard a particular investment 
as a loan (or as an equity contribution) in a given situation is, if not 
entirely meaningless, certainly not decisive, and by no means does it 
signal the end of the inquiry. In short, that state law conclusion does 
not answer the question of how this claim should be characterized in 
bankruptcy,226 save for the fortuitous circumstance when the state law 
rule for making that determination just happens to coincide with the 
federal test. 227 But to leave the matter to be decided based on the purely 
serendipitous rubrics of state law is hardly prudent; it is not mandated 
by the Supreme Court's opinion in Butner and it is certainly no way to 
run the railroad. 22s 
The court in Dornier Aviation recognized this need to go beyond 
§ 502(b), noting that "even if a claimant is able to meet§ 502's minimal 
threshold for allowance of the claim, the bankruptcy court still must 
look beyond the form of the transaction to determine the claim's proper 
[provenance] ."229 In doing so, the Dornier Aviation court understood 
same point in the context of the consequences of surrender of property subject to 
§ 1325(a)(5), the so-called "hanging paragraph" at the end of§ 1325(a)). 
225. AB stated in In re American Reserve Corp.: 
The principal function of bankruptcy law is to determine and implement in a 
single collective proceeding the entitlements of all concerned .... When there is 
not enough to go around, the bankruptcy judge must establish priorities and 
apportion assets among creditors with the same priority, but the starting point is 
legal entitlements that exist outside of bankruptcy. 
840 F.2d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing Butner, 440 U.S. 48; Bos. & Me. Corp. v. Chi. Pac. 
Corp., 785 F.2d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 1986)). AB just one of many examples, § 502(b)(6) places 
a cap on an allowable claim for future rents because of the risk that otherwise such a 
claim might overwhelm the case, thereby treating other creditors unfairly and inhibiting 
the prospects of a successful reorganization. See In re Kmart Corp., 362 B.R. 361, 384 
(Bankr. N.D. ill. 2007), affd, Philip Morris Capital Corp. v. Kmart Corp., No. 07 C 1926, 
2007 WL 3171316 (N.D. ill. Oct. 24, 2007). 
226. See Litovitz, supra note 176, at 315-16 (noting that the Lothian Oil court's 
reliance on Butner was inapposite and introduced several unnecessary problems into the 
analysis). See generally Juliet M. Moringiello, (Mis)use of State Law in Bankruptcy: The 
Hanging Paragraph Story, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 963, 987-88 (pointing out as well that, 
implicitly, the Court held that state law generally controlled property rights upon entry 
into bankruptcy, but not necessarily what happened to them in bankruptcy or how they 
looked upon exit). Professor Moringiello expands on the overly-broad interpretation that 
Butner has received in the case law. See generally Juliet M. Moringiello, When Does Some 
Federal Interest Require a Different Result?: An Essay on the Use and Misuse of Butner v. 
United States, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 657. 
227. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
228. See infra text accompanying note 250 (concerning why reliance on state law to 
resolve the characterization question in bankruptcy is capricious). 
229. Fairchild Dornier GMBH v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Dornier 
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what the Lothian Oil and Fitness Holdings courts overlooked, namely, 
that when the issue involves the underlying character of the 
investment, § 502(b) alone is inadequate to do the job.230 That is, 
without the aid of § 105(a) (or other authority) to permit the court to 
ascertain the true nature of the investment, a putative claim might 
survive the allowance process despite its inherent equity character.231 
The Dornier Aviation opinion went on to explain that "[d]isallowance of 
a claim under § 502(b) is only appropriate when the claimant has no 
rights vis-a-vis the bankrupt, i.e., when there is 'no basis in fact or law' 
for any recovery from the debtor."232 Recharacterization, by contrast, 
occurs only "when the claimant has some rights vis-a-vis the 
bankrupt."233 With this, the court seemed to be implying that allowance 
or disallowance is relegated to real claims, while the question in the 
recharacterization context is unearthing the intrinsic substance of the 
investment, once established, to be valid on its face. Thus, the court 
Aviation (N. Am.), Inc.), 453 F.3d 225, 232 (4th Cir. 2006). Concededly, the court in 
Dornier Aviation also distinguished§ 510(c) from recharacterization, id., a differentiation 
that I try to harmonize. See infra Part N.B. 
230. Litovitz, supra note 176, at 320-21 (pointing out that several circuits are in 
agreement that the requirements for allowability and the degree of scrutiny under 
§ 502(b) are low). 
231. Dornier Aviation, 453 F.3d at 231-32 (providing that the allowance inquiry only 
directs the bankruptcy court to ascertain whether there is a basis for payment of any kind 
from the estate to the claimant). Earlier, a panel of the Sixth Circuit, in an unpublished 
opinion, appeared to take a contrary view. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of 
Russell Cave Co. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. (In re Russell Cave Co.), 107 F. App'x 449 
(6th Cir. 2004). In that decision, the court cryptically stated that "[a] recharacterization 
claim and objecting to a claim's allowance are one·in-the[-]same." Id. at 451. However, the 
decision was unusual as the reorganization plan, which had been proposed by the debtor 
and the plaintiff, called for all "claims objections" to be filed within 120 days of the 
confirmation date. Id. at 450. The plaintiffs complaint seeking recharacterization was 
filed after the claims objections deadline. Id. The bankruptcy court determined that it fell 
under the broad definition of "claim objections" in the plan and, thus, dismissed it as 
time-barred. Id. It was this decision that was on appeal. Id. It also bears noting that the 
circuit court's decision cited AutoStyle. Id. at 450-51 (citing Bayer Corp. v. MascoTech, 
Inc. (In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc.), 269 F.3d 726, 748-49 (6th Cir. 2001)). For these 
reasons, it appears that the decision can be treated as sui generis and not really relevant 
to the general question of whether recharacterization more closely aligns with 
disallowance or subordination. 
232. 453 F.3d at 232 (quoting Diasonics, Inc. v. Ingalls, 121 B.R. 626, 631 (Bankr. N.D. 
Fla. 1990)). 
233. Id.; see also Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 
F.3d 448, 454 (3d Cir. 2006) (providing that the bankruptcy courts' ability to 
recharacterize purported debt as equity, just like its ability to equitably subordinate debt, 
is "grounded in [its] equitable authority to ensure 'that substance will not give way to 
form, [and] that technical considerations will not prevent substantial justice from being 
done"' (footnote omitted) (quoting Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 305 (1939))). 
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correctly concluded that the recharacterization analysis is separate 
from the allowance process and takes place only after the claim is 
deemed allowed.234 The point being that if the essential character of the 
investment is verified during the claims allowance process under state 
law, there is simply no next step, as the issues of "allowance" and 
"character" are conflated into a single inquiry, and one that likely 
eclipses the factors most relevant to uncovering the inherent nature of 
the claimant's interest in the case. This largely defeats the purpose for 
testing the character of a claim in the first place, which is to ascertain 
its true nature in light of the goals of a federal debt collection 
procedure. 
To expand on the last point, the consequence of concluding that 
there is a defense to payment of a claim under§ 502(d) is that the claim 
is disallowed, meaning it will not participate in the bankruptcy case. 
But that is the wrong conceptual analogy for capturing 
recharacterization situations since the focus in the claims allowance 
process is on validity or invalidity, and not priority. A determination 
that a purported debt is really an equity contribution may eliminate the 
"claim" in the§ 101(5) "right to payment" sense of the word, but it does 
not result in the claim being eliminated as a cognizable interest in the 
case. To the contrary, it remains a valid and enforceable economic right 
in the debtor entity, even if its value has been diminished through 
recharacterization.235 In other words, what has transpired is that the 
investment, though not invalid, has been subordinated, but not 
disallowed. This is why, if § 105(a) cannot provide the authority to 
permit debt recharacterization, § 510(c) is a much more compatible new 
home.236 And it is more than a matter of semantics, as the metaphoric 
entailments of referring to the reclassification of a claim as 
subordination rather than disallowance are different. Put another way, 
because of the prowess of metaphor, and its impact on our cognitive 
234. Dornier Aviation, 453 F.3d at 232-33. 
235. The Supreme Court made something of the same point in relation to the 
distinction between a nonprovable claim under the 1898 Act and disallowance. Lesser v. 
Gray, 236 U.S. 70, 74 (1915) ("A bankruptcy court in which an estate is being 
administered has full power to inquire into the validity of any alleged debt or obligation of 
the bankrupt upon which a demand or claim against the estate is based. This is essential 
to the performance of the duties imposed upon it. When an alleged debt or obligation is 
ascertained to be invalid-without lawful existence-the claim based thereon is 
necessarily disallowed. A disallowed claim and a nonprovable debt are not identical 
things; and a failure accurately to observe the distinction has led to confusion in 
argument."). 
236. See infra Parts IV.B-C. 
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reasoning processes,237 using the most accurate metaphoric concept to 
describe a phenomenon is much more likely to produce coherence in the 
law and avoid undesirable and untoward results.238 
From a policy perspective, some commentators have heralded the 
decisions in Lothian Oil and Fitness Holdings for resolving the 
characterization question under state law principles rather than under 
a federal framework. One such commentator urged that reliance on 
state law will yield more "consistent, predictable results" and minimize 
the risk that a bankruptcy court will infringe on substantive state 
policy.239 Similarly, in another apologia for use of state law, the authors 
contend that "[t]he use in bankruptcy courts of inconsistent, judicially 
created federal common law tests for debt recharacterization has 
usurped state authority to regulate the enforceability and priority of 
debt instruments held by corporate insiders."240 These views implicitly 
endorse and are congruent with the purely proceduralist view of 
bankruptcy law,241 which would place the bankruptcy courts in much 
the same position insofar as any readjustment of rights is concerned as 
a federal district court deciding a case under its diversity jurisdiction.242 
237. This point has most compellingly been made in the pioneering work of Lakoff and 
Johnson on experiential realism. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, 
METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980); Mark L. Johnson, Mind, Metaphor, Law, 58 MERCER L. 
REV. 845 (2007). 
238. See Carlson, supra note 142, at 162 (commenting that injustice is sometimes the 
result when courts "enslave" themselves to the wrong metaphor). For present purposes, 
the point is to protect the distributional hierarchy in § 726 of the Code, which, in 
subsection (a)(6), places equity in the '1ast" position in the sense that all unsecured debt 
must be satisfied before equity interest holders receive anything. While the last position 
will often be left taking nothing, it is not because the interest lacks validity, but rather 
simply because of insufficient wherewithal to satisfy prior claims. That scenario is the 
nature of subordination, not disallowance. 
239. See Curran, supra note 111, at 53 (arguing that, "[u]nlike federal rule approaches 
that are not rooted in precedent, the state law approach ensures that bankruptcy courts 
do not overreach the extent of their equitable power by supplementing the Code with 
other substantive areas of the law"). 
240. Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 30, at 1278. The authors also lament that 
application of a set of factors developed in tax court cases may be inconsequential or 
immaterial in a bankruptcy setting. Id. at 1263. Of course, just because the list of factors 
arose in the context of IRS challenges to the tax treatment accorded to an advance does 
not mean that those factors must be weighted and applied in the same fashion as they 
might be in a tax case. 
241. See sources cited supra note 8. 
242. Slavish adherence to state law enfeebles the policies of fresh start and 
rehabilitation of the debtor, each of which require that, when necessary, the bankruptcy 
forum alter state law rights and entitlements in service of adjusting the competing 
interests and values implicated by the unique considerations accompanying a collectivized 
debt collection procedure. &e Vern Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy 
Cases (Part 1), 4 7 N.Y.U. L. REV. 407, 409 (1972) ("Also in the category of judicial errors, 
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In addition to a general distaste for that limited outlook on the role of 
the bankruptcy regime in our commercial economy,243 I would submit 
that, in fact, the results derived from application of state law to decide 
the innate character of an interest will have just the opposite effect that 
these commentators assert. 
In the first place, it is state law that, almost by definition, will 
produce inconsistent and nonuniform results, as the several states' 
jurisprudence in relation to the methodology for discriminating between 
debt claims and equity interests will obviously never be congruent.244 
Second, that law will be much more fulsome and well-developed in some 
jurisdictions than others, creating uncertainty in the latter cases as to 
what the applicable standard actually provides and, therefore, 
increasing the risk of an improper outcome.245 Third, wholesale 
deference to state law ignores the often overlooked qualification in 
Butner for circumstances where an important federal interest may 
warrant a deviation from the state law rule. 246 Under Lothian Oil and 
in my judgment, are those decisions which treat Erie Railroad Co. u. Tompkins as 
requiring the application of state law in bankruptcy cases." (footnote omitted)). 
243. See Ponoroff, supra note 3 (manuscript at 59) ("A healthy and utile system of 
bankruptcy embodies a set of distributional norms and outcomes that differ from state 
law, and that have aggregate social and economic aspirations, such as allowing for 
survival of a business through reorganization and the discharge of debt, that are alien or 
forbidden to state law."). 
244. Wilton and Moeller-Sally, in their criticism of a federal approach to the 
determination, point out that the law in Wisconsin, like the law in Massachusetts, is 
inconsistent with federal debt recharacterization cases. Wilton & Moeller·Sally, supra 
note 30, at 1274. However, it is equally true that the law of Wisconsin is not consistent 
with the law of Massachusetts. Id. As the authors note, Wisconsin law requires initial 
undercapitalization or inequitable conduct by an insider before insider debt may be 
recharacterized as an equity contribution. Id. Texas, on the other hand, appears to follow 
the multifactor approach derived from tax cases. See Grossman v. Lothian Oil Inc. (In re 
Lothian Oil Inc.), 650 F.3d 539, 544 (5th Cir. 2011). Moreover, some states apply federal 
debt recharacterization precedent in applying state law. See, e.g., Dealer Servs. Corp. v. 
Am. Auto Auction, Inc., No. NNHCV095028282S, 2013 WL 2451250, at *12-13 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. May, 14 2013); cf. Curtis Wheaton, Comment, Clearing a Minefield of 
Insolvency Law: Toward Debt Recharacterization as a Supplement to the Bankruptcy 
Code, 55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 769, 779 (2015) {opining that whether approaches that 
ground the question in state law "are viable depends on state law application to 
bankruptcy, and whether debt recharacterization fits within these areas'l The 
attenuated connection between state law cases and the bankruptcy issue is also discussed 
infra. See infra text accompanying notes 250-56. 
245. See, e.g., Stapleton v. Newkey Grp. (In re SGK Ventures, LLC), No. 13 B 37603, 
2015 WL 7755525, at *20 (Bankr. N.D. ill. Nov. 30, 2015) (noting that the guidance on 
this question provided under Illinois law is "sparse''). It has also been pointed out that 
deference to state law would pose a major issue in some cases in determining which state 
law to apply. See Litovitz, supra note 176, at 320. 
246. See supra note 217. 
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Fitness Holdings, even a state law rule that, for example, called for 
complete immunity from reclassification for claims held by noninsiders 
would have to be respected. Yet, it is precisely that possibility-
defmition of a property interest in a manner that undermines 
bankruptcy equality policy-that illustrates why recharacterization is 
permitted in the first place and why it must be exercised under the 
bankruptcy courts' equitable authority separate and apart from the 
determination of the claim's validity under § 502. 
The suggestion that application of a federal rule will have a chilling 
effect on the capital markets and, particularly, on the willingness of 
insiders to extend credit to keep their troubled firms afloat, also misses 
the mark.247 Surely, the development, albeit over a period of time, 248 of 
a coherent federal standard to be applied in determining when debt is 
to be recharacterized would be infinitely more preferable to virtually 
any type of lender than leaving the matter to the vagaries, 
inconsistencies, and idiosyncrasies of state law. This is particularly true 
in an environment that, over the past couple of decades, has witnessed 
an enormous national consolidation in the banking and allied financial 
247. See, e.g., Redmond & Gabel, supra note 204, at 22 ("Essentially, equitable 
subordination and recharacterization disincentivize eleventh-hour restoration 
financing."); Michael R. Tucker, Note, Debt Recharacterization During an Economic 
Trough: Trashing Historical Tests to Avoid Discouraging Insider Lending, 71 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 187, 213-14 (2010) (urging the scraping of indeterminate tests in connection with 
insider transactions); see also Braas Sys., Inc. v. WMR Partners (In re Octagon Roofing), 
157 B.R. 852, 858 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (making a similar point about discouraging insider 
loans when needed the most). What is likely to have an even greater chilling effect, 
however, and provide even less guidance to lenders, is leaving the resolution of the 
question to the vagaries and whim of the laws of fifty separate jurisdictions. Moreover, 
knowing the criteria (under a multifactor approach) that a court will later use to evaluate 
the character of the advance, a lender can likely acquire some measure of comfort simply 
by avoiding overreaching. 
248. Currently, even among the courts taking a federal approach to the issue, there are 
two, perhaps three, different standards being employed. See supra notes 53, 83, 101-02 
and accompanying text. Two as opposed to three because the "intent of the parties' 
approach" in SubMicron is not inconsistent with the multifactor standard. See, e.g., 
Anderson v. Commonwealth Renewable Energy, Inc. (In re Commonwealth Renewable 
Energy, Inc.), 540 B.R. 173 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2015) (representing a decision of a 
bankruptcy court in the Third Circuit approaching the analysis in much the same way as 
courts applying the multifactor approach); see also supra notes 100, 111. Moreover, the 
categorical approach of N & D Properties has really not gotten much, if any, traction 
outside of the Eleventh Circuit. 
The proposal advanced in this Article for relocating the source of the bankruptcy 
courts' authority to engage in debt recharacterization ought to hasten the development of 
a single standard. See infra text accompanying notes 341-42. Indeed, it is entirely 
plausible to imagine that, over time, a more uniform and predictable federal test would 
emerge. 
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services industries.249 Furthermore, tolerating incursions on 
bankruptcy distribution and priority norms because of fear over 
disincentivizing corporate insiders from trying to help their fmancially 
flagging companies is not only predicated on an unproven and perhaps 
questionable assumption about insider behavior, but it also has an 
unpleasant "peace in our time" feel to it. 
Even more fundamentally, however, than the above three factors, 
state law jurisprudence in relation to the issue was not and never will 
be developed with a view toward the allocational norms that should 
govern in a collectivized debt collection proceeding.250 The 
establishment of those norms is an exercise consigned exclusively to 
Congress. That is to say, while the question may be framed identically 
in and out of bankruptcy, i.e., is this investment truly a debt obligation 
or is it really risk capital, the context in which the question is being 
asked matters mightily. To divorce that consideration from the process 
is to invite results that can only serve their intended objectives 
fortuitously, if at all. 
By its very nature, a bankruptcy proceeding involves the 
adjustment and reconciliation of multiple, and often conflicting, claims 
in and to a limited pool of assets. 251 The process is a dynamic one that 
249. The differences in jurisprudence among the states is less likely to be an issue for 
inside lenders, but even in those situations, there may still be uncertainty over which 
state's law applies and, of course, a lack of uniformity from district to district. 
250. The distinction between state law and the federal tests was highlighted in Kaye v. 
Nath Cos., Inc. (In re Duke & King Acquisition Corp.), wherein the court described 
Minnesota jurisprudence relating to recharacterization of corporate debt as 
allow[ing] a court, "in the exercise of its equitable powers, [to] set aside a 
transaction or ignore the form of that transaction, particularly where the parties 
are in a confidential or fiduciary relationship." The nomenclature used by parties 
in the original transaction is not controlling; the question is the end·resultant 
substance [of the transaction] .... 
508 B.R. 107, 157 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2014) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (first 
quoting Schaub v. Kortgard, 372 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); and then quoting 
Booth v. Union Fibre Co., 162 N.W. 677, 677 (Minn. 1917)). As might well be expected, 
Delaware has adopted a test for recharacterization that is much more deferential to the 
business judgment of the board than the bankruptcy standards. See, e.g., Nelson v. 
Emerson, C.A., No. 2937-VCS, 2008 WL 1961150, at *9 (Del. Chan. Ct. May 6, 2008). 
251. This is the so-called common pool problem, a state of affairs that arises when 
there are simply not enough assets to go around, such that creditors will behave in a 
manner not in the best interest of the creditor collective. See JACKSON, supra note 3, at 
10-13. There is no disagreement regarding this core function of bankruptcy law. However, 
Jackson, and his frequent collaborator, Doug Baird, would have it that bankruptcy is 
nothing more than a federal debt collection system, the sole object of which is, or should 
be, to ameliorate the common pool problem. See Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, 
Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 827 (1987); 
Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied Good Faith Filing 
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begins with, but cannot completely nor satisfactorily be controlled by, 
the ordering of priorities and entitlements established under state 
law.252 Unlike the adjudicatory model that defines state debt collection 
law, there are no defined "winners" and ''losers" in a bankruptcy case. 
Rather, the object of the bankruptcy process is to maximize estate value 
and apportion that value in a manner consonant with the goals of the 
system, which are themselves the subject of considerable debate. 253 
Inevitably, then, as the agency charged with responsibility to preside 
over the administration of the estate, the bankruptcy court must retain 
reasonable discretion to alter the technical, legal priority of claims 
when necessary to effectuate the purposive objectives of the order, as 
they may exist from time to time. 254 The Supreme Court recognized this 
by its approbation of the judicially created doctrine of equitable 
Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 919, 949-50 
(1991) (outlining and critiquing the "Collectivist" position, as Baird and Jackson's view of 
bankruptcy law has come to be termed, that bankruptcy exists only to respond to the 
common pool problem); see also supra note 8. 
252. Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 251, at 966-67 ("The pace and complexity of 
modern commercial life have created enormous pressure for a system in which a broad 
range of competing concerns and interests can be factored into specific solutions which are 
unattainable (or attainable only at the cost of unacceptable delay) under applicable non-
bankruptcy law and procedure."); see also David Gray Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 
85 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1389 (1987) (declaring that a search for any "deep structure" in 
the Bankruptcy Code is generally a forlorn endeavor). 
253. The disagreement among scholars over the scope of bankruptcy policy was 
originally framed in the debate between Professors Warren and Baird, in which 
conflicting policy views were stated as polarities. See generally Elizabeth Warren, 
Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987); Baird, supra note 251. A manageable 
summation and explication of the positions of the debaters can be found in Baird. Baird, 
supra note 8 (identifying, solely for purposes of convenience, the two "camps" as that of 
"Proceduralist" (Baird) and ''Traditionalist" (Warren)). For more contemporary 
descriptions of the distinction between the positions, see Levitin, supra note 9, at 4-5 and 
Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards a Constitutional Theory of 
Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 617-21 (2008) (labeling the parties at the 
antipodal ends of the spectrum as the "proceduralists" and the "statists"). 
254. "[E) quality is equity, and this is the spirit of the bankrupt law." Cunningham v. 
Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 13. (1924). A ''beguiling slogan," perhaps, 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY 
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 45.2, at 1287 (1965), but a slogan consistently 
reflected in bankruptcy law in the form of a central tenet, namely, substantially equal 
treatment of substantially similar claims, that is to say, equal distribution. See DeNatale 
& Abram, supra note 172, at 418-19 ("Although the orchestral functions are marshalling 
and distribution, the contrapuntal theme is intended to be equality of distribution. [The 
equity powers of the bankruptcy court should function to ensure] fair ... results for all ... 
interested parties [to the proceeding] where ... narrow judicial interpretation [of the 
substantive rules] would yield an inequitable result."); see also supra note 2. See generally 
1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQillTY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA§§ 405-08 (4th ed. 1918). 
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subordination under the 1898 Act, 255 and Congress followed suit when it 
codified the doctrine in the 1978 Act.256 Lothian Oil and Fitness 
Holdings deprive the courts in those circuits of that discretion in 
situations where§ 510(c) is deemed inapplicable. 
B. The Potential Flaw in the Majority Approach 
As noted at the onset, the first attempt to use the Supreme Court's 
decision in Law257 to invalidate the decisions relying on § 105(a) as 
authority for debt recharacterization failed.258 The defendant in In re 
Alternative Fuels argued that, as a consequence of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Law, combined with its earlier opinion in Travelers, 259 the 
bankruptcy courts' ability to call upon its § 105(a) powers in support of 
its competence to recharacterize debt as equity had been abrogated. 260 
The line of reasoning continued that, because reclassification of a 
putative debt as an equity contribution could only occur as part of the 
claims allowance process under § 502(b), the circuit court's earlier 
decision in Hedged-Investments, along with its application of a federal 
thirteen-factor test,2s1 was no longer valid.262 
The Tenth Circuit disagreed.263 As for Travelers, the court observed 
that the holding in the case extended only to the point that claims valid 
under state law will be allowed in bankruptcy, except where expressly 
disallowed by the Code.264 In other words, the holding did not go so far 
as to preclude a court from taking a "second step" in its analysis to 
determine whether an otherwise allowed claim fails in bankruptcy 
255. See sources cited supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
256. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
257. Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188 (2014). 
258. See supra text accompanying note 23. 
259. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443 (2007). Ai> 
discussed earlier, Travelers overruled a Ninth Circuit decision that the allowability of 
post-petition attorneys' fees pursuant to a prepetition contract are not recoverable 
regardless of whether they would be enforceable under applicable state law. See supra 
Part I.C.l. 
260. Redmond v. Jenkins (In re Alt. Fuels, Inc.), 789 F.3d 1139, 1146-47 (lOth Cir. 
2015). 
261. Sender v. Bronze Grp., Ltd. (In re Hedged-Invs. Ai>socs., Inc.), 380 F.3d 1292, 1298 
(lOth Cir. 2004); see also supra text accompanying notes 94-96. 
262. Alt. Fuels, 789 F.3d at 1147-49. 
263. Id. at 1146. 
264. Id. at 1149. It is also worth reiterating that the Court qualified its references to 
the allowability in bankruptcy of claims enforceable under state law with qualifier terms 
such as "generally" and "usually." Travelers, 549 U.S. at 450-51. Thus, while the Court 
certainly suggested a narrow scope of operation, it did not make the presumption as to the 
allowability of claims enforceable under state law absolute. Alt. Fuels, 789 F.3d at 1149. 
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because it involves transactions properly characterized as equity. 265 As 
explained earlier,266 the fact that local law concludes that a claim exists 
has nothing to do with whether or not that claim should or will be 
allowed in a bankruptcy proceeding nor, for that matter, how it will be 
treated in that case. Those questions are decided under federallaw.267 
In relation to Law, the court noted that, unlike the surcharge of a 
debtor's exemption, an order to recharacterize a claim as an equity 
contribution does not transgress any specific provision of the Code. 268 
Therefore, the court declined the invitation to join the Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits by conflating debt recharacterization with claim disallowance. 
Having distinguished both decisions, the court then reaffirmed that its 
decision in Hedged-Investments remained good authority, noting-of 
some importance for present purposes-that "recharacterization" under 
§ 105(a) is essential to a court's ability to properly implement the 
priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code, including priority for true 
creditors as against equity investors.269 
While the rationale in Alternative Fuels seems sound enough, it 
takes a somewhat narrow view of the precedential reach of the Supreme 
Court's respective holdings in Travelers and Law. As ever, hope beats 
eternal, but there is of course no assurance that other circuits will 
follow suit. This is particularly of concern in light of the legislative and 
judicial trend in recent years to reduce the discretion of bankruptcy 
judges,27o an ambition that naturally demands curbing the equitable 
265. See Fairchild Dornier GMBH v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re 
Dornier Aviation (N. Am.), Inc.), 453 F.3d 225, 232 (4th Cir. 2006); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 97-108. 
266. Allowability and characterization are separate questions, but become conflated if 
the latter exercise can only occur under § 502 rather than pursuant to the equitable 
authority of the bankruptcy courts. See supra notes 226, 233-38 and accompanying text. 
267. See supra note 224. 
268. Alt. Fuels, 789 F. 3d at 1148. 
269. Id. at 1146. The court went on to deny relief under both recharacterization and 
equitable subordination. Id. at 1156. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Phillips, also 
applying Hedged·Investments factors, would have affirmed the bankruptcy court's 
decision to recharacterize the loan at issue as an equity contribution. Id. (Phillips, J., 
dissenting). 
270. While the restraints on bankruptcy judges' discretion in personal bankruptcy 
cases have received considerable attention, the BAPCPA also imposed limitations on 
bankruptcy judges in business cases. See supra note 25. In addition to its ruling in Law, 
the Supreme Court's earlier bombshell decision in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 487 
(2011), limiting the courts' jurisdiction to enter final judgments on state law 
counterclaims that are not resolved entirely through the claims allowance or disallowance 
process, is further evidence of a decided trend in the body politic to reign in the autonomy 
of bankruptcy judges as tightly as possible to those powers enumerated in the Code and 
not beyond. See Stapleton v. Newkey Grp. (In re SGK Ventures, LLC), No. 13 B 37603, 
2016] WHITHER RECHARACTERIZATION 1271 
authority of the bankruptcy courts under § 105(a). Furthermore, 
although the narrow issue before the Court in Law was whether 
equitable disallowance is prohibited without regard to how perfidious 
the debtor or how execrable her actions, Law may have significant 
ramifications for other areas of bankruptcy law271 and, at a minimum, 
has narrowed considerably the wiggle room that the Court, in Marrama 
v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, 272 seemed for a time to have restored 
to§ 105(a). 
At the time it was decided, Marrama was applauded as restoring 
some punch to the bankruptcy courts' ability to invoke § 105(a) even in 
the face of a contrary Code provision.273 The issue in Marrama was 
whether the debtor had an "absolute" right to convert his Chapter 7 
case to a case under Chapter 13, despite his patently fraudulent 
conduct. 274 The text of § 706(a) seems to confer that right 
unconditionally. According to the Marrama Court, however, the ''broad" 
authority conferred on bankruptcy judges by § 105(a) includes the 
authority to sanction a debtor's bad-faith litigation abuse by ordering 
forfeiture of the relief that would otherwise have been available. 275 
While the Court in Law did not outright reject Marrama, and made a 
feeble effort to distinguish it,276 it can hardly be gainsaid that it 
represented a rousing endorsement of the earlier holding. Indeed, it is 
hard not to see Law as a retreat from Marrama, and under the 
principal holding in Law-that § 105(a) has no role to play when an 
express provision of the Code speaks to a matter-it is highly likely 
2015 WL 7755525, at *20 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2015) (citing Law as evincing the 
correctness of its earlier prediction that the Seventh Circuit would be unlikely to find that 
the bankruptcy courts possessed the equitable authority to treat a clainl in a manner not 
stated in the Code); see also supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
271. See supra note 20. 
272. 549 u.s. 365 (2007). 
273. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Warren & Shane G. Ramsey, Revisiting the Inherent Equitable 
Powers of the Bankruptcy Court: Does Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts Signal 
a Return to Equity?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2007, at 22, 62-63 (hailing the decision as 
cause for celebration by those concerned about the trend limiting the exercise of discretion 
by bankruptcy judges). Of course, the celebration turned out to be a short-lived one. See 
infra note 276. 
274. Marrama, 549 U.S. at 367. 
275. Id. at 374-75. 
276. The opinion in Law attempted to reconcile its holding in Marrama by drawing a 
line between substantive rights granted by the Code (which bankruptcy courts may not 
abridge) and mere "futile procedural niceties" imposed by a literal reading of the Code 
(which bankruptcy courts have equitable authority to disregard). Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 
1188, 1197 (2014). Thus, the Court was able to opine: "Marrama most certainly did not 
endorse, even in dictum, the view that equitable considerations permit a bankruptcy court 
to contravene express provisions of the Code." Id. 
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Marrama would come out differently if decided today. 
IV. REALIGNING EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION AND RECHARACTERIZATION 
The ultimate fate of the bankruptcy courts' prerogatives under 
§ 105(a) are shrouded in doubt in light of Law. 277 That fact strengthens 
the appeal to fold debt recharacterization into the claims allowance 
process, representing a far less unsettled source of authority, a fact that 
certainly influenced the Ninth Circuit. 278 However, doing so largely 
denudes the process of the considerations most relevant to the 
determination of how a particular investment should be characterized 
in order to remain faithful to the statutory scheme of priority and 
distribution in a bankruptcy case.279 Thus, a better solution is needed to 
assure that the classification of an allowed claim as debt or equity 
continues to be governed by a developing uniform federal approach, 
and, ideally, under the equitable authority of the bankruptcy courts. 2BO 
That solution, I would urge, is to eliminate what is largely an artificial 
distinction to begin with between equitable subordination and 
277. After Law it is unclear where courts will draw that line in connection with various 
non-Code practices in which the bankruptcy courts frequently engage other contexts, such 
as, on a finding that the action is essential to the success of the reorganization, approving 
Chapter 11 plans providing for nonconsensual releases of affiliates or insiders of the 
debtor, or extension of the stay to nondebtor parties. See supra note 20. In the former 
situation, § 524(e) states that the "discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the 
liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt." 11 
U.S. C. § 524(e) (2012). Likewise, § 362 of the Code, by its terms, limits the stay to actions 
against the debtor or the estate, except in circumstances specifically contemplated by the 
Code, such as the co-debtor stay in § 1301. See id. §§ 362, 1301. With its limited view 
regarding bankruptcy courts' equitable powers, Law calls these decisions (and other 
analogous exercises of equitable powers in apparent conflict with the Code in other 
contexts) into question. 
278. See supra note 134; see also Stapleton v. New key Grp. (In re SGK Ventures, LLC), 
No. 13 B 37603, 2015 WL 7755525, at *20 (Bankr. N.D. lll. Nov. 30, 2015) (citing Law as 
casting into serious doubt the authority of the bankruptcy courts to recharacterize a claim 
under their general equitable authority). 
279. See supra text accompanying note 234. 
280. Although Professor Levitin makes a compelling case for the common law of 
bankruptcy as involving a uniquely federal interest, Levitin, supra note 9, at 71-77, the 
received wisdom remains that when Congress enacts a "comprehensive legislative 
scheme," the omission of a remedy is deemed to be intentional. See Walker v. Cadle Co. 
(In re Walker), 51 F.3d 562, 567 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. 
Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981)); see also Plank, supra note 8, at 639 (rejecting the 
concept of a federal common law in bankruptcy and suggesting that, when confronted 
with an issue beyond the scope of the Code, the bankruptcy courts must apply state law). 
Thus, regardless of one's personal views on the question, it would be imprudent to 
attempt to locate the authority to recharacterize debt to the inherent power of the courts. 
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recharacterization281 by expanding the interpretation of§ 510(c) broadly 
enough to serve as the enabling authority in recharacterization cases. 
This approach would not only provide a textual justification for exercise 
of the power, but would also preserve a federal framework over the 
entirety of the subject.2B2 Is it, however, a tenable interpretation and 
application of the doctrine of equitable subordination?2B3 
I would submit that it is, notwithstanding that the bias, at least 
until recently,284 has been to limit application of the doctrine of 
equitable subordination generally, and particularly so in the case of 
noninsiders.285 That bias, however, is not only inconsistent with the 
broad grant of discretion that Congress saw fit to confer on the 
bankruptcy courts in 1978 when it codified the doctrine,286 but has been 
harmful as well to the overall integrity of a utile system of 
bankruptcy.287 In effect, the doctrine of equitable subordination has in a 
sense itself been "subordinated" in the service of, among other vague 
ideologically-oriented philosophies, federalism and judicial restraint. 
Therefore, it is time to take a fresh perspective on the issue, and, in 
particular, appreciate the very different contextual circumstances in 
which equitable subordination has been employed in the past, 288 and 
may appropriately be applied under the Code. 
Because equity contributions can be dressed up in loan clothing 
both innocently as well as with improper intent, and the harm to other 
creditors is identical in both situations, employing equitable 
subordination to afford relief when the true nature of an advance to the 
debtor is mischaracterized as a loan requires that we recognize an 
additional exception to the first prong of the Mobile Steel 
281. See supra note 177. 
282. For a useful, but ahistorical discussion of why§ 510(c) cannot be used as the basis 
for debt recharacterization, see generally Nozemack, supra note 73. An altemative 
approach to the one proposed here is a legislative solution. See generally Wheaton, supra 
note 244. This would certainly do the job, but is probably highly unrealistic in the recent 
and prevailing political climate surrounding bankruptcy. See supra notes 15, 273; infra 
note 363. 
283. See, e.g., Fairchild Dornier GMBH v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re 
Domier Aviation (N. Am.), Inc.), 453 F.3d 225, 232-33 (4th Cir. 2006) (articulating the 
contemporary view that recharacterization requires a different inquiry and serves a 
different function than equitable subordination). 
284. See supra note 177; infra note 313 and accompanying text. 
285. See supra note 63; infra note 349. 
286. See supra note 167. 
287. This is so, bearing in mind that a utile bankruptcy system harbors policy 
objectives distinct from state law. See supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
288. See supra note 172. 
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formulation2B9-that is, expand modestly the circumstances under 
which the requirement of insisting upon a finding of inequitable 
conduct will be relaxed. In addition, while insider status certainly can 
and does factor into a recharacterization analysis, 290 it is neither a 
necessary factor nor necessarily a dominant one. Therefore, bringing 
the analysis under § 510(c) would also mean, when the question 
involves the intrinsic character of a claim, softening the distinction in 
the quantum of proof courts often employ in reviewing insider versus 
noninsider transactions. 
A. No-Fault Subordination 
The concept of equitable subordination in the absence of inequitable 
conduct (so-called no-fault equitable subordination) is not without 
precedent, although it has yet to be universally embraced.291 Having not 
been expressly condoned or rejected by either Congress or the Supreme 
Court, it thus represents an unsettled area of law. The argument that 
Congress did not intend for§ 510(c) to be applied to a claim unless the 
facts demonstrate some form of misconduct is based on the legislative 
history of the 1978 Act. 292 It stems from language in the Floor 
Managers' Statement to the effect that "it is intended that ... 
'principles of equitable subordination' follow existing case law"293 and a 
belief that all of the 1898 Act cases involving equitable subordination 
included a finding of creditor misconduct.294 Even to the extent, 
however, that this description of case law under the former Act is 
accurate, 295 it ignores the remainder of the Floor Managers' Statement, 
289. See supra text accompanying note 179 (explaining the Mobile Steel formulation). 
The reference here is to an additional exception because certain exceptions are already 
recognized in at least some jurisdictions. See infra Part N.A. 
290. See infra text accompanying notes 353-61. 
291. See generally Solow, supra note 192. But see In re Lifschultz Fast Freight, 132 
F.3d 339, 348 (7th Cir. 1997) and Montgomery Ward Holding Corp. v. Schoeberl (In re 
Montgomery Ward Holding Corp.), 272 B.R. 836, 845 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001), both of which 
suggest that, despite the general rule requiring inequitable conduct in most cases, 
equitable subordination may exist even in the absence of misconduct by the creditor 
whose claim is under scrutiny. 
292. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text. 
293. 124 CONG. REC. 32,398 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards). 
294. See Pardo, supra note 167, at 1507 (arguing that at the time the Code was 
adopted, a claim for equitable subordination required proof of inequitable conduct, and, 
"[o]n this evidence alone, it seems that the intent of Congress was to allow equitable 
subordination only in cases involving creditor misconduct''). 
295. It is the case that misconduct was present in each of the trilogy of Supreme Court 
cases, see supra note 165, generally regarding the establishing (or approving ot) the 
doctrine of equitable subordination under the 1898 Act. However, several months prior to 
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providing that-as part of the compromise between the House and 
Senate versions of the bill-Congress resolved to leave the development 
of "principles of equitable subordination" to the courts, which can mean 
only to evolve in the usual common law fashion.296 In other words, what 
Congress said in 1978 was that § 510(c) codifies the doctrine as it 
presently exists, and, as a judicially created doctrine to begin with, its 
ultimate contours and boundaries would unfold over time in the 
evolving decisional law. Moreover, the language in the Floor Managers' 
Statement indicating that, "a claim is generally subordinated if the 
holder of such claim is guilty of inequitable conduct" is prefaced by the 
phrase "[t]o date."297 This, too, is a clear indication that Congress did 
not intend to forever freeze the scope of equitable subordination to its 
historical confines. 
As far as the Supreme Court is concerned, as observed earlier,298 its 
rejection in Noland299 and Reorganized CF & J'd00 of automatic or 
categorical subordination based purely on the intrinsic nature of the 
claim did not encompass a rejection of no-fault equitable 
the passage of the 1978 Act, the Second Circuit rendered its decision in Jezarian v. 
Raichle (In re Stirling Homex Corp.), in which the court ordered subordination of claims 
by defrauded shareholders who had not been found to have engaged in any misconduct. 
579 F.2d 206, 209-10 (2d Cir. 1978). In In re Virtual Network Servs. Corp., the court 
expressed the view that the principal managers of the bill were likely aware of the 
decision and also expressed the belief that subordination would be warranted under the 
language of what would become § 510(c)(1) of the Code. 902 F.2d 1246, 1249 (7th Cir. 
1990). But see Pardo, supra note 167, at 1501-02 (taking the position that reliance on 
Stirling as authority for a no-fault theory of equitable subordination is misplaced). 
296. 124 CONG. REC. 32,398 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); see also Kham & 
Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1356 (7th Cir. 1990) 
("Absence of statutory criteria commits the subject to the courts, to be worked out in the 
common law fashion." (citing Virtual Network, 902 F.2d at 1248-49)); Newman v. Tyberg 
(In re Steel Wheels Transp., LLC), Nos. 06-15377 DHS, 06-15378 DHS, 2011 WL 5900958, 
at *6 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 28, 2011) ("Section 510(c) does not codify the elements of an 
equitable subordination claim. Rather, it directs the Court to apply judicially developed 
principles of equitable subordination to the equities at hand." (citing Citicorp Venture 
Capital, Ltd. v. Comm. of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims, 323 F.3d 228, 234 (3d Cir. 
2003))). 
297. 124 CONG. REC. 32,398 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards). 
298. See supra text accompanying notes 192-96. 
299. United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996). In Noland, the postpetition tax 
claim was entitled to a statutory priority. Id. at 543. 
300. United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213 
(1996). In Reorganized CF & I, the Court extended the holding of Noland in that the 
nonpecuniary tax claim arose prepetition and was nonpriority. Id. at 229. Specifically, the 
Court held that the principle of Noland had nothing to do with transfer between classes, 
as distinct from ranking within a single class. Id. Rather, the principle was that a 
categorical reordering of priorities was beyond the scope of judicial authority under 
§ 510(c), making the subordination in this equally objectionable as in Noland. Id. 
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subordination, ao1 which had formed part of the rationale in the lower 
courts.3°2 The Supreme Court in those decisions made crystal clear that 
the bankruptcy courts may not adjust the priority of claims "merely 
because the court perceives that the result is inequitable,"aoa but it 
stopped short of holding that inequitable conduct is required for 
subordination under § 510(c). Hence, the Supreme Court's opinions 
cannot be read as rejecting the reasoning of the courts of appeals that 
have, without requiring proof of misconduct, permitted subordination of 
nonpecuniary tax loss (the type of claims involved in Noland and 
Reorganized CF & I) and certain other categories of claims based on a 
totality of the circumstances analysis. 304 
In In re Virtual Network Services Corp., for example, the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed the subordination of the IRS's prepetition tax penalty 
claim since, the court observed, allowing the claim to share ratably with 
the debtor's other unsecured creditors would not punish the debtor, as 
intended, but rather would unfairly dilute the claims of unsecured 
creditors.305 That is to say, while the government's claim technically 
enjoyed the same legal priority as other unsecured debt claims, it would 
301. See Noland, 517 U.S. at 543 ("Given our conclusion that the Sixth Circuit's 
rationale was inappropriately categorical in nature, we need not decide today whether a 
bankruptcy court must always find creditor misconduct before a claim may be equitably 
subordinated."). 
302. At the court of appeals level in both Noland and Reorganized CF & I, the courts, 
like other circuits to address the issue, see infra note 306, did state that, even in the 
situation involving tax penalties, the bankruptcy court must determine if subordination is 
appropriate based on the equities in the case. &e United States v. Noland (In re First 
Truck Lines, Inc.), 48 F.3d 210, 218 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 517 U.S. 535; United States v. 
Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc. (In re CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc.), 53 
F.3d 1155, 1159 (lOth Cir. 1995), vacated, 518 U.S. 213. The Supreme Court's opinions 
reversing them nonetheless regarded the courts' rationales as inappropriately categorical 
in nature, given the lower courts' reliance on language in the Floor Managers' Statement, 
see supra note 166, to the effect that 
under existing law, a claim is generally subordinated only if [the] holder of such 
claim is guilty of inequitable conduct, or the claim itself is of a status susceptible 
to subordination, such as a penalty or a claim for damages arising from the 
purchase or sale of a security of the debtor. 
124 CONG. REC. 32,398 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards). This, apparently, implied to 
the Court that it was more the source of the claim that accounted for subordination below 
rather than the overall fairness or equities of the situation. 
303. Noland, 517 U.S. at 539 (quoting DeNatale & Abram, supra note 172, at 428); 
accord Reorganized CF & I, 518 U.S. 213. 
304. See infra text accompanying notes 306, 308-311. 
305. 902 F.2d 1246, 1250 (7th Cir. 1990). The court also pointed out the absence of 
conflict with the statutory scheme of priority and distribution set forth in § 726(a) since 
the perambulatory language in that provision states "[e]xcept as provided in section 510." 
Id. at 1249 (alteration in original) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)). 
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have been inequitable to permit a nonpecuniary claim to share pari 
passu with creditors whose claims arose as a result of an actual parting 
with value. That argument in support of subordination is still 
compelling and, because the court in Virtual Network also stated that 
the bankruptcy courts must weigh the equities in each case before 
determining if subordination is warranted, 306 the decision has not been 
superseded by the Supreme Court's rulings in either Noland or 
Reorganized CF & I. 307 
In addition to tax penalty and other kinds of nonpecuniary 
claims,3°8 the other category of cases where courts have applied§ 510(c) 
306. Id. at 1250; see also Schultz Broadway Inn v. United States, 912 F.2d 230, 232-34 
(8th Cir. 1990) (holding that creditor misconduct is not a prerequisite to equitable 
subordination, but subordination must be considered on a case-by-case basis); Burden v. 
United States (In re Burden), 917 F.2d 115, 120 (3d Cir. 1990) (following Virtual Network 
in holding that "the district court must weigh the equities 'on a case-by-case basis without 
requiring in every instance inequitable conduct on the part of the creditor claiming parity 
among other unsecured general creditors."' (quoting Virtual Network, 902 F.2d at 1250)). 
These decisions pointed as well to the reference in the Floor Managers' Statement, see 
supra note 166, about subordination being warranted in the case of misconduct or the 
status of the claim as a penalty. See Schultz Broadway, 912 F.2d at 232; Burden, 917 F.2d 
at 123. Similar to the opinion in Virtual Network, they also rejected the govemment's 
argument that the inclusion of a specific subordination provision for such claims in 
Chapter 7 (§ 726(a)(4)) implied an intention of Congress that subordination of such claims 
was impermissible in cases under other chapters of the Code. Schultz Broadway, 912 F.2d 
at 233; Burden, 917 F.2d at 118. But see supra note 291. In addition, in In re Kreisler, the 
Seventh Circuit cited Mobile Steel's three-prong test approvingly, with no mention of 
Virtual Network. In re Kreisler, 546 F.3d 863, 866 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Noland, 517 
U.S. at 538-39); see also Grede v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. (In re Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., 
Inc.), 809 F.3d 958, 965 (7th Cir. 2016) (mentioning the necessity for inequitable conduct 
without referring to Virtual Network); In re Lifschultz Fast Freight, 132 F.3d 339, 348 
(7th Cir. 1997) (suggesting that Virtual Network represented an exception that should not 
be mistaken "for the death of [the] rule''); Pardo, supra note 167, at 1505-09 (debunking 
the courts' reliance on the Floor Managers' Statement). 
307. See supra text accompanying notes 191-195, 298 and accompanying text. AB in 
Lifschultz, 132 F.3d at 347-49, it has, however, been suggested that no-fault 
subordination has been and is limited to certain categories of cases. See NTP Marble, Inc. 
v. Papadopoulos (In re NTP Marble, Inc.), 491 B.R. 208, 214 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2013) 
(observing that most courts that have considered "no-fault" equitable subordination 
claims have waived the misconduct requirement in a limited set of cases, including those 
involving tax penalties, stock redemption claims, and punitive damages claims). This 
statement may not be entirely accurate in relation to the application of equitable 
subordination under the 1898 Act. See supra note 177. In addition, just because, 
empirically, the no-fault cases that have arisen thus far fall into one of those categories 
does not mean they are exclusive, unless one is able to posit a principled distinction 
between those three situations and every other situation. 
308. See, e.g., In re Friedman's, Inc., 356 B.R. 766, 776-79 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006) 
(allowing subordination without a showing of misconduct but distinguishing between 
class claims seeking recovery of statutory penalties and claims seeking statutory 
minimum damages). But see Durango Ga. Paper Co. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. (In re 
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without an explicit finding of misconduct is in connection with 
promissory notes given in connection with a stock redemption. 309 The 
reasoning of course is that the right to payment represented by the 
promissory note is simply a payout of the balance of the value of the 
payee's equity investment in the debtor and, as such, not a true debt, or 
at least different in kind from traditional third-party debt. 
For instance, in In re Merrimac Paper Co., the First Circuit initially 
held that claims arising out of stock redemption transactions could not 
be subordinated based solely on their intrinsic nature, as the 
bankruptcy court had done.310 The court conceded, however, that such 
claims are suspect and might be subject to equitable subordination 
based on the totality of the circumstances in an individual case. 311 Of 
course, when a court subordinates a debt arising out of a stock 
repurchase transaction based on the totality of the circumstances, the 
operation comes remarkably close to the exercise in which the courts 
engage in the recharacterization cases, i.e., a putative debt claim is 
assigned the same priority as an equity interest. Indeed, the line 
between the two doctrines is blurred because, until Noland and 
Reorganized CF & I, the distinction between the two doctrines in the 
bankruptcy context was largely nonexistent and the remedies applied 
more or less interchangeably.312 Moreover, this was true even when no 
misconduct was involved. It was only when, because of the uncertainty 
over the reach of the Supreme Court's holdings in those two cases, 
bankruptcy lawyers began to plead their allegations seeking 
subordination of an alleged misclassified investment based upon an 
Durango Ga. Paper Co.), 539 B.R. 896, 902 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2015) (declining to extend 
Friedman's to compensatory, actual loss claims). 
309. See authorities cited in Pardo, supra note 167, at 1493 n.15 and also in Solow, 
supra note 192, at 12-13. 
310. Merrimac Paper Co. v. Harrison (In re Merrimac Paper Co.), 420 F.3d 53, 60-62 
(1st Cir. 2005) (rejecting lower court authorities that endorsed categorical subordination 
based on the Supreme Court's rulings in Noland and Reorganized CF & I). 
311. Id. at 62-63 (qualifying earlier lower court precedent providing for automatic 
subordination of claims emanating from stock redemption agreements, but acknowledging 
that "the core principle of these decisions-that equity holders should not be able 
artificially to evade the debt-over-equity paradigm-is generally sound"). Because the 
lowers courts in Merrimac had followed that earlier precedent, summary judgment on the 
debtor's complaint for subordination of the appellant's claim was reversed and remanded 
to the bankruptcy court with instructions to reconsider the claim in light of the court's 
holding. Id. at 65; see also SPC Plastics Corp. v. Griffith (In re Structurlite Plastics Corp.), 
224 B.R. 27, 35-36 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2007) (commenting that equitable subordination is not 
restricted to cases entailing creditor misconduct, and, in connection with a claim arising 
out of an agreement for former shareholders' equity interest, the court must give effect to 
the substance of the transaction as opposed to its form in the interest of fairness). 
312. See supra note 177; infra text accompanying notes 339, 378. 
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independent theory that debt recharacterization emerged as a separate 
cause of action distinct from a claim for equitable subordination. 313 At 
the same time, a rationale developed in the case law that articulated a 
conceptual distinction between the two doctrines,314 which, though real 
enough, is a distinction more of degree than kind. 315 
Finally, as discussed earlier,316 utilizing the totality of the 
circumstances approach, the bankruptcy court in In re Yellowstone 
Mountain Club subordinated the claims of a noninsider without 
requiring an affirmative showing of intentional misconduct. 317 While 
Yellowstone Mountain might yet be reconciled with the view that insists 
upon "inequitable conduct" as an element of the cause of action, 318 its 
313. This explains why recharacterization is primarily a twenty-first century 
phenomenon. See supra text accompanying note 33. This also is part of the explanation as 
to why, almost invariably, a proceeding in which recharacterization is sought by the 
plaintiff is accompanied by an alternative claim for equitable subordination. By way of 
illustration, of all of the circuit court cases discussed supra Part I, the only two that 
rejected § 105(a) as the source of the authority to recharacterize claims in bankruptcy 
proceedings did not also involve a claim for equitable subordination. See Official Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors v. Hancock Park Capital II, L.P. (In re Fitness Holdings Int'l, Inc.), 
714 F.3d 1141, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 2013); Grossman v. Lothian Oil Inc. (In re Lothian Oil 
Inc.), 650 F.3d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 2011). Moreover, the absence of the § 510(c) claim in 
Fitness Holdings can be attributed to the procedural posture in which recharacterization 
became an issue-namely, in order to resolve a complaint seeking to recover an alleged 
fraudulent transfer. See supra Part I.D.l. In Lothian Oil, the debtors challenged the 
claimants' "undetermined claims" under a liquidating Chapter 11 plan. 650 F.3d at 542. 
The appeal to the Fifth Circuit was due to the district court's holding that, as a matter of 
law, bankruptcy courts could only recharacterize the claims of corporate insiders. Id. 
However, the opinion indicated that the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's 
dismissal of the defendants' claims on all but the recharacterization issue, without 
identifying what those other grounds were supporting the bankruptcy court's ruling in 
favor of the debtors. Id. 
314. See, e.g., Nozemack, supra note 73, at 705-12; see supra text accompanying notes 
75-79, 95. 
315. See infra Part IV.C.3. 
316. See supra notes 207-211 and accompanying text. 
317. Credit Suisse v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Yellowstone 
Mountain Club, LLC), No. 08-61570-11, 2009 WL 3094930, at *1, *10 (Bankr. D. Mont. 
May 12, 2009), vacated, No. 08-61570-11-RBK, 2009 WL 10624435 (Bankr. D. Mont. June 
29, 2009). Frankly, it is unclear whether Yellowstone should be read as sanctioning 
reckless lending practices as tantamount to inequitable conduct (i.e., expanding the 
definition beyond the traditional three categories), see supra note 179, or whether it is 
best seen as representing another exception to the requirement of inequitable conduct. 
See F. Stephen Knippenberg, &-Purposing Dram Shop Law to Subordinate the Claims of 
Reckless Bartenders of Credit Drunks: In Bankruptcy, This One Should Be on the House, 
52 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 39, 59 (2013) (suggesting that Yellowstone might be seen as 
describing the parameters of a new, fourth category of inequitable conduct). 
318. 2009 WL 3094930, at *9 (describing t.he only plausible explanation for Credit 
Suisse's actions as driven by the fees it would extract from the loans, and referring to its 
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approach nonetheless strongly hints at the possibility of determining 
the existence of grounds for subordination without a fmding of the 
presence, or absence, of any single element.319 The point to be made is 
that no-fault equitable subordination remains a viable option under 
§ 510(c), even if its reception in the decisional law to date has been 
uneven at best. 320 
B. Recharacterization as a Category of No-Fault Subordination 
It is generally understood that equitable subordination is remedial 
in nature, not penal. 321 This has accounted for the general requirement 
that the "inequitable conduct" complained of be shown to have caused 
demonstrable harm to unsecured creditors. 322 An insistence of this 
behavior as motivated by naked greed); see also Beckett, supra note 208, at 88 (observing 
that Credit Suisse's behavior was not consistent with the ordinary practices of any other 
arranger of a syndicated loan); cf. In re Aida's Paradise, LLC, 485 B.R. 806, 814 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 2013) (holding that the debtor's allegations, if proven, would support a claim for 
equitable subordination against a noninsider since "even where all acts are technically or 
legally permissible, a lender must be careful not to become overly involved in a debtor's 
affairs"). 
319. This is consistent with a view that the three-pronged Mobile Steel test falls short 
of representing a statement of the essential elements of a claim for equitable 
subordination in all cases. See Anderson v. Bajaj (In re Med. Mgmt. Grp., LLC), 534 B.R. 
646, 656 (Bankr. D. S.C. 2015) (showing that "[c]ourts have subordinated ... [based on] a 
variety of transgressions" and do not require that the conduct be sufficient to support a 
standalone complaint). This, too, implies that any effort to reduce equitable subordination 
to a formulaic test, ala Mobile Steel, would necessarily be under-inclusive. 
320. See NTP Marble, Inc. v. Papadopoulos (In re NTP Marble, Inc.), 491 B.R. 208, 
213-14 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2013) (noting that no-fault equitable subordination is recognized 
in the Third Circuit); Newman v. Tyberg (In re Steel Wheels Transp., LLC), Nos. 06-15377 
DHS, 06-15378 DHS, 2011 WL 5900958, at *6 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 28, 2011) (same); see 
also supra notes 306-312. 
321. See, e.g., Walnut Creek Mining Co. v. Cascade Inv., LLC (In re Optim Energy, 
LLC), 527 B.R. 169, 175 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015); see also supra note 170. 
322. Wooley v. Faulkner (In re SI Restructuring, Inc.), 532 F.3d 355, 362 (5th Cir. 
2008). Of course, the Mobile Steel formulation, supra text accompanying note 179, also 
refers to the misconduct conferring an unfair advantage on the claimant as well as harm 
to other creditors. Further, in rejecting the argument that creditors who were not paid 
from the proceeds invested by the insiders, the court cited Universal Farming Industries. 
SI Restructuring, 532 F.3d at 362 (citing Spacek v. Thomen (In re Universal Farming 
Indus.), 873 F.2d 1334, 1335, 1337 (9th Cir. 1989)). Notably, however, the actual language 
in that decision stated that because the plaintiff was unable to show any legally 
cognizable harm to him or any other creditor, or any unfair advantage accruing to the 
defendant as a result of the conduct being challenged, the bankruptcy court did not abuse 
its discretion in determining that equitable subordination was not available. Universal 
Farming, 873 F.2d at 1337. In point of fact, the court in SI Restructuring referred to 
unfair advantage, but erroneously included it as part of the first rather than the second 
prong of Mobile Steel. SI Restructuring, 532 F.3d at 361 ("[W]e assume, without deciding, 
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requirement is of course what led the Fifth Circuit in SI Restructuring 
to overturn the lower courts' decisions to subordinate loans made by two 
officers of the debtor, who were also its largest shareholders.323 At first 
blush this might seem to negate § 510(c) as a candidate to supplant 
§ 105(a) as the statutory imprimatur for debt recharacterization. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that the panel in SI 
Restructuring rejected the unsecured creditors committee's expert's 
testimony that the company had been harmed by its incurring of 
additional debt.324 Also, the court's rejection of "deepening insolvency" 
as a theory of harm was followed by its observation that the bankruptcy 
court had made no finding that the company was insolvent or 
undercapitalized at the time of the transactions at issue. 325 Those 
considerations, in turn, are key components in the multifactor approach 
used by the majority of the courts to test the characterization of the 
disputed investment. 326 Their absence in SI Restructuring is telling. 
Finally, the rationale of deepening insolvency, if not as an independent 
cause of action, 327 has more recently received a friendlier reception as a 
type of injury for purposes of analyzing corporate insider behavior than 
that the record supports the finding of inequitable conduct and unfair advantage."). 
"Unfair advantage" is also an important component of justification for no-fault 
subordination. See In re Virtual Network Servs. Corp., 902 F.2d 1246, 1250 (7th Cir. 
1990) (describing the district court's finding that it would confer an unfair advantage on 
the IRS if the tax penalty claim were not subordinated). 
323. 532 F.3d at 360-61; see also supra text accompanying notes 196-203. 
324. 532 F.3d at 363. 
325. Id. 
326. See supra Part I.B-C. 
327. See Trenwick Am. Litig. Tr. v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 205 (Del. Ch. 
2006) (holding that a strategy employed by an insolvent company "results in continued 
insolvency and an even more insolvent entity does not in itself give rise to a cause of 
action. Rather, in such a scenario the directors are protected by the business judgment 
rule. To conclude otherwise would fundamentally transform Delaware law."). Trenwick 
was cited in SI Restructuring. SI Restructuring, 532 F.3d at 364 (citing Trenwick, 906 
A.2d at 174). As noted above, see supra note 202, the SI Restructuring opinion also cited 
the Third Circuit's decision in CitX Corp. as rejecting the doctrine. SI Restructing, 532 
F.3d at 363 (citing Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey & Assocs., P.C. (In re CitX Corp.), 448 F.3d 
672, 678 (3d Cir. 2006)). Later, however, the Third Circuit altered course again, 
concluding that deepening insolvency remains a viable claim in Pennsylvania. See Official 
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Baldwin (In re Lemington Home for the Aged), 659 F.3d 
282, 292 (3d Cir. 2011) (reversing and remanding the lower court's summary judgment 
dismissal of the plaintiffs deepening insolvency claim). Subsequently, the court sustained 
the jury's verdict on a theory of deepening insolvency. Official Comm. of Unsecured 
Creditors v. Baldwin (In re Lemington Home for the Aged), 777 F.3d 620, 630 (3d Cir. 
2015); see also NCP Litig. Tr. v. KPMG, 945 A.2d 132, 141-42 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
2007) (suggesting that rejection of the theory is at least the subject of some debate outside 
of Delaware). 
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it was accorded in SI Restructuring.32B 
In addition to the foregoing, it is also true that when the holder of 
what is, in substance, an equity interest, casts that interest in the form 
of a loan, other creditors are financially injured simply by the dilutive 
impact that the elevation of that equity interest to the status of debt 
will have in all but the rare full-pay cases. Thus, when the factors that 
must align to support an order of debt recharacterization are present-
at least under the multifactor approach-the harm to the debtor or 
other creditors is almost invariably going to be present. 329 For this 
reason, the holding in SI Restructuring does not, in fact, render§ 510(c) 
an inhospitable home for recharacterization. 330 
Another hurdle, however, in the way of reuniting equitable 
subordination and debt recharacterization, is created by the fact that 
the harm caused by miscasting an equity interest as debt exists 
whether the putative lender whose interest is being challenged acted 
with calculated deliberation, wonton recklessness, or blitheful 
ignorance. Furthermore, the injury to other creditors caused by the 
mischaracterization is the same without regard to whether the claimant 
is an insider or noninsider.33l Because the recharacterization decision 
does not, therefore, depend on either intent or status, if equitable 
subordination is to be employed (or, really, reemployed)332 in this 
context, the recharacterization of a claim as an equity investment 
cannot be shoehorned into the Mobile Steel test by treating it as an 
328. Deepening insolvency has also gained some currency as a theory of damages, 
assuming liability on a separate cause of action. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured 
Creditors of Hydrogen, L.L.C. v. Blomen (In re Hydrogen, L.L.C.), 431 B.R. 337, 357 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that, in New York, deepening insolvency is regarded as a 
theory of damages, rather than an independent cause of action, that may only result from 
the breach of a separate duty or the commission of a separate tort); cf Hunter v. Citibank, 
N.A., No. C09-02079 JW, 2011 WL 7462143, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2011) (refusing to 
dismiss an aiding and abetting claim as an improper circumvention of the "discredited" 
deepening insolvency theory). See generally John Tully, Note, Plumbing the Depths of 
Corporate Litigation: Reforming the Deepening Insolvency Theory, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 
2087 (critiquing the various ways that the doctrine has been employed by courts). 
329. Moreover, as noted, Mobile Steel seems to contemplate that an unfair advantage 
conferred on the claimant may substitute for injury to creditors. See supra notes 169, 203 
and accompanying text. 
330. In addition, as discussed above, see supra notes 179, 203, 322, the second prong of 
the Mobile Steel test may be satisfied by a showing of "unfair conduct," as well as injury to 
other creditors. Obtaining the benefits of an equity investment without assuming the 
corresponding risks associated with the same would seem to squarely meet this 
requirement. 
331. Insider status does, however, factor into the analysis of whether the claim is more 
properly treated as debt or equity. See infra text accompanying notes 353-361. 
332. See supra note 194. 
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additional form of inequitable conduct. 333 To do so would result in an 
under-inclusive rule-not dissimilar in effect to one of the potential 
consequences of using state law to test the true nature of the 
obligation. 334 Instead, faced with the prospect of losing § 105(a) as the 
basis for recharacterizing debt as equity, and thus having the 
determination turn on the whimsy and caprice of state law 
jurisprudence developed with nonbankruptcy considerations in mind, 335 
it is necessary to expand recognition of no-fault equitable subordination 
beyond tax, other penalty, and stock redemption claims to include 
actions seeking an adjudication of the true character of a capital 
investment in the debtor. To do so is not incompatible with either the 
language of § 510(c) or irreconcilable with the legislative history that 
underlies its enactment. 336 Instead, it is a natural evolution of the 
doctrine of equitable subordination, as contemplated by Congress, 337 to 
ensure fairness in the bankruptcy context. For this purpose, "fairness" 
is measured in terms of congruence with the distributional priorities 
and objectives established by and under the Code. 338 Assuring that 
those norms are not impugned requires policing and, from time-to-time, 
333. This rules out the approach taken by Professor Knippenberg in treating predatory 
lending as a fourth form of inequitable conduct because, while equitable considerations 
might call for subordination, specific inequitable conduct by the claimant may not be 
implicated. See Knippenberg, supra note 317, at 42-43. Similarly, an estoppel rationale is 
unavailing since it, too, must be based on some kind of false statement or misleading 
representation. See supra note 166. 
334. While there is an argument that disallowance does not have to be based on state 
law, certainly that is how some courts have interpreted it recently. See supra Part I.D.2. 
335. See supra text accompanying notes 250-251. 
336. Actually, the character of a claim was originally dealt with as part of the equitable 
subordination analysis; it bears reiterating, however, that historically once a 
determination was made that a debt was not in fact a debt but rather an ownership 
interest, subordination followed as a matter of course. See Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 
165, at 94 (stating that "where the advance of capital funds is deliberately cloaked as a 
formal debt, it is indeed a common bed-fellow with subordinating influences such as 
fraud, illegality or other variants of misconduct"); see also Aquino v. Black (In re 
AtlanticRancher, Inc.), 279 B.R. 411, 433 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) ("[W]hile once 
considered solely in conjunction with the doctrine of equitable subordination, bankruptcy 
courts now consider recharacterization a separate cause of action." (citing Herzog v. 
Leighton Holdings, Ltd., 212 B.R. 898, 931 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997))); supra note 177 and 
accompanying text; infra note 378 and accompanying text. It was arguably only after the 
Supreme Court muddied the waters about the application of § 510(c) to the 
recharacterization situation that creditors, and their lawyers, began to seek relief for 
mischaracterization as an independent cause of action. See supra notes 32, 313 and 
accompanying text. 
337. For a contrary view about the compatibility of equitable subordination as a basis 
for recharacterizing debt as equity, see Nozemack, supra note 73, at 733. 
338. See supra notes 217, 238. 
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overturning the artificial boost gained from elevating what is 
intrinsically an ownership interest to the level of a debt obligation. It is, 
in a word, inequitable to allow the holder of such an interest to take 
pari passu with the claims of true creditors who were neither seeking 
nor receiving the heightened benefits of, nor assuming the increased 
perils associated with, risk capital. 
Bringing the bankruptcy courts' authority to properly characterize 
claims under the umbrella of§ 510(c) would initially change nothing. It 
would simply preserve the power as a critical component of the 
bankruptcy courts' ability to ensure that the Code's statutory scheme of 
priority and distribution are not subverted by the form in which an 
investment is designated. Over time, however, there invariably would 
be ancillary benefits. First, much of the confusion created by the 
overlapping presence of undercapitalization as a consideration factoring 
into the analysis under both areas of law would be abated.339 In 
addition, while it is true that taking this step would not itself resolve 
which federal standard should apply in determining when to reclassify 
a putative debt as equity, 340 it surely should force the issue and 
accelerate the progress toward a uniform federal standard. Logically, 
the multifactor approach, followed in a majority of the circuits treating 
the issue under a federal framework, is most consistent with the 
Supreme Court's direction that subordination must be based on a case-
by-case analysis. 341 It is also consistent with the direction supplied by 
the authorities applying no-fault subordination in other contexts, 
namely, that the determination be made based on the totality of the 
circumstances.342 Finally, by determining that the bankruptcy courts' 
339. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. The confusion dates back to the 
Supreme Court's holding in Pepper. See Autobacs Strauss, Inc. v. Autobacs Seven Co. (In 
re Autobacs Strauss, Inc.), 473 B.R. 525, 577 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (pointing out that 
previously thin capitalization had been the standard for both equitable subordination and 
recharacterization before they were divided into separate inquiries). 
340. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
341. See supra notes 188-189 and accompanying text. It also assures that the 
requirement of harm to other creditors is met, as required by the Fifth Circuit's decision 
in Wooley v. Faulkner (In re SI Restructuring, Inc.), 532 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2008). See 
supra notes 196--203 and accompanying text. 
342. This is particularly important given development of hybrid securities partaking of 
characteristics of both debt and equity. See Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 30, at 1262 
(noting that modern financing transactions can fall along a spectrum between debt and 
equity, potentially including securities that are neither purely one nor the other); see also 
supra note 82. Moreover, it bears reemphasizing that use of the factors developed in tax 
court cases does not mean that those factors have to be weighted and/or applied in 
bankruptcy in the same fashion as a tax court case. Since the standard is essentially a 
"totality of the circumstances" approach, those factors can offer guidance but do not 
necessarily have to represent a closed or exclusive list of relevant considerations in any 
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ability to recharacterize a debt claim as equitable in nature, the need to 
rely on § 502(b), with all of the conceptual asymmetries and negative 
entailments associated with "disallowance," would be eliminated. In 
sum, the shift in the source of the bankruptcy courts' authority, when 
the facts warrant, to recharacterize debt as equity as proposed could 
provide beneficial clarity in multiple respects. 343 
Therefore, to ensure that the standard for making the assessment 
as to the true character of a claim is both uniform and focused on 
relevant considerations, I would propose that the three-part test in 
Mobile Steel be tweaked as follows, with the proposed new language 
italicized and omitted language struck-through: 
• The claimant must have engaged in some type of inequitable 
conduct, or the claim must either constitute a penalty or 
involve a transaction appropriately characterized as an 
equity interest;344 
• The misconduct must have resulted in injury to the 
creditors OF eonfeFFed an unfaiF advantage on the elaimant 
or, under the circumstances of the case, other creditors would 
be harmed if the claim were not subordinated;345 
given case. 
343. This would include resolving the standard of review in a manner that accords 
greater discretion to the determination made in the first instance by the bankruptcy 
court, since the application of a multifactor approach is largely a factual determination, 
whereas the applicability of a state law defense is, or has been construed to be, a question 
of law that the appellate courts review de novo. See supra notes 93, 105, 122 and 
accompanying text. 
344. Of course, more than one of the three triggers could be present in a particular 
case, but this addition to the first prong would overcome the objections of the Fifth and 
Ninth Circuits to look to § 105(a) to fmd the bankruptcy courts' authority to 
recharacterize claims improperly labelled as debt. Deliberately, this modification takes no 
affirmative position on whether the definition of inequitable conduct should be expanded 
beyond its traditional perimeter, see supra note 317, to include reckless or predatory 
lending along the lines suggested by Yellowstone Mountain. Credit Suisse v. Official 
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC), No. 08-61570-11, 
2009 WL 3094930, at *9 (Bankr. D. Mont. May 12, 2009), vacated, No. 08-61570-11-RBK, 
2009 WL 10624435 (Bankr. D. Mont. June 29, 2009); see supra notes 207-211 and 
accompanying text. Instead, I would propose to leave that question to subsequent judicial 
determination. 
345. Notably, the reference in the Mobile Steel test to conferring an unfair advantage 
on the claimant is eliminated in favor of a standard that requires proof of harm to other 
creditors. This would clarify the confusion over the point created by the Fifth Circuit's 
decision in SI Restructuring. See supra note 203. Of course, the language could also be 
retained without doing any violence to the proposal herein being made. 
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• Equitable subordination must not be inconsistent with the 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Aet Code. 
This would "codify," in a sense, the currently recognized exceptions 
to the requirement of creditor misconduct, 346 and also allay concerns 
that no-fault equitable subordination might gradually expand to 
eliminate or overwhelm the requirement of a showing of inequitable 
conduct.347 
C. Objections to Bringing Recharacterization Under the Auspices of 
Equitable Subordination 
1. Treatment oflnsiders 
It is generally accepted that, although equitable subordination 
applies to arms-length or noninsider claims,348 noninsiders are granted 
considerably more latitude in dealing with the debtor; put in the 
obverse, insider claims will trigger a higher level of scrutiny and 
require a lower level of misconduct than in cases where the claimant is 
not an insider.349 This is appropriate because, simply by virtue of their 
346. The "penalty" language would capture nonpecuniary tax claims and other 
penalties, while the language concerning "appropriately characterized as an equity 
interest" would capture the stock redemption exception, see supra notes 309-310, as well 
as mischaracterized investments. 
347. See, e.g., In re Lifschultz Fast Freight, 132 F.3d 339, 347-48 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(expressing wariness about any expansion of exceptions to the requirement of finding 
inequitable conduct as a predicate to subordinating a claim); NTP Marble, Inc. v. 
Papadopoulos (In re NTP Marble, Inc.), 491 B.R. 208, 214 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2013) (pointing 
out that the cases that have been receptive to "no fault" equitable subordination have 
been limited to just a few categories of situations: tax penalties, stock redemption claims, 
and punitive damages claims); see also infra Part IV.C.2. 
348. See LightSquared LP v. SP Special Opportunities LLC (In re LightSquared Inc.), 
511 B.R. 253, 348 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that it is now well-settled that the 
doctrine applies to general creditors or noninsiders). Moreover, courts have uniformly 
held that the Code's definition of "insider" must be flexibly applied on a case-by-case 
basis. See Pan Am Corp. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 175 B.R. 438, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
349. See supra notes 63, 172-175. Generally speaking, status of the creditor will not so 
much alter the standard of review as it will reduce the severity of the behavior that might 
constitute inequitable conduct. See 80 Nassau Assocs. v. Crossland Fed. Sav. Bank (In re 
80 Nassau Assocs.), 169 B.R. 832, 840 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994). Thus, noninsider status 
does not provide immunity from equitable subordination, but it may increase the 
plaintiffs burden of proof. See Bayer Corp. v. MascoTech, Inc. (In re AutoStyle Plastics, 
Inc.), 269 F.3d 726, 744 (6th Cir. 2001) (describing the distinction in insider versus 
noninsider cases as involving a higher standard of proof); In re Adia's Paradise, LLC, 485 
B.R. 806, 813 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013) (noting that when the defendant-creditor is an 
insider or a fiduciary, the plaintiff must present material evidence of unfair conduct, at 
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position with the company, insiders have a much greater opportunity to 
engage in the sorts of transactions and behavior that would warrant 
subordination based on inequitable conduct. 350 Insiders also stand in a 
fiduciary relationship with the firm, which, of course, is not true in the 
case of arms-length creditors. 351 It has been suggested that, because 
recharacterization does not require a showing of misconduct, the 
claimant's status as an insider or noninsider is inconsequential in the 
analysis. 352 If true, this makes inclusion of recharacterization into the 
doctrine of equitable subordination a rather more difficult and logically 
awkward task than would otherwise be the case. 
The suggestion that insider status is irrelevant under a 
recharacterization analysis may, however, be overstated, at least under 
the multifactor approaches adopted by the Sixth and Tenth Circuits. 353 
In both cases, an "identity of interest" between the so-called creditor 
and the shareholder,354 and "the ... ability tu obtaill financing from 
outside lending institutions" are among the factors to be considered and 
weighed in making the determination as to the nature of the claim. 355 
Moreover, "the extent to which the advances were subordinated to the 
claims of outside creditors" is one of the other eleven factors in Roth 
which point the burden shifts to the creditor to prove it acted fairly; whereas if the 
defendant-creditor is rwt an insider or fiduciary, the challenging party debtor has the 
higher burden to prove, with particularity, more egregious conduct such as fraud, 
spoliation, or overreaching). 
350. LightSquared, 511 B.R. at 348 (citing Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. 
Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. (In re Lois/USA, Inc.), 264 B.R. 69, 134 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2001)). 
351. See Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Lehman 
Bros. Holdings Inc.), 541 B.R. 551, 583 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015); supra notes 172-175. 
352. See Litovitz, supra note 176, at 326 (maintaining that, in reviewing a claim for 
recharacterization, a bankruptcy court should not necessarily take into account the 
claimant's status as an insider or a noninsider). 
353. See supra Part I.B-C. 
354. In application, the analysis in relation to this factor focuses on a comparison 
between a shareholder percentage equity interest and its debt claim. See Friedman's 
Liquidating Tr. v. Goldman Sachs Credit Partners, L.P. (In re Friedman's Inc.), 452 B.R. 
512, 522 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) ("If stockholders make advances in proportion to their 
respective stock ownership, an equity contribution is indicated. On the other hand, a 
sharply disproportionate ratio between a stockholder's percentage interest in stock and 
debt is indicative of bona fide debt. Where there is an exact correlation between the 
ownership interests of the equity holders and their proportionate share of the alleged loan 
this evidence standing alone is almost overwhelming." (quoting AutoStyle, 269 F.3d at 
751)). 
355. Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Comm'r, 800 F.2d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1986); accord Sender v. 
Bronze Grp., Ltd. (In re Hedged-lnvs. Assocs., Inc.), 380 F.3d 1292, 1298 (lOth Cir. 2004). 
The latter, of course, is also one of the two circumstances warranting subordination under 
the categorical test. See supra text accompanying note 53. 
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Steel,356 and the thirteen-point test adopted in Hedged-Investments 
includes "the status of the contribution in relation to regular corporate 
creditors."357 The status of the claimant as an insider or a noninsider 
matters in the evaluation and weighting of all of these factors, and 
possibly others. 358 
The point to be made is that insider status does bear on the analysis 
of whether recharacterization is justified more often than not, just as is 
true in connection with equitable subordination. 359 Insider status will 
trigger closer scrutiny in the recharacterization inquiry and weigh more 
heavily against the claimant than in the case of noninsider status, just 
as in an equitable subordination analysis. The difference is that the 
standard for actually recharacterizing a claim should be the same 
regardless of whether the claimant is an insider of the company, unlike 
those equitable subordination cases that require a lesser showing of 
misconduct, or a lower burden of proof, in the case of an insider.3so In 
this respect, the sharp distinction between insiders and noninsiders 
356. 800 F.2d at 630 (emphasis added); see also In re Cold Harbor Assocs., L.P., 204 
B.R. 904, 915 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997) (noting that the ultimate aim is to ascertain if the 
transaction "bears the earmarks of an arms length negotiation" (citing Pepper v. Litton, 
308 u.s. 295 (1939))). 
357. Hedged-Invs., 380 F.3d at 1298 (citing Stinnett's Pontiac Serv., Inc. v. Comm'r, 
730 F.2d 634, 638 (11th Cir. 1984)). Of course, this factor can also apply to an outside 
creditor, but it is most likely to apply to a "loan" made by a party who is already an 
insider and thus able to use that status to secure disproportionately favorable terms 
compared with arms-length creditors. 
358. Although, as noted above, see supra note 240, these factors may originally have 
been derived in tax cases, they need not be applied with the same degree of emphasis as 
in the tax cases. See, e.g., AutoStyle, 269 F.3d at 750 ("The factors must be considered 
within the particular circumstances of each case." (citing Roth Steel, 800 F.2d at 630)). 
359. See, e.g., In re Petersburg Regency LLC, 540 B.R. 508, 545 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015) 
(making the point that insiders occupy a different status than other creditors in 
connection with both an equitable subordination and a recharacterization analysis). 
360. See Va. Broadband, LLC v. Manuel, 538 B.R. 253, 264 (W.D. Va. 2015) (stating 
that the standard for subordination is lower when the creditor is an insider). Other courts 
focus on burden of proof. See SEC v. Spongetech Delivery Sys., Inc., 98 F. Supp. 3d 530, 
553-54 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (stating that, "[i)n the case of non-insider claims, the proponent 
[of subordination] always bears the burden of proofL but that,] ... when a party seeks to 
subordinate an insider's claim, the party must only show 'a substantial basis to support 
the charge of unfairness, [whereupon) the burden shifts to the insider to show the fairness 
of the claim"' (quoting 80 Nassau Assocs. v. Crossland Fed. Sav. Bank (In re 80 Nassau 
Assocs.), 169 B.R. 832, 839 n.5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994))); Capmark Fin. Grp. Inc. v. 
Goldman Sachs Credit Partners L.P., 491 B.R. 335, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that, in 
the case of insiders, once the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of inequitable conduct, 
the burden shifts to the claimant to prove good faith and the inherent fairness of the 
transaction); 80 Nassau Assocs., 169 B.R. at 839 n.5 (noting that the distinction between 
insider and noninsider creditors is important for purposes of allocating the burden of 
proof); see also supra note 275. 
2016] WHITHER RECHARACTERIZATION 1289 
that exists in conventional equitable subordination analysis is not 
appropriate when the question is subordination of a putative debt based 
on its true character, unrelated to any sort of inequitable conduct. 
Nonetheless, the point remains that the two doctrines are not, in fact, 
as completely distinct from one another on this basis as might have 
been thought and as has sometimes been suggested. 361 
2. The Slippery Slope 
Another concern that might be voiced to bringing recharacterization 
under the fold of§ 510(c) is the same bromide that has been leveled at 
§ 105(a);362 namely, that it should not be construed so as to provide 
bankruptcy judges with free-wheeling authority to alter the legal 
priority of claims based principally on their general sense of right and 
wrong or some abstract notion of fairness or justice. 363 The fear, 
however, of unleashing a can of worms (to mix my metaphors) is 
spurious. First, as suggested above, 364 the expanded standard for 
applying equitable subordination can be crafted in a fashion that cabins 
it only to situations where the true substance of an investment is at 
issue. 365 This is a power that every circuit agrees the bankruptcy courts 
already possess, even if they disagree over the source from which that 
authority derives. 
In what might be described as a perhaps ironic way of putting it, 
the proposed extension of § 510(c) can be made "categorical" in the 
sense that it would apply only to currently-recognized categories of 
exceptions to the inequitable conduct requirement and to challenges 
based on the intrinsic character of a monetary advance or other form of 
361. See infra Part IV.C.3. 
362. See supra notes 15, 18. 
363. This is particularly true in the political climate that has prevailed since the 
BAPCPA. See supra note 270; see also Jean Braucher, The Challenge to the Bench and 
Bar Presented by the 2005 Bankruptcy Act: Resistance Need Not Be Futile, 2007 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 93, 94 (observing that the subtext of the BAPCPA "was the view that bankruptcy 
judges and consumer debtors' lawyers needed to be reined in to keep them from 
facilitating abuse by consumer debtors"); Kara J. Bruce, Rehabilitating Bankruptcy 
Reform, 13 NEV. L.J. 174 (2012) (discussing the BAPCPA's emphasis on a rules-based 
framework to limit what was perceived as undesirable judicial interference in Chapter 
11). 
364. See supra text accompanying note 354. 
365. The other categories of no-fault subordination contemplated by the proposed 
formulation are already recognized in some jurisdictions as exceptions to the requirement 
of inequitable conduct and, so long as the determination is made on a case-by-case 
analysis, are not barred by the Supreme Court's holdings in Noland and Reorganized CF 
& I. See supra Part IV.A. 
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investment in the debtor. It would also not contravene the rulings in 
Noland and Reorganized CF & I, since the modified standard 
contemplates that the determination would be the product of a fact-
intensive analysis and performed on a case-by-case basis. Third, while 
also an issue relating to bankruptcy jurisdiction more generally, it 
makes good policy sense that the bankruptcy courts be permitted a 
certain measure of latitude to alter the treatment in bankruptcy of 
transactions that, if left undisturbed, would compromise Code values, 
whether speaking in connection with§ 105(a) or§ 510(c). To permit the 
exercise of such discretion in a measured way falls well short of the 
Fifth Circuit's admonition that the bankruptcy courts not become 
"roving commission[s]" of righteousness. 366 
In sum, the bankruptcy courts' power to subordinate a claim for an 
equitable reason based on proof other than of the claimant's inequitable 
conduct is consonant with the general doctrine of equitable 
subordination and can be ordered within the framework of that doctrine 
as established by the Supreme Court back at the inception of the 
remedy.367 Furthermore, as pointed out by the court in Dornier 
Aviation, using the claims allowance process as the sole opportunity for 
the courts to deal with mischaracterized interests is inadequate since it 
entails only a "minimal threshold" determination focused on different 
considerations than those that animate recharacterization. 368 Even the 
Fifth Circuit in Lothian Oil agreed that resolution of a 
recharacterization challenge requires a step beyond the claims 
allowance process, 369 although its actual holding is incongruent with 
that acknowledgement. Finally, as evinced by Lothian Oil and Fitness 
Holdings, resolving the question of whether a putative claim should be 
regarded as equity as part of the claims allowance process leads, not 
inescapably, but more likely than not, to the conclusion that the 
determination must be made based upon application of state law 
366. Wells Fargo Bank of Tex. N.A. v. Sommers (In re AMCO Ins.), 444 F.3d 690, 695 
(5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Mirant Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co. (In re Mirant Corp.), 378 
F.3d 511, 523 (5th Cir. 2004)). Even the Supreme Court in Law recognized "that in some 
circumstances a bankruptcy court may be authorized to dispense with futile procedural 
niceties in order to reach more expeditiously an end result required by the Code." Law v. 
Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1197 (2014). 
367. See supra notes 165, 177. 
368. Fairchild Dornier GMBH v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Dornier 
Aviation (N. Am.), Inc.), 453 F. 3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 2006). 
369. Grossman v. Lothian Oil Inc. (In re Lothian Oil Inc.), 650 F.3d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 
2011) ("[W]here the reason for such disallowance is that state law classifies the interest as 
equity rather than debt, then implementing state law as envisioned in Butner requires 
different treatment than simply disallowing the claim."). 
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precedent.370 This not only triggers all the undesirable consequences of 
doing so, as outlined above, but it also means that there is no separate 
inquiry beyond the threshold question of allowability, even when such 
an inquiry is necessary to faithfully fulfill the priority scheme 
contemplated by the Code.371 For these reasons, anchoring the authority 
to recharacterize a putative debt in § 510(c) would in no way be a first 
step down a slippery slope. Rather, by grounding the inquiry in the 
more apt metaphorical category, it would actually be a step in the right 
direction. 
3. Conceptual Differences and Different Purposes 
A further roadblock to bringing recharacterization under the aegis 
of § 510(c) that one might expect to be advanced is based on the 
frequently-pronounced reasoning that recharacterization does not entail 
subordination of a debt, but rather proper characterization of an 
interest as not a debt.372 Thus, the argument would be that equitable 
subordination and recharacterization address distinct concerns, serve 
different purposes, and are inherently at odds with one another.373 It 
would be contended, under this view, that equitable subordination 
applies when circumstances dictate that the payment priority of an 
otherwise legitimate debt be altered to take only after those of other 
claimants, while the object of the analysis in connection with 
recharacterization is to determine if a debt actually exists in the first 
place so that, if not, there is nothing to subordinate. 374 
370. Although it led precisely to that conclusion in those two cases, it may not 
necessarily have to follow in the ipso facto manner implied. See supra Part I.D; see also 
supra text accompanying note 217 (arguing that Butner has been given too broad of an 
interpretation). 
371. See supra Part liLA 
372. See Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 
448, 454 (3d Cir. 2006) (suggesting that the terms recharacterization and equitable 
subordination address different concerns and require different inquiries by the court); 
Nozemack, supra note 73, at 717-18 (same). On the other hand, the court in SubMicron 
admitted that the two remedies lead to the same result. 432 F.3d at 454. For further 
discussion of the point, see supra notes 235-238 and accompanying text and infra note 
377. 
373. See, e.g., Blasbalg v. Tarro (In re Hyperion Enters., Inc.), 158 B.R. 555, 560-61 
(D.R.I. 1993) (pointing out that the language of§ 510(c) speaks to subordination and not 
to the recasting of a claim as an interest). Of course, what is that recasting if not, in 
almost all practical respects, the subordination of a claim? See supra note 238 and 
accompanying text; see also infra note 376. 
374. See Diasonics, Inc. v. Ingalls, 121 B.R. 626, 630-32 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990) 
(discussing the distinction between disallowance and subordination); see also Gernsbacher 
v. Campbell (In re Equip. Equity Holdings, Inc.), 491 B.R. 792, 841 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 
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However, while the two remedies may superficially appear to 
involve conceptually different exercises, in fact to persist in advancing 
that distinction would itself be an elevation of form over substance. To 
begin with, when both doctrines are properly understood, it is clear that 
they both derive from the equitable jurisdiction of the bankruptcy 
courts.375 But, even more telling is the fact that the economic 
consequences of subordination and recharacterization are identical. 376 
Thus, while their journeys may entail taking somewhat different paths, 
they arrive at the same destination. Moreover, the paths are not in fact 
all that different when we recall that many of the factors involved in a 
recharacterization analysis are also relevant in the determination of 
when equitable circumstances require that a claim be subordinated. 377 
This is why, until more recently, the question of recharacterization was 
addressed by the courts in the context of equitable subordination rather 
than as an independent cause of action. 378 The concept of 
recharacterization is much more akin to subordination than it is to 
disallowance, as recharacterization does not result in elimination of the 
claimant's interest in the debtor or its right to participate in the case-
only priority is affected.379 Therefore, the instant proposal does nothing 
more than return the recharacterization analysis to the environs from 
where it originated in order to ensure that the issue continues to be 
resolved under federal standards and with a focus on the unique 
2013) (noting that "while both doctrines entail the altering of priority of payment for a 
creditor's claim in the Bankruptcy Code's distribution scheme, the doctrines themselves 
are distinct"). 
375. SubMicron, 432 F.3d at 455 n.6. 
376. See Dorula v. Holmes (In re Starlight Grp., LLC), 531 B.R. 611 n.l (Bankr. E.D. 
Va. 2015) (noting that it is not necessary to reach recharacterization once equitable 
subordination is ordered since the relief would be identical); Bunch v. J.M. Capital Fin., 
Ltd. (In re Hoffinger Indus., Inc.), 327 B.R. 389, 407 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2005) (stating that 
"recharacterization has the effect of subordinating the loan because capital contributions 
would be repaid only after all other corporate obligations have been met" and, thus, 
financial consequences are the same as equitable subordination); see also Templeton v. 
O'Cheskey (In reAm. Hou&. Found.), 785 F.3d 143, 152 n.12 (5th Cir. 2015) (taking a 
similar approach to Starlight on the lack of any need to examine recharacterization once 
it was determined that subordination was mandated under§ 510(b)). 
377. The overlap was apparent as far back as Pepper, which noted that bankruptcy 
court proceedings are inherently equitable in nature and that the bankruptcy courts 
possess the power to "rejectO in whole or in part 'according to the equities of the case' ... 
claims previously allowed." Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939). 
378. See Aquino v. Black (In re AtlanticRancher, Inc.), 279 B.R. 411, 433 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 2002); see also supra notes 177, 336. 
379. See supra text accompanying note 236 (providing an explanation for why it makes 
more sense to deal with debt recharacterization issues as part of the § 510(c) analysis, 
rather than to attempt to invigorate a greater receptivity to equitable disallowance); see 
also supra Part I.D.2; supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
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objectives of a federal bankruptcy case.380 
CONCLUSION 
Equality of distribution is a fundamental tenet of the bankruptcy 
creed.381 To preserve and protect this pivotal norm, bankruptcy courts 
must maintain the ability to reclassify a disguised equity contribution 
such that bankruptcy outcomes are based on the true economic realities 
of the claims and interests that comprise the case. 382 Determining what 
circumstances that authority is exercised under should not hinge on 
state law, the apparent (although not inevitable) byproduct of the view 
that insists the power to recharacterize does not exist independent from 
the courts' authority to allow or disallow claims under § 502. 383 
Approaching the question as governed by state law belies the reasons 
why the bankruptcy courts need to be able to exercise the authority in 
the first instance: to subordinate a previously allowed claim, regardless 
of how it might be classified under state law, to ensure a principled and 
consistent application of the Code. Hence, identification of the proper 
standards governing recharacterization is no less important than the 
threshold recognition of the courts' power to engage in the exercise in 
the first place. 
State law does not, except in rare cases involving assignments for 
the benefit of creditors, 384 embrace an equality ethos; in fact, quite the 
380. As the Court put it in Pepper, in describing the purpose of the doctrine of equitable 
subordination: to ensure "that technical considerations will not prevent substantial justice 
from being done." 308 U.S. at 305. This proposal also assures that the test for deciding 
whether to recharacterize debt as equity is applied separately from, rather than as part 
of, the claims allowance process. 
381. Historically, ratable distribution to creditors has been one of the traditional goals 
of federal bankruptcy law. Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 
651, 655 (2006). To achieve this goal, the Code creates a comprehensive and intricate 
scheme designed to equitably distribute the debtor's nonexempt assets. Sherwood 
Partners, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 394 F.3d 1198, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 2005). Hence, the old adage 
that, in bankruptcy, "equality is equity." See Columbus Elec. Co. v. Warden (In re Fort 
Wayne Elec. Corp.), 99 F. 400, 402 (7th Cir. 1900). 
382. See, e.g., Redmond v. Jenkins (In re Alt. Fuels, Inc.), 789 F.3d 1139, 1146 (lOth 
Cir. 2015) (making the critical point that the bankruptcy courts' ability to recharacterize 
putative debt as equity when appropriate is essential to implementing the priority scheme 
of the Code); see also supra notes 254-256 and accompanying text. 
383. See supra Part I.D.l. 
384. Some, but not all, state assignments for the benefit of creditor statutes even 
contemplate recovery of preferential transfers. See Vivian Luo, Comment, A Preference for 
States? The Woes of Preempting State Preference Statutes, 24 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 513, 
525 (2008) (noting that fifteen states, in addition to California, permit the assignee under 
an assignment for the benefit of creditors to avoid preferences). There is some question, 
1294 RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[V ol. 68:1215 
opposite, as under state collection norms the race goes to the swiftest 
and the devil takes the hindmost. 385 Allowing jurisprudence developed 
under a system that advances a different policy agenda than the 
objectives pertaining in a bankruptcy case-and which achieves those 
objectives in a different manner-to decide the true nature of an 
investment for bankruptcy priority and distribution purposes makes no 
sense. It assures not only that the results will be inconsistent, but also 
that its application will produce the "right" result haphazardly, at best, 
and the "wrong" result more often than not. 
Therefore, the current majority view on recharacterization is more 
appropriate: it has the capacity to promote more consistent, predictable 
results386 and, more importantly, results congruent with the larger 
purposes and policies of the federal debt collection law. 387 However, 
anticipation of further incursions on the general equitable authority of 
the bankruptcy courts under § 105(a) puts that view at risk. Thus, 
recognizing the authority of the courts to recharacterize contributions to 
the debtor from debt to equity under the courts' statutory power of 
equitable subordination would safeguard the bankruptcy courts' 
continued ability to assure that substance does not give way to form. It 
would likely also have the subsidiary benefits of: (I) clarifying that the 
power to recharacterize is equitable in nature, thereby resolving the 
current circuit split; (2) resolving the disagreement in the case law as to 
the standards that should guide the analysis (as well as the standard of 
review of the bankruptcy courts' determination);388 (3) eliminating the 
current confusion between the two doctrines;389 and, (4) because 
recharacterization claims are almost invariably brought in tandem with 
an alternative cause of action under § 510(c), streamlining litigation in 
the bankruptcy courts, thereby promoting the expeditious resolution of 
bankruptcy cases. All in all, not a bad deal. 
however, as to whether such provisions are preempted by the Code. See Sherwood 
Partners, 394 F.3d at 1203. 
385. See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb, Fishing in Muddy Waters: Clarifying the Common 
Pool Analogy as Applied to the Standard for Commencement of a Bankruptcy Case, 42 AM. 
U. L. REV. 337, 356 (1993) (describing the individual creditor remedy approach of state law 
as "grab law," in contrast with bankruptcy's collective remedy approach). 
386. See supra text accompanying notes 244-256. 
387. See Sherwood Partners, 394 F.3d at 1203 (describing this as the "unique 
contribution of the Bankruptcy Code [and one] that makes bankruptcy different from a 
collection of actions by individual creditors"); see also supra text accompanying notes 253, 
385. 
388. See supra notes 123, 343. 
389. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
